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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Henri Philippe Petain was born on April 24, 1856, at 
Cauchy-A-La-Tour in the Pas-de-Calais. A farmer's son, he 
was educated at a Catholic high school, at the military 
academy of St. Cyr, and at the Ecole Super ieure de Guerre, 
where he later taught. Petain's unorthodox views, which 
stressed the effectiveness of artillery fire power and 
objected to the one-sided, offense-oriented doctrine of the 
time, caught the attention of the young instructor's 
superiors. However, his independent and bluntly forthright 
personality hampered his military career, and he was 
promoted to General only in 1914 when he was fifty-eight 
years old. His wartime achievements earned him the title 
"Victor of Verdun" and praise for his firm but humane 
suppression of the mutinies within the French Army in 1917; 
he succeeded in restoring French morale and the army's 
fighting capacity which it demonstrated during the spring 
offensives in 1918. In recognition of his leadership he was 
honored with the title "Marshal of France" after the 
Armistice of 1918. In 1920, he was appointed Vice-President 
of the High Council of War and Commander-in-Chief in case of 
war. Subsequent positions included: the office of General 
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Inspector of the Army in 1922, the assignment to command the 
French troops in Morocco against the uprising of Abd-el-Krim 
in the Rif in 1925, and, in 1931, the appointment as General 
Inspector of Air Defense. 
P~tain was seventy-eight years old when he entered the 
field of politics for the first time, serving for eight 
months in 1934 as Minister of War in Doumergue's cabinet. 
From then on, until the outbreak of World War II, Petain 
gave many lectures and wrote articles on French defense. 
They turned around one theme: Hitler's threat to France. 
As Minister of Defense, Petain declared that a larger 
defense budget was imperative because of the German 
rearmament. In 1935, he wrote in the Revue ..de..s. ~ Mondes 
that recent discoveries in the sciences and new technology 
in transportation had inspired a totally new concept of 
warfare: Blitzkrieg. Quoting a German military journal, he 
pointed out that the Germans considered it the preferred 
tactic of attack for the future. He then analyzed the state 
of French military capability and recommended changes to 
adapt it to the new challenge. 
P~tain did not stop at military considerations. Known 
as a realist who had always taught that patriotism was no 
substitute for fire power, he was nonetheless acutely aware 
of the importance of morale and the power of strong 
motivation. In his opinion, France was still war-weary 
and with good reason after her heavy losses in World War I. 
The country was deeply shaken in its self-confidence: in 
3 
spite of the fact that France was better off materially than 
either Germany or Italy, she lacked their faith in the 
future and was content to accept the status quo. Such a 
mentality was no match for aggressive totalitarian 
adversaries, and this was no time for indulging in dreams of 
peace. Petain therefore proposed a program to motivate the 
French people. 
The school system was his first target. Since the end 
of World War I, the teachers had turned to pacifism and even 
anarchism, he charged, and there were those who did not 
hesitate to display open hostility toward the state. It was 
necessary to reorient the schools, since, as he put it, long 
before its armies meet on the battlefield, a nation's 
destiny has been decided in classrooms and lecture halls. 
Nationalism and civic duty were not only to be taught in 
schools. The war of the future would be total war, and 
every citizen would need the motivation which formerly had 
only been expected from soldiers. He went so far as to 
recommend intensive indoctrination by the media to reach 
citizens beyond the school age. 
Petain did not underestimate the seductive power of the 
totalitarian doctrines which appealed to all those who were 
suffering under the abuses of capitalism and longed for 
social justice. Fascism and Nazism, with their emphasis on 
Blut .l.l.D.d Boden, on the individual's ties to native soil, to 
community, and country, also attracted those who felt lost 
in an urban, industrialized environment. French education 
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had neglected the social nature of man in favor of 
developing the potential of the individual. Again P~tain 
called for a change. Only a nation of citizens who felt 
secure in being members of their community, profession, and 
nation and were united in patriotism could stand up to the 
challenge of totalitarian aggression. 
P~tain had recognized the strengths of the totalitarian 
systems and wanted to use similar methods to increase 
France's chances of survival in a confrontation which he 
considered inevitable. His views found an echo among many 
Frenchmen who watched Germany's power and national unity and 
resolve grow while France became more factionalized and torn 
by class hatred. The Third Republic proved incapable of 
providing strong leadership, and by 1935 P~tain's name 
became for some the symbol not only of past victory but also 
of a new France. Gustave Herv~, publisher of the newspaper 
L£ Victo.Lt.e, wrote a series of articles which were later 
collected in a booklet entitled~ .ne.e..d P~tain CC'est Petain 
gu'il nous f.a.1.lt.). The title caught on; other journals also 
called for him to save the nation. Regardless of political 
affiliation, many Frenchmen came to see in him the man who 
could unify France and galvanize her energies to stand up to 
German aggression. However, P~tain declined when he was 
asked to be a candidate for the Presidency in 1939. 
The same year he accepted the ambassadorship to Spain, 
only to be recalled by Prime Minister Paul Reynaud on May 
18, 1940, during the Battle of France. When Paul Reynaud 
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resigned on June 16, 1940, over the armistice issue, P~tain 
became his successor, and as President of the Council he 
requested the German government's armistice and peace 
conditions. The armistice was signed at R~thondes on June 
22, 1940, and became effective three days later. 
Subsequently the French Government moved to Vichy. On July 
10, still dazed by the trauma of the defeat, coaxed by 
Pierre Laval but also recognizing the need for leadership, 
the National Assembly voted full powers to Petain and 
authorized him to promulgate a new constitution which was to 
be submitted to the nation. On July 11, Petain arrogated 
almost all legislative and executive powers to himself as 
Head of State and adjourned the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies. The following day, he designated Pierre Laval as 
.. 
successor in case he should be unable to fulfill his 
functions as Head of State before the new constitution came 
in effect. 
Petain was convinced that France had lost the war 
because of her failure to prepare herself for the inevitable 
conflict with Germany. In his opinion, the reconstruction 
of the nation was now more urgent than ever. The country 
was divided, the Germans occupied two-thirds of the 
territory, and France was burdened with exorbitant payments 
for the upkeep of the German occupation army. For the 
duration of the war, living conditions would therefore 
remain harsh, and the population would be vulnerable to 
Communist propaganda and anarchy. To galvanize the nation's 
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energies into a powerful current of patriotism and common 
resolve, Petain called for a National Revolution. During 
the following months his government streamlined the 
administration, reformed the educational system, and 
improved its relations with the Catholic Church. Steps were 
taken toward a corporate, state-directed economy. Through 
social legislation the government sought to improve living 
conditions for the French working classes and to encourage 
large families to stop the demographic decline of France. 
Some of the government's measures were discriminatory: 
secret societies were prohibited; the children of immigrant 
fathers could no longer work for the civil service; and a 
special statute excluded Jews from work in the media, 
education, and high governmental positions. These decrees 
were officially justified as necessary for the security of 
the state and for the elimination of influences that were 
harmful to French unity and resolve. In the fall of 1940, 
high officials of the Third Republic were arrested and 
brought to trial in the spring of 1942 for neglect of duty 
which had contributed to the French defeat. 
While Petain tried to beat the Fascists at their own 
game, he never went so far as to adopt a single-party 
system; in fact, he excluded political parties from 
government, and in August, 1941, he prohibited them from 
meeting even in private. Though the influential Legion of 
Veterans played an important role as a link between the 
government and the population, Petain insisted that its 
7 
departmental associations remain subordinate to the 
prefects. 
In spite of his powerful position, P~tain was unable to 
form a stable cabinet, and Vichy had a dizzying turnover of 
ministers. Most spectacular was P~tain's dismissal of Laval 
on December 13, 1940. Petain had lost confidence in him 
because he was secretive and dealt too much with the 
Germans. He subsequently defied German pressure to take 
Laval back, and a few months later he appointed Admiral Jean 
Darlan in his stead. 
In foreign relations, the government was handicapped by 
the armistice agreements which were never replaced by a 
peace treaty. Relations with Great Britain were irreparably 
damaged when the British Navy attacked a part of the French 
fleet at Oran on July 3, 1940, causing the deaths of 1297 
sailors and marines. During the following spring, French 
and British forces clashed in Syria, ending in a defeat for 
France. France also had to accept Japanese intrusion into 
Indochina, since the French forces stationed there were 
hopelessly outnumbered. The Petain government defended 
Algeria and the French colonies with obstinacy against any 
intruder, as the Allies found out during the invasion of 
North Africa on November 8, 1942. Only Admiral Darlan's 
presence and his constant references to Marshal Petain's 
support for his actions persuaded the French Army to agree 
to a cease-fire and made possible the collaboration of the 
French in North Africa with the Allies. The Allied invasion 
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was the immediate cause for the German and Italian 
occupation of the Free Zone. Rather than delivering the 
French fleet in the harbor of Toulon to the Germans, Admiral 
de Laborde ordered the flee 1t to scuttle itself on November 
27, 1942. 
Relations with Germany were always strained for a 
number of reasons. First, the daily payments of 400 million 
francs for the upkeep of the occupying troops were blatantly 
excessive. Secondly, the Germans refused to release 1.5 
million French prisoners of war from German prison camps, 
where they suffered not only under the long internment but 
were in constant danger from Allied bombings. Thirdly, the 
demarcation line separating the occupied territory from the 
Free Zone alienated the French government in Vichy from the 
larger part of the French population, disrupted the economy, 
and made it very difficult to provide the Free Zone with 
sufficient foodstuffs. 
The meeting between Hitler, Petain, and Laval at 
Montoire on October 24, 1940, which raised the French 
government's hopes for easier peace conditions in return for 
collaboration with the Germans, produced no results. After 
the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, 
the government had to stop guerrilla attacks against the 
German occupying forces by French Communists. Sabotage and 
terrorism complicated Franco-German relations, as the 
armistice agreement provided for the cessation of all 
hostile acts against Germany. Petain could no longer 
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concentrate on the reconstruction of France through the 
National Revolution but had to counteract growing opposition 
and dissidence from many quarters. Gaullists, Communists, 
and Popular Front liberals condemned the government for its 
authoritarianism and its collaboration with Germany. Ultra-
collaborationists like Jacques Doriot and Marcel Deat in 
Paris, on the other hand, accused Petain of playing a double 
game favoring the Allies. The economic misery and the 
hardships caused by the division of the country also worked 
against him. 
By the summer of 1941, Petain's hopes that the National 
Revolution would prove beneficial were dashed. Most of the 
planned reforms had not yet been applied. For their 
success, national consensus and resolve were imperative. 
Clearly these were lacking, and Petain tried in vain to 
impose the reforms against his own better insight. By April 
1942, he rarely mentioned the National Revolution. 
Petain's hopes for a compromise peace between Allied 
and Axis powers also remained unfulfilled. Germany's 
shortage of manpower led Hitler to requisition workers in 
the occupied countries. At first, French workers were 
induced to work in Germany by generous working conditions 
and special benefits. Later the Germans ordered the French 
government to impress workers for them. Opposition to the 
deportations became so strong that Premier Laval refused to 
collaborate after 500,000 French workers had left France. 
When the Germans began to use French production facilities 
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and workers in France for German manufacturing, Allied 
bombers began to fly raids on French plants and airports to 
disrupt production and transfer of war materials to Germany. 
By 1943, many young Frenchmen had joined the Haquis (the 
Resistance). To stern the growing number of guerrilla 
attacks, the French government established a special police 
force, the Milice. Its persecution of Frenchmen and its 
collaboration with the German Gestapo compromised the French 
government irreparably in the eyes of the people. 
In December, 1943, the Germans pressured Petain into 
accepting the ultra-collaborationists Darnand and Deat into 
his cabinet. By the time of the Allied Invasion of France 
on June 6, 1944, the French government had lost the support 
of the population and was no longer functioning. On August 
20, 1944, the Germans arrested Petain and deported him and 
th~ members of his cabinet to the Hohenzollern castle at 
Sigmaringen in Germany, where he refused any political 
activity or function. In April, 1945, German officers 
allowed Petain to return to France to stand trial before the 
High Court of Justice which had been created by the 
Provisional Government of de Gaulle. 
Petain's voluntary return to defend his honor as French 
Chef and to protect by his presence those who had followed 
him was a unique and memorable act which h~s not yet been 
recognized by historians in its full significance. Only in 
comparison with other defeated leaders do his courage and 
stature as a statesman become evident. For example, within 
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two weeks after the meeting of Russian and American troops 
on the banks of the Elbe on April 25, 1945, Adolf Hitler and 
Josef Goebbels had committed suicide. Mussolini fled in the 
direction of Switzerland to find asylum but was caught and 
assassinated by Italian partisans. Pierre Laval took flight 
to Spain only to be extradicted to the Allies after three 
months. In comparison to those who thus evaded 
responsibility and their people's wrath, Petain was truly an 
exception. His action was consistent with his sense of 
responsibility as a~ and with his independence of mind 
which had characterized his life and career. 
On his way to France, the eighty-nine year old Marshal 
spurned an offer of asylum in Switzerland and rode on to 
Paris. The trial began on July 23, 1945, and judgment was 
pronounced on August 15, 1945. Petain was condemned to 
death for collaborating with the enemy. However, following 
the High Court's recommendation, de Gaulle commuted the 
sentence to life imprisonment. After six years of solitary 
confinement at the Ile-d'Yeu, Petain died on July 23, 1951, 
at the age of ninety-five. He was buried on the Ile-d'Yeu. 
Marshal Petain's life and career as a military leader 
and statesman have aroused an extraordinary amount of 
attention, controversy, and scholarly study in the United 
States. Foreign correspondents reported from France during 
the war; editors pondered the consequences of his actions 
for the Allied cause; political scientists examined the 
legitimacy of his authoritarian regime and analyzed its 
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structure; and historians tried to fit Vichy and its 
ideology into the pattern of French political, social, and 
economic history. 
For a historian, the study of P~tain's career is 
fascinating since it contained elements of high drama, and 
since he was conf rented with fundamental problems of 
leadership: the dilemma of forming a government - in exile 
or of accepting limited sovereignty in a partially occupied 
country; the handling of dissent and terrorism; and the 
strengthening of the nation's morale and its determination 
to preserve its culture and values from the conqueror's 
encroachment. 
This dissertation focuses on those of Marshal P~tain's 
policies which were designed to reconstruct France. They 
were a combination of reforms which he had advocated as 
early as 1934, and of measures which were directly related 
to the defeat. His decision to conclude an armistice with 
the German government in order to end the bloodshed and to 
preserve French sovereignty over a part of the national 
territory mirrored P~tain's conviction that France was 
militarily defeated and unable to carry on the battle from 
its overseas Empire. The armistice agreement assured the 
survival of the French state and forced the German 
government to negotiate with its French counterpart instead 
of treating France as conquered territory bereft of a 
functioning government. P~tain's establishment of an 
authoritarian government and his arrest of former leaders 
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proved that he considered the Third Republic a failure. The 
reform programs of his National Revolution were designed to 
neutralize the lures of Communism and National Socialism by 
promises of social justice and of a modernized economy. 
This dissertation examines how the foreign 
correspondents for American newspapers in France, their 
editors in the United States, and contemporary American 
scholars reacted to these measures. Their views are then 
compared to the findings of the American historians and an 
evaluation is made. 
American sources on Vichy France are abundant for both 
the war period and the years after 1945. Foreign 
correspondents, radio news analysts, editors, and political 
scientists wrote widely on French affairs during the Second 
World War. Since P~tain's trial, a great number of 
dissertations, monographs, and articles on various aspects 
of his regime have been published. 
The fate of France was of great interest to Americans 
because France remained one of the last bastions of 
democracy during the 1930s. One after the other, the 
eastern European nations, with the exception of 
Czechoslovakia, had turned to military dictatorships in 
times of crisis. France and Great Britain were the only 
great democracies left in Europe. Yet neither of the two, 
nor the United States for that matter, had been able to 
shake off the Great Depression. Unemployment remained high, 
and the United States was entering a new recession. 
14 
Hitler's Germany, on the other hand, was providing full 
employment for her working population, and her factory 
workers' living conditions were approaching middle class 
standards. More importantly, German morale was high. The 
hopelessness and despair of 1933 had been transformed into 
common purpose, optimism, and vitality. Hitler's success in 
shaping Germany into a world power in the extraordinarily 
short time of five years showed what charismatic leadership 
was able to achieve. The venerable theory that democracies 
were better because they were more successful than other 
systems was shaken. 
Americans saw the French declaration of war on 
September 3, 1939, as the democratic riposte to totalitarian 
challenge and watched the military developments carefully. 
The swift German victory over the highly regarded French 
Army was a traumatic event and had deep repercussions on 
public opinion in the United States. Many American editors 
began to advocate massive rearmament at home because 
Hitler's defeat of France revealed that the Germans had 
become the greatest military power of the time. 
The fall of France was well covered by the 
correspondents of American newspapers and broadcasting 
systems. At the time of the armistice, however, a number of 
correspondents left France. Only~~~ YQ.t:.k ~im..e.a, ~ 
~~ XQ..r..k Herald Tribune,~ Chicago Daily l'.L..ib.l.l.n..e, ~he 
Chicago Daily~, and the Associated Press as well as the 
United Press organizations kept permanent staffs in Paris or 
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Vichy after the armistice. Among the byline correspondents, 
G. H. Archambault and Lansing Warren of~~ YQ..r.k .I.i.m..e.s, 
and Paul Ghali of~ Chicag~ lla~ .N..e.li~ were the most 
prolific writers. 
In December 1941, the American correspondents in Paris 
were interned by the Germans when the United States joined 
the belligerents. Those still residing in the Unoccupied 
Zone in November, 1942 were stripped of their press rights 
on November 9, and subsequently interned in Baden-Baden in 
the Black Forest. 
The number of foreign correspondents who were 
accredited to American papers declined steadily between 1940 
and 1942. The gap in information on France was filled only 
to a degree by the Office of Strategic Services Co.s.s.) 
which wrote research and intelligence reports for the United 
States Government. 
For the dissertation, the author examined the 
correspondents' dispatches as they were published in the 
newspapers, as well as the original typescripts of Paul 
Ghali, the reporter for ~.h.e ChicagQ D.ai.Js .N..e.li~· Both The 
.N..e.li YQ.1:.k ~im~ and ~.h.e Chicago D.ai.Js .N..e.li~ allowed their 
foreign correspondents to interpret the news and to reveal 
their opinions on political issues. French censorship 
restricted the reporters' freedom considerably, however. 
Theoretically, this censorship was lifted in January, 1941, 
but Ghali's typescripts bore again the censor's stamp in 
July, 1941. Negative remarks about the person of the 
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Marshal and information which might endanger the security of 
the state were always prohibited. The dispatches were not 
only subject to French supervision, however. A comparison 
between Ghali's typescripts and their published version 
showed that the office of the foreign editor of the T~ 
Chicago Daily~ deleted or altered the dispatches without 
indicating the changes to its readers. Since only Ghali's 
typescripts are available at this time, it is not possible 
to determine whether such home-front censorship was the rule 
or the exception. 
As to the correspondents themselves, it should be noted 
that they were an international group of exceptionally well 
educated and capable men, as can be readily seen from their 
biographies (see Appendix A). Unfortunately, the 
biographies of three important correspondents could not be 
included for lack of data -- those of Mallory Browne, Ralph 
Heinzen, and Lansing Warren. 
The views expressed in the reporters' dispatches were 
compared to those in editorials published in American 
new spa per s and magazines. While weeks would pass without 
any editorial comment on France e~en in T.h.e .Hex .Yo.I..k Times, 
during certain periods French problems aroused such high 
interest that editorials on France became a daily fare. The 
vast collection of American editorials on World War II, 
1940-1941, in .N.h.a.t America Thinks, was therefore very useful 
for views on the fall of France, on the armistice, and on 
the abolition of the Third Republic. To widen the scope of 
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opinions, editorials and feature articles were utilized from 
the following newspapers and magazines: ~ .C.h..r.istian 
Science ~onitor, the German-language Jewish Aufbau, the 
Catholic magazines Am~..r.i~~ and T.h~ .C~mm~nli~~i, the 
protestant journal T.h~ .C.h..r.i~~i~n .C~n~~..r.~, Tim~, as 
representative for the news magazines, and~ Nation and 
l'.h.e ~ Republic as representative for the liberal journals. 
In spite of the fact that editors had a vast amount of 
information at their fingertips and were sought out by 
refugees from France and French visitors to the United 
States, editorials often reflected less an understanding of 
French concerns than the editor's ideological stance and his 
perception of the interests of the United States. The 
majority of the correspondents on the other hand, had lived 
in France for many years, and several among them -- like 
Philip Whitcomb and David Darrah -- were married to 
Frenchwomen. Others were French by birth or education, and 
most had developed close ties to France. Even though they 
wrote as "American" correspondents for the American public, 
their sympathy and concern for France was evident in their 
reports. The contrast between the correspondents' opinions 
and those of their editors is therefore understandable but 
nonetheless striking. 
Scholarly contemporary views were found in political 
science journals such as Foreign Affairs, Political Science 
Quarterly,~ American Political science Review, and Public 
Opinion Quarterly; in journals of contemporary history, such 
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as Current History and Living Ag.e,, and in military journals 
like .Militau Revie.lrf and Quarterly .B~li .Q.f .Milil.a.I.Y 
Literature. Not all of the scholars were Americans since 
the journals attracted authors from all over the world. 
Their writings were noteworthy for their emphasis on 
analysis and accuracy. Personal opinions were usually 
clearly identified as such. 
The emigr~ literature represents a different genre and 
has been de~berately avoided in this dissertation with the 
exception of a debate in~ ,C,Qmmonweal (Chapter IV) which 
did involve ~migr~ writers. The debate was included because 
it illustrated the dilemma which confronted the French with 
regard to structural reforms during foreign occupation. 
Articles in Foreign Affairs by famous French writers like 
Pertinax (Andr~ G~raud), Raoul de Roussy de Sales, Julien 
Benda, Rene Cassin, Andre Siegfried, Jacques Maritain, and 
Pierre Cot had to be excluded since the authors were 
Frenchmen who were deeply involved in the Petain - de Gaulle 
controversy. Without any doubt, however, they were 
influential with regard to American foreign policy and 
public opinion. 
Given the different vantage points of foreign 
correspondents, editors, and contemporary scholars, the 
original goal of the dissertation -- to compare "the" 
contemporary view with the historians' judgment -- had to be 
modified to show how differently French policies were 
perceived by each of these groups. 
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The work of American historians was analyzed in the 
same manner as the contemporary literature, but interviews 
with American specialists on modern France were of great 
importance and help in this endeavor. Besides articles and 
books, the published proceedings of the conference on "The 
Fall of France: Causes and Results," at the Center for 
European Studies at Harvard in 1980 (under the direction of 
Stanley Hoffmann), were much utilized. On several occasions 
the historians' views were evaluated; most often by 
comparison with recent research findings. But occasionally 
the author used her own experience of World War II and its 
aftermath as a gauge. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ARMISTICE 
Events Leading to the Armistice 
On September 3, 1939, Great Britain and France 
fulfilled the first stage of their commitment to support 
Poland in the event of German aggression by declaring war 
against Germany. It turned out to be the only action they 
undertook on Poland's behalf. Passively they watched the 
first application of Hitler's Jil.i.t.zkrieg strategy by the 
German army without realizing that they were witnessing a 
revolution in warfare. They attributed the surprising ease 
with which the German forces conquered Poland to the 
backwardness and weakness of the Polish Army. General 
Maxime Weygand, the Commander-in-Chief of the French forces 
in the Orient, who followed the invasion of Poland from 
Syria, admitted eight months later, after the German armored 
corps had broken through the Ardennes: 
We are definitely in the presence of 
completely different means and of a completely 
different tactic than in 1918. The breakthrough 
was possible and its exploitation instantaneous. 
We have judged the Polish army harshly and without 
perhaps ~aving learned the lesson the campaign 
entailed. 
Weygand's blindness to the revolutionary warfare 
employed by Hitler's armies was all the more surprising, as 
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the concept of .lil.i.tzk.I:~ was well known among French 
military specialists. For instance in 1935, Marshal Petain, 
then a member of the Superior Council of National Defense, 
had written in the current affairs journal, B,evu.e. ~ .D.e.Ji..x 
Mondes, on the war of the future. Basing his views on 
recent studies by theoreticians of military science, Petain 
expected the next war to be a war of "brutal and unexpected 
aggression." Conventional, slow-moving wars exhausted both 
sides, but only very recently had technological advances 
made an attack possible which could destroy the first-line 
forces of the enemy, disorganize his mobilization, and smash 
his vital power center. This new form of warfare would take 
advantage of new discoveries in the sciences, new methods of 
transportation, armored vehicles, and most of all the 
progress in aviation technology. Airplanes could demolish 
vulnerable railway installations and airports, paralyze 
economic activities, and spread terror by heavy attacks on 
the capital and the large metropolitan areas. The Marshal 
stressed that the Blitzkrieg concept was very popular in 
German military circles.2 
Despite the fact that French military experts expected 
Hitler to use a Blitzkrieg strategy, the French leaders were 
not prepared for his ingenious use of parachutists, and 
Panzerkorps in the German offensive on May 10, 1940. Vexed 
by Hitler's simultaneous attack on the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Luxembourg, the French Commander-in-Chief, Genera 1 
Maurice Gamelin, ordered three armies into Belgium to stop 
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the German advance. Meanwhile, the main thrust of the 
Panzerk~ through Luxembourg and the Ardennes remained 
almost unnoticed until they reached the Meuse on May 13. 
Racing toward the Atlantic, the Panzerkorps reached the sea 
a week later. Turning northward, they cut off the main 
French forces in that sector. The Dutch Army under General 
Winckelmann capitulated on May 14, and the Belgian Army 
followed with the unconditional surrender of King Leopold 
III on May 28. The British Expeditionary Corps was forced 
to retreat toward Dunkirk on May 26, and approximately 
338,000 French and British troops were evacuated from France 
between May 26 and June 4.3 
In view of the desperate military situation, the French 
Premier Paul Reynaud recalled General Weygand from Syria on 
May 19 and appointed him Chief-of-Staff of National Defense. 
He succeeded General Gamelin, who had proven incapable of 
stopping the German drive to the sea. At the same time 
Reynaud recalled the French Ambassador to Spain, Marshal 
Petain, to serve as Vice Premier to bolster the morale of 
the French military forces. Even though General Weygand set 
up a defense on the Somme to stem the German drive south 
after the evacuation of Allied troops at Dunkirk, he failed 
to achieve his goal. On June 5, 1940, the Germans opened 
the offensive, and three days later Weygand declared the 
Battle of the Somme to be lost.4 
On June 9, the French government left Paris, moved to 
Tours, and installed itself at Bordeaux on the fifteenth. 
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Italy had declared war on France on June 10, crushing French 
hopes that Mussolini would remain neutral in the conflict. 
On June 13, General Weygand explained to the French cabinet 
that France had lost the war and that it was absolutely 
necessary to open negotiations with Hitler. He also warned 
of the danger of internal disorders in case the government 
did not call an end to the fighting before there was no army 
left to establish and maintain order. He opted for an 
armistice as early as possible while France was still in a 
bargaining position and not yet fully occupied by German 
troops. 5 
Time was running out: Paris, declared an open city to 
prevent its defense and probable destruction, was taken by 
the Germans on June 14. Two days later Premier Reynaud 
resigned, recommending Marshal P~tain to President Albert 
Lebrun as his successor. P~tain requested armistice and 
peace conditions from the German government the same day 
through the good offices of the Spanish Ambassador, Jose 
Lequerica. 
French Considerations 
The resignation of Paul Reynaud was the result of a 
heated debate within the French cabinet concerning the 
alternatives they had left. The dispute revolved around the 
obvious defeat of the French forces and its military and 
political consequences. The French cabinet and the Chief-
of-Staff of National Defense, General Maxime Weygand, agreed 
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that there was no longer any hope for a French military 
success in metropolitan France; the fighting had to be 
stopped to prevent a senseless sacrifice of Frenchmen. 
Disagreement, however, was sharp as far as the method 
of obtaining the cease-fire was concerned. Should the 
French Army capitulate in the field, or should the French 
government try to negotiate an armistice agreement with the 
German government? Capitulation, being strictly a military 
decision, did not involve the French government politically, 
and therefore it did not entail a change in the relations 
between France and Germany. The French government could 
leave the country to find asylum in London, or it could 
continue the war from one of the French territories 
overseas. However, such an exodus would deliver France to 
the invader, who would be free to impose his will on the 
country, unrestricted by any binding agreements. Moreover, 
capitulation in the field was prohibited by the French 
military judicial code. General Weygand therefore rejected 
a capitulation as being contrary to the honor of the French 
Army. Premier Reynaud favored capitulation but did not dare 
to dismiss General Weygand for his insubordination and 
replace him with a commander who would surrender.6 Reynaud, 
who had in vain called on the President of the United 
States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to bring the United States 
into the war, chose a solution which let him appear to have 
opposed an armistice to the very end, yet at the same time 
guaranteed that the French government would request one. He 
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resigned, recommending Marshal Petain, an avowed advocate of 
an armistice, as his successor. It is unclear why Reynaud 
chose Petain as his successor, but members of his staff as 
well as his mistress, Madame Helene de Portes, had been 
trying to persuade him to conclude an armistice since May 
25.7 
For instance, the director of his staff for National 
Defense, Colonel Paul de Villelume, had presented a 
memorandum to Reynaud on June 12, outlining the foreseeable 
consequences of both a capitulation and an armistice on the 
future of the country. A capitulation of the French Army 
would entail the country's total occupation by German 
troops. In de Villelume's view this would have potentially 
far-reaching and uncontrollable consequences. The German 
occupation and administration might last for years, and no 
one could predict the extent of the Germans' interference in 
French affairs. One could envision a nazification of 
France, which might be achieved by the elimination of the 
French elite. Even if France were spared such a fate, a 
prolonged occupation might permanently alter French life and 
culture. Would France still be "France" after a lengthy 
subjection to Hitler's Germany? 
De Villelume was rather skeptical as far as the 
eventual liberation of France through an Allied victory was 
concerned. Only the entry of the United States into the war 
would make such a victory probable; even then, success was 
not assured. But there was no sign that the United States 
26 
would join the Allies soon: rather, de Villelume thought 
their involvement might still be years away. Also, the 
German non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union and 
Soviet-German trade agreements substantially strengthened 
the case for the Axis powers. 
One of the problems which would arise in the case of a 
French capitulation concerned the attitude of the French 
people toward the government if it left France to continue 
its functions in North Africa. De Villelume wondered if the 
government would be able to retain and exert its moral 
authority over the occupied motherland from North Africa. 
He also raised the issue of international recognition: 
Would the international community recognize the French 
government as legitimate under these circumstances?8 
De Villelume's question was by no means academic. Just 
a few months before, a British court of appeal had rejected 
Haile Selassie's claim as .d.e .iJlil Emperor of Ethiopia. In 
spite of the fact that Ethiopia had been a member of the 
League of Nations, and even though its invasion and conquest 
by Mussolini's forces in 1935 and 1936 had been condemned by 
the international community, the British government had 
already recognized the King of Italy as~ jJ.u:,e Emperor of 
Ethiopia on November 30, 1938. Thus Great Britain had 
accepted the invader as the legitimate government, and Haile 
Selassie had lost his claim to represent his nation after 
less than three years. Even though international law 
considered the acquisition of a nation's territory by force 
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illicit, "long-term" occupation and possession erased the 
illegality of the conquest. For France this obviously meant 
that an exile government could not depend on the continued 
recognition by other countries.9 
Another grave danger involved the existence of the 
French State itself. According to international law, the 
existence of a state presupposes three essential elements: 
a territory; a population which is organized in a society, 
and a government capable of assuming its internal and 
external functions and of assuring law and order. In the 
case of a total conquest of the territory by the invader, 
and in the absence or destruction of the public powers, the 
conqueror could claim Debellatio. Debellatio implied that 
the defeated state had ceased to exist and that the 
conquering state acquired sovereignty over the territory. 
Again, the question of the continued existence of France as 
a state was by no means a rhetorical one. The invasion, 
conquest, and dismembering of Poland w~s an all too vivid 
example of .Jle..b.e.l.l.a.t..i..Q: the Polish State had ceased to 
exist. Its government had fled, and its territory had been 
either annexed by Hitler or Stalin or was now under German 
administration.lo 
Clearly, such a "polonization" of France had to be 
prevented under all circumstances, since it destroyed the 
state and allowed the invader total control over the 
country. The most dreaded consequence of a long-term 
occupation of France by the Germans, in the absence of a 
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resident French government, would be the conversion of the 
population to Hitler's National Socialism. De Villelume 
remembered the "astonishing success of national-socialist 
propaganda in several countries" prior to World War II, on 
account of its emphasis on socialism. He also recalled 
Hitler's proclamation before the western campaign as "a 
veritable social gospel." He saw at once its similarity to 
the programs of the Popular Front in 1936, which had been so 
enthusiastically received by the masses. 
French leaders knew that irreversible, profound changes 
of a nation's basic beliefs and principles could be wrought 
by a charismatic conqueror within an extremely short time 
span. They had before their eyes those revolutionary and 
enduring innovations in law, education, and government, and 
their effects on national consciousness, which were the 
result of less than a dozen years of Napoleon's rule over 
western Europe. They had also watched the radical changes 
Communism had effected in Russia during the past twenty 
years, and they had seen how Hitler's National Socialism had 
transformed a foundering Germany within the incredibly short 
time of five years, giving the Germans a new sense of 
identity and destiny and molding the nation into the 
greatest power in Europe. Obviously, the impact of a long-
term German occupation on France, if unchecked by 
countervailing influences, could be devastating. France 
might indeed "lose her soul," as P~tain and Weygand warned. 
However, de Villelume knew that in the long run an 
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armistice might also raise problems of the same nature. In 
the event of a partial occupation of France, the French 
government might not remain strong enough to control the 
country, and France still could end up as a prey of the 
Germans. Therefore, he hoped that the French government 
would not have to choose between capitulation and armistice. 
Even on June 12, he still clung to his hope that the United 
States would rescue France at the last minute. That hope 
broke down when President Roosevelt made it clear that the 
United States would not enter the war. The French defeat 
was now inevitable.11 
What kind of treatment could France expect after the 
armies had ceased fighting? Since France was the seventh 
country conquered by Hitler since the beginning of World War 
II, the French could refer to a number of precedents 
regarding the method of surrender which had been adopted and 
the treatment which Hitler had so far accorded to these 
earlier victims. While the French could not deduce from 
this record what the German government had in store for 
them, at least an analysis could be made of the range of 
German initial responses to these nations' acceptance of 
military defeat. 
The first victim of Hitler's aggression had been 
Poland. On September 17, 193 9, ten days before the fall of 
Warsaw, the Polish government had fled to Rumania, exhorting 
at the same time the Polish forces to continue fighting. 
Eventually, the Polish government found asylum in London, 
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where it formed a government in exile and remained in a 
state of war against Germany. In the meantime, Hitler and 
Stalin split Poland into three parts. The German area of 
influence comprised the western half of Poland to the Curzon 
Line. Areas lost by Germany in the treaty of Versailles 
were annexed to Germany, and the center of Poland up to the 
Curzon Line became the Generalgouvernement under the German 
Governor-General, Hans Frank.12 Within the annexed area the 
Germans systematically either jailed or deported the native 
Polish elite. Also, about a million Poles and Jews were 
expropriated, expelled, and resettled in the Qeneral-
gouvernem.e.n.t, to make room for German settlers elsewhere.13 
Denmark, Hitler's next target, surrendered on April 9, 
1940, without putting up a fight. The country was occupied 
by German armed forces, but King Christian X and his cabinet 
continued to govern. The King of Norway, Haakon VII, stayed 
in his country until June 9, 1940, when he ordered his 
defeated troops to capitulate and left for England to set up 
a government in exile. A German Reichskommissar took over 
the government and was supported by the former minister 
Vidkun Quisling, an avowed Norwegian Nazi. 
The same procedure was adopted in The Netherlands, 
where a German B~i~h~k~mmi~~~~ also took over the 
administration after the Dutch Army capitulated on May 15, 
1940. He governed with the aid of Dutch secretaries of 
state. Queen Wilhelmina, her family, and her cabinet had 
left the country before the capitulation to avoid being 
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taken hostage by the Germans. Luxembourg had already fallen 
on May 11, and Grandduchess Charlotte had sought shelter in 
France. Before the Treaty of Versailles, Germany and 
Luxembourg had enjoyed the close ties of a monetary and 
customs union. While Hitler did not dare to annex 
Luxembourg .d.e. ~' he quietly incorporated the duchy .d.e. 
facto. 
Less than two weeks later, on May 28, King Leopold III 
of Belgium, the Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army, was 
forced to surrender unconditionally after Hitler had 
rejected his request for an armistice. The King let himself 
be arrested as a prisoner of war and refused subsequently to 
exercise any of his royal prerogatives. The King's cabinet, 
which condemned his refusal to go into exile, sought asylum 
in France and shortly thereafter in England. Belgium was 
administered by a German military government.14 
Interestingly enough, popular opinion in the defeated 
nations was hostile to their governments in exile. Gordon 
Wright later noted that 
In Norway and in the Netherlands there was 
especially bitter resentment toward the sovereigns 
and their governments who had scuttled off to 
London leaving their peoples to face the conqueror 
alone. The Kings of Denmark and Belgium, on the 
other hand, enjoyed a sudden outburst of public 
affection because they had sti~ed to share the 
uncertainties of the occupation. 
Not only did the populations of the occupied countries 
resent their governments' flight; American observers too 
expressed contempt at the exodus of European royalty and 
high administration officials. ~ magazine captioned the 
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picture of Queen Wilhelmina of The Netherlands in its issue 
of May 20, 1940, with "Wilhelmina--London was Safer.nl6 One 
week later .li..m.e, reported with undisguised sarcasm: "Safe in 
London, Dutch Foreign Minister van Kleffens announced that 
one in four of his country's 400,000 soldiers was killed."17 
The editor of the ..I&ng Beach Press-Telegram wrote on June 4: 
Queen Wilhelmina's flight to England after 
the Nazi invasion of Holland did not make an 
altogether favorable impression on Dutch and 
neutral opinion. Although the reason given--that 
she left the country to avoid capture by the 
invader, and being held as a hostage--was 
convincing, nevertheless there was an instinctive 
feeling that the head of a state should remain 
with the people in a time of great suffering and 
peril--a feeling that was only partly cancelled by 
the fact that in this instance the ruler was a 
woman. 
The editor went on to state that he had changed his mind 
upon reading in .IJ..f~ magazine the Queen's defense of her 
action. She had not fled her country out of personal fear 
but because "duty, responsibility, and farsighted 
statesmanship" demanded it. From abroad she could govern 
the 65,000,000 inhabitants of the Dutch Empire free from 
German coercion, and in exile she could "keep the voice and 
the symbol of Holland alive.n18 It is clear, however, that 
the editor's "gut" reaction of contempt for governments who 
left their peoples at the mercy of the invader was 
widespread at the time. 
While the circumstances of defeat varied in each of 
these countries, two important facts stand out. First, none 
of them had signed an armistice with Hitler. This does not 
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mean that they refused to deal with him, but rather that 
they had no opportunity to reach an armistice agreement. 
The governments of Poland, Norway, The Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg fled their countries before their armies were 
defeated and had to surrender. Denmark surrendered without 
having fought; thus, an armistice was unnecessary. 
Belgium's request for an armistice was rejected by Hitler. 
Therefore it would be incorrect to attribute the lack of 
armistice agreements to the desire of these governments to 
continue the war against Hitler from exile; rather, their 
exodus must be seen as a flight in the face of impending 
total defeat. 
After all, an armistice agreement meant that the 
defeated nation still had some bargaining power. This was 
generally recognized at the time, as the attitude of the 
Finnish government in 1940 shows. The Finnish foreign 
minister wanted to reach a "bearable agreement" with the 
Russians "before the Finnish forces were forced to 
capitulate in the field." An even more forceful example is 
the Allies' "Unconditional Surrender" policy adopted toward 
Germany later in the war, by which they sought to foreclose 
any possibility of a negotiated peace.19 Secondly, in all 
cases where the government had fled the country, German 
officials took over the administration. In contrast, 
Denmark's regular government, presided over by King 
Christian X, continued its work in the presence of German 
occupying forces. 
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At the time of the French def eat, too short a time had 
elapsed since the beginning of the war for a general 
assessment to develop regarding German occupation patterns 
or to predict the effects of the German occupation on the 
conquered states; only from the case of Poland could 
conclusions be drawn. In some respects, the situation of 
Poland bore similarities to that of France. Both countries 
had German minorities and had received territories from 
Germany in the Treaty of Versailles which were by culture 
and language German. Poland therefore could serve as a 
precedent for the French government as it groped for clues 
regarding German policies after conquest. While Germany's 
annexation of its pre-World War I territory in Poland had 
been expected, nobody anticipated the destruction of the 
Polish elite and the expropriation, expulsion, and 
resettlement of one million Poles. International law was 
violated. While annexation in the case of total conquest 
and in the absence of a functioning government was 
permissible, the expropriation of private property was 
not.20 
The French leaders had to consider the possibility that 
Hitler might deal with France as he had dealt with Poland. 
He might expel the French-speaking population of Alsace-
Lorraine unless the French government could prevent the 
nation's "Polonization" by requesting an armistice at a time 
when France still had important assets: control over part 
of her metropolitan territory, the fleet, and the vast 
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French Empire. In order to keep the French fleet from 
joining the British Navy, Hitler might agree to an armistice 
with favorable terms for France. The French government 
could then retain sovereignty over part of its territory at 
least and would be able to keep Hitler from imposing German 
administration and legislation on the country. The purpose 
of the armistice was therefore much more than merely to 
achieve a cessation of hostilities. It must insure the 
survival of France as a state and minimize the danger of a 
systematic despoliation of the population. For these 
reasons Petain and Weygand refused categorically to leave 
the country for an exile abroad. 
Moreover, the resentment expressed by the Norwegian and 
Dutch populations over the flight of their governments to 
London proved that citizens everywhere expected their 
leaders to share the nation's fate, to protect them from the 
invader's rapacity and violence, and to assure the 
population's basic needs. The continued presence of the 
government was in Petain's and Weygand's opinions 
indispensable: Even though international law did contain 
rules regarding warfare and the treatment of civilians in 
wartime, no invader could be expected to count the welfare 
of a defeated nation among its priorities.21 
PAtain and Weygand were further concerned with the 
danger of anarchy in case the government left France for an 
exile overseas. The French Communists, with their well-
disciplined membership, might emerge from the general 
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dissolution and absence of authority as the new leaders. 
The recent friendship between Germany and the Soviet Union 
might allow them to come out of hiding under German 
protection and openly exert the subversive influence which 
had been so damaging to the war effort during the Phony 
War.22 Leon Trotsky's predictions may also have haunted the 
two leaders, as he had contended since 1934 that France 
would be forced to choose between Fascism and Communism. 
Trotsky foresaw only one possibility to avoid the dilemma: 
by setting up a bureaucratic military dictatorship, 
Bonapartists might try "to save the nation" from both 
totalitarian systems.23 
While Marshal P~tain and General Weygand advocated an 
armistice with the German government, Premier Reynaud tried 
to convince the British that such a move did not pose a 
threat to their war effort and security. He had signed a 
Franco-British agreement on March 28, 1940, which stipulated 
that neither of the two nations would engage in separate 
armistice and peace negotiations.24 Churchill was 
apparently ready to release the French government from this 
obligation, but he made his approval contingent upon French 
compliance with his demand that the French Navy be sent to 
British ports. However, this would have deprived the French 
of one of their two remaining bargaining assets--the fleet. 
The still intact French fleet surpassed the German 
ELi~g~m~Lin~ in strength. It was therefore of great 
importance in any armistice negotiation that the fleet 
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remain under French controi. 25 
It is revealing that de Gaulle claimed to have 
encouraged and even provoked Churchill's hardening attitude 
regarding the French demand for release from the Franco-
British agreement. It was also de Gaulle who convinced 
Churchill that the Anglo-French union proposal authored by 
Jean Monnet and Charles Corbin would be a strong morale 
booster for the French government. This plan, which was 
accepted by the British cabinet, called for an immediate 
fusion of the two nations: Great Britain and France would 
be united under one constitution with common defense, 
foreign policy, finance, and economy. Only one cabinet 
would administer both countries during the war; both 
parliaments would merge immediately. Citizens of both 
nations would hold dual citizenship. 
The proposal was conceived in London, far from the 
reality of the French chaos and military rout. The French 
cabinet did not consider the plan a viable possibility. It 
was seen as empty rhetoric in a situation of genuine 
despair, and seemed fantastic and ridiculous. Even de 
Gaulle admitted in his memoirs that it was meant merely to 
symbolize the solidarity between the Allies.26 
By June 16, Reynaud was faltering under the pressure of 
the military leaders: Weygand had already pointed out on 
June 12, that the troops could no longer go on fighting, 
that men and officers were exhausted. On the sixteenth, the 
Germans had reached Dijon and the SaOne front. The streets 
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were clogged with troops and refugees. Their provisioning 
with food posed serious problems. Still, the decision to 
request an armistice was taken very reluctantly. Only the 
sophisticated proposition by Camille Chautemps to request 
armistice conditions instead of asking for an armistice 
itself seemed to provide a means to "save face" for the 
French cabinet. It implied that the French still had a 
freedom of choice, that they were not yet beaten into total 
submission. If the German conditions proved to be too harsh 
and injurious to French honor, the French might still 
continue to fight. However, P~tain's radio message to the 
country on June 17 made it clear that the French government 
wanted to end the fighting: "With a heavy heart I tell you 
that we have to stop the battle.n27 
On June 21, 1940, a French delegation consisting of 
General Huntziger, Ambassador Noel, Rear Admiral Le Luc, and 
the Generals Parisot and Bergeret, received the armistice 
conditions from a German delegation at Compi~gne. (For the 
text, see Appendix C) •28 
The twenty-four articles of the document contained 
provisions which were designed to make it impossible for 
France to resume hostilities. German troops were to occupy 
northern France and the Atlantic coast. Within the Occupied 
Zone the French government had to enforce the regulations 
imposed by the German Reich. All French forces except those 
required for the maintenance of public order were to be 
immediately disarmed and demobilized. All war production 
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was to cease immediately, and all materials of war were to 
be surrendered to the German or Italian authorities upon 
demand or stored under their control. France was required 
to pay for the maintenance of German troops on French soil, 
an especially onerous clause, since no amount was mentioned. 
The provisions regarding the French fleet were among the 
most significant, since the fleet was considered a major 
asset. Under the agreement, the fleet was to be demobilized 
and laid up under German or Italian control, with the 
exception of ships needed for the protection of French 
interests in the Empire. The German government "solemnly 
and expressly" declared that it did not intend "to bring up 
any demands" regarding the fleet during peace negotiations. 
Further stipulations were designed to prevent continued 
resistance by Frenchmen after the Armistice, either at home 
or abroad. No Frenchman was permitted to fight against 
Germany in the service of a nation still at war with the 
Reich; violators were treated as insurgents by the German 
government. French prisoners of war in German prison camps 
were to remain there until the conclusion of a peace treaty. 
German prisoners were to be released immediately, and upon 
demand, the French government had to surrender "any German 
named by the German government." This provision frightened 
political refugees from Germany and Austria who had found a 
haven in France. The French government was free to choose 
its seat either in Paris or in the Unoccupied zone. 
The French delegation at Compiegne transmitted the 
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armistice conditions by telephone to the French government 
at Bordeaux, which considered the terms severe but not 
inconsistent with French honor. However, the government 
proposed several amendments. It objected to the provision 
which prohibited any transfer of economic securities and 
stocks from the Occupied Zone to the Unoccupied Zone. 
Secondly, it rejected the article which required the 
extradition of all German nationals on French territory upon 
German demand. Finally, the French government protested 
against Article XXIII, which made the armistice agreement 
dependent upon the signing of a parallel armistice between 
the French and Italian governments. The Germans rejected 
the fir st French amendment, but with regard to the second, 
General Keitel assured the French delegation orally that the 
German Reich would only demand the extradition of warmongers 
among the German refugees in France. The Germans were 
intransigent with regard to the linking of the two armistice 
agreements. General Huntziger, therefore, made it clear 
that France would renounce the armistice with Germany if the 
Italian conditions were unacceptable to his government. 
On June 22 the French delegation signed the armistice 
agreement with Germany, and two days later a second 
agreement with Italy was signed in Rome. The armistice took 
effect on June 25.29 On July 1, the French government 
settled at Vichy, in the Free Zone, thirty miles south of 
the Demarcation Line. 
While the Petain government at Bordeaux had been 
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waiting for the German armistice conditions, Petain's 
decision to negotiate with Hitler for an end to the 
hostilities had already been fiercely denounced. The former 
Undersecretary of War and National Defense in Reynaud's 
cabinet, Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle, had vainly 
tried to persuade his colleagues of the merits of the Anglo-
French union for the duration of the war. After Reynaud had 
resigned on June 16 to be succeeded by the Pe tain 
government, de Gaulle decided to leave France. He flew to 
London on the following day. On June 18 he called on all 
French soldiers, officers, engineers, and skilled armament 
workers to contact him. In the following days he emphasized 
the worldwide scope of the war and the duty of every French 
soldier to continue to fight if he was able to do so. In 
addition, he contacted the French generals and high 
administrators in North Africa, the Middle East, and 
Indochina to form an organization for the defense of the 
Empire. De Gaulle's efforts were supported by the British 
government, which recognized him on June 28 as the head of 
the "Free French." Even though de Gaulle was practically 
unknown in the United States, his extraordinary call for 
continued French resistance was heard and commented upon by 
American correspondents in France, as well as by news 
analysts at home.30 
The American Reaction 
From its beginning, the war in Europe had aroused a 
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passionate interest in the American press. A large number 
of editorials expressed the view that not only a European 
conflict but another World War had begun. Many writers felt 
deeply troubled with regard to the position of the United 
States to the conflict. Hitler was seen as bent on 
destroying Western Civilization in Europe in order to 
replace it with his "New Order." Morally, they felt that 
the people of the United States could not stand by as 
passive spectators when the sources of their own culture and 
their own values were threatened. Yet, all their instincts 
recoiled from being drawn into a war which the United States 
had not provoked in any way. Therefore, a deep hatred 
toward Hitler, coupled with a profound uneasiness regarding 
the United States' role in the war, characterized many 
editorials. One writer put it bluntly. Referring to the 
lonely battle of France and Britain against Hitler, he 
wrote: 
In effect we are saying that Hitler must be 
stopped, that he must be fought to the last drop 
of English and French blood. Meanwhile we shall 
remain in splendid isolation and wish our 
defenders well.31 
Even he tried to justify "this not altogether noble 
attitude" by declaring that the United States could help the 
world best by pursuing their own "enlightened self-
interest." 
Perhaps it was this uneasiness about the American 
position which compelled the editors to refrain for several 
months from criticizing Great Britain or France. The mere 
43 
fact that these countries had declared war on Hitler seemed 
to them already a show of courage--a feat which would not be 
matched by the United States in the near future. Therefore, 
an unusual restraint characterized American editorials 
throughout the Polish campaign and during the Phony War. 
This became glaringly evident during the invasion of Poland, 
when the lack of action by Great Britain and France on 
Poland's behalf was quietly ignored in the American press. 
The writers heaped praise on Poland's bravery and courage 
but refrained carefully from raising their voices to rally 
support for the Poles in their struggle for survival. 
Astonishingly, French and British military reputations were 
not tarnished on account of their failure to act, and 
Hitler's swift victory over Poland was not sufficiently 
impressive or close enough to home to provoke a reappraisal 
of Allied and Axis strengths.32 
The longer the Phony War dragged on, the less dangerous 
Hitler appeared, and by the spring of 1940 the threat of a 
Blitzkri~ in the West had lost much of its terror. On 
March 16, 1940, a cartoon in .The. Nation ridiculed Hitler for 
the "interminable overture" to his "opera" .lU.ilzkrieg.33 
But the sudden German attack on Denmark and Norway on April 
9, 1940, and the swift German victory over the British and 
Norwegian forces altered the writers' views. British 
prestige suffered a terrible blow, and several writers noted 
that neutral countries obviously could not rely on Allied 
pledges of help. They also worried that Italy might 
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definitely choose Germany as its ally in view of Germany's 
record of success since September, 1939.34 
In spite of the embarrassing failure of the Allies in 
the Norwegian campaign, their terrible rout in the western 
campaign was not expected, and it stunned the American 
editors. Frantically, they tried to rationalize Hitler's 
easy conquest of The Netherlands and to attribute the early 
surrender of the Belgiam Army to the King's defeatism. Yet 
they could not hide their anxiety over the fall of France. 
Hitler's previous conquests had involved small countries, 
which were, with the exception of Poland, unprepared for war 
and in all regards no match for the martial German Reich. 
France, on the other hand, was a powerful nation with a much 
admired army. By defeating her, Hitler took on the stature 
of a great conqueror, so much so that he was perceived by 
the American press as a threat to the United States.35 An 
editorial in the N~H XQik ~Q~~ vividly expressed the 
apprehension caused by the fall of France: "The American 
people definitely feel their security menaced. We are 
passing through a period of fear ••• We fear Hitler ••• 
because he is beating the Allies •••• n3 6 l'.lLe ~H XQI.k l'..im~ 
spelled it out: "The first line of our defenses is 
broken.... The misfortune which has overtaken Britain is 
our own in scarcely less measure.n37 Walter Lippmann and 
Dorothy Thompson called for a "total defense" effort of the 
United States and for an end to party strife. Both saw 
Hitler as bent on subjugating the world.38 
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A collection of American editorials on the war, Nh.a.t 
Am~..i.Q.a ~.hi.nk~, contains twenty-six pieces on the fall of 
France written between June 17 and July 3. Five of them 
regarded Hitler's victory over France as a threat to the 
security of the United States. Ten writers did not go that 
far but grasped the chance to advocate a massive American 
arms build-up in view of the French defeat.39 
The French request for an armistice was registered by 
the vast majority of editors as unavoidable and a foregone 
conclusion. Out of the twenty-six editorials, fifteen 
discussed the defeat without expressing any opinion on the 
French fighting capacity, French morale, or the necessity of 
the Armistice itself. Ten editorials expressed admiration 
for French valor or were at least openly sympathetic to the 
plight of the vanquished country. In the eyes of these 
writers, a negotiated settlement was the best a defeated 
country could hope for. Thus, upon hearing of the German 
occupation of Paris on June 14, one editor wondered: "If 
Germany wins completely in France, will she grant terms, or 
will the war end in a blackout as it did in Poland?" Given 
the fact that none of Hitler's previous victims had been 
able to negotiate an armistice, the question was 
justified. 40 In most editorials the French defeat was 
characterized as total. France had but two alternatives 
left: either to fight to the complete destruction of the 
country or to sue for peace. Typical was the following 
comment: "The action of France in asking for an armistice 
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with Germany was the act of a brave people before 
overwhelming forces.n41 
However, as early as June 18, 1940, the editors of l'..h.e 
.N.eli Xork ~m.e.a displayed a markedly different attitude. 
They distinguished between the defeated nation and the new 
P~tain government. While praising "the heroic nation that 
gave away its strength in a vain effort to check 
dictatorship and aggression," they simultaneously blamed the 
P~tain government for deserting the British, who were now 
facing "unimaginable horrors." In agreement with Churchill, 
they argued that France should have continued the war from 
North Africa and should have assisted her ally with the 
French Navy and the remnants of the French air forces.42 
This viewpoint was exceptional at the time, but the 
situation changed dramatically once the armistice conditions 
were published on June 26. Generally, the editors expressed 
shock and dismay over the harshness of the terms. The 
armistice of 1940 was considered much more punitive than the 
Treaty of Versailles on account of the occupation ot two-
thirds of the French territory. Significantly, the writers 
did not only describe the armistice terms as "shameful" and 
"humiliating," but as posing a threat to Great Britain. 
They argued that French soil would now become a base for the 
forthcoming German invasion of England, since the Germans 
were in possession of both the Channel and the Atlantic 
coasts. Moreover, the demand for the demobilization of the 
French fleet under German or Italian supervision signalled 
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to them Hitler's intention eventually to use the fleet 
against England. 
Since only England remained in the battle as a bulwark 
against Hitler, the French armistice agreement was primarily 
evaluated by American editors in connection with its impact 
on Britain's security. The implications of the armistice 
conditions for France itself were at the moment of little 
interest to frightened American observers. On the contrary, 
in their eagerness to rally to Britain's side, some editors 
seemed to forget that France had not requested an armistice 
out of spite against the former ally, but because French 
forces had suffered a crushing defeat. 43 
Some of the editorials are therefore notable for their 
lack of realism. The editor of~ ~li YQ.r..k .U..m~, for 
instance, called the Petain government a "puppet ot 
Hitler's" because it had, as required in Article XIX of the 
armistice agreement, complied with the German demand to 
release. and repatriate four hundred captured German 
aviators. He noted that these pilots would now return to 
Germany to fly raids over England. In his concern for Great 
Britain, he closed his eyes to the fact that no victor in 
any war would ever forgo the liberation of his own troops 
taken prisoner by the defeated enemy.44 
Since the fate of Great Britain was uppermost in the 
editors' minds, only few among them took a closer look at 
those armistice terms which did not directly concern the 
war.45 It is significant that not one among thirty 
48 
editorials written between June 24 and July 27, even 
mentioned the ominous second paragraph in Article XIX. This 
paragraph is today regarded by many historians as "the most 
shameful" of the armistice terms, since it mandated the 
extradition of German nationals living under French 
administration. 
This meant that German refugees who had found asylum in 
France could no longer count on the protection of the French 
government. The groups most endangered by this provision 
were German anti-fascists and Communists. This problem was, 
however, immediately recognized by the staff ot the ~li 
Republic and of the Aufbau, a German-language Jewish weekly, 
who drew attention to the foreseeable consequences of 
Article XIx.46 Fearing for the fate of Jewish refugees, the 
Aufbau advocated their immediate departure to the United 
States to save their lives.47 In reality, Jewish refugees 
in France were not yet endangered in 1940, contrary to the 
Aufbau' s contention. As a matter of fact, the German 
Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst) was ordered on October 
30, 1940, to take immediate measures to prevent the return 
of German and East European Jews to Germany. They were to 
be held in camps which would allow eventually a speedy 
evacuation to a location overseas.48 Both papers attacked 
the French government bitterly for signing the armistice 
agreement. It is possible that they were unaware of the 
fact that the French government had initially rejected the 
paragraph involving the delivery of German nationals, but 
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the Germans had not yielded.49 
Among those few writers who analyzed the French 
position and speculated on the future of France under German 
occupation was the news analyst of NBC, Hans v. Kaltenborn. 
While he considered the armistice agreement "a complete 
capitulation, without a single redeeming feature," he felt 
nonetheless that Hitler would not be able to "police France" 
unless he received substantial support from French fascists 
and sympathizers. Kaltenborn predicted as early as June 24, 
1940, that the outcome of the war would determine the 
legitimacy of either P~tain or de Gaulle! Like other 
editors, Kaltenborn looked for a lesson to be learned from 
the French military fiasco and warned the United States 
government of the unpreparedness of American generals and 
admirals for such an "altogether different kind of war." 
The government would have to overcome the "extreme 
conservatism of its military and compel them to take up new 
methods, new ideas, and new weapons." 
However, Kal tenborn agreed with P~ tain that moral 
factors had contributed to the French defeat, noting that 
"no country can wax great in ttme of crisis, no country can 
meet a real challenge to its existence unless its people 
have the spirit of sacrifice." He regarded this revelation 
as "perhaps ••• the most important lesson of a11.n50 In a 
similar vein, Senator Styles Bridges entered an editorial 
into the Congressional Record which argued that "corrupt 
politics, corrupt newspapers, too much soft living, and too 
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much love of self and too little love of country brought 
about the downfall of France. n51 
No longer reticent in criticizing the French war 
effort, American papers informed their readers that "the 
morale of the French people in the period leading up to the 
war had been thoroughly bad.n52 On June 24, for instance, 
hm~ had on 1 y di s cussed the m i 1 it a r y def eat of France. In 
its July 1 edition,~ suggested that "France had not only 
been defeated in battle; her institutions had been 
discredited." The new P~tain government had been 
established through a coup involving the military, rightists 
and appeasers; its goal was "to wring mercy from the enemy." 
By July 22, lim~ attributed France's defeat to a "long, 
slow, disintegration of democratic and republican ideals.n53 
The sober examination of the French campaign by Mallory 
Browne of %h.e ~~.i..fill Scien~~ MQnitQr was unusual and 
refreshing, even though his love for Great Britain led him 
to astounding conclusions about British and French national 
characteristics. Writing from London, Browne attributed the 
fall of France primarily to the lack of great political 
leadership, the "inertia and shortsightedness" of French 
politicians, as well as to an overly defense-oriented 
strategy. Browne also blamed the French politicians for 
their failure to strengthen the French fortifications behind 
the frontiers of Luxembourg and Belgium and the High Command 
for placing second-rate troops in that area. He claimed 
that infantry soldiers and subordinate officers had felt 
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"let down" by the High Command and that widespread defeatism 
had set in soon after the Sedan breakthrough. Acknowledging 
the superior German armament and especially the Blitzkrieg 
strategy, with its massive use of tanks supported by fighter 
planes and bombers, Browne found the French unable to adjust 
swiftly to the new conditions imposed on them. 
Browne's interpretation of the French government's 
decision to request an armistice is more a testimony to his 
love for the British than to his objectivity: 
The rigid logic of the French inclined their 
political and military leaders to reason that 
since the front was broken and the Army was 
disorganized, victory was impossible, and since 
the French could not win, logically France had to 
demand an armistice. In the same circumstances, 
the unreasoning British instinct would have 
inclined first to refuse to admit the possibility 
of defeat, and secondly, to §include that the only 
thing to do was to fight on. 
Such harsh and detailed criticism heaped upon French 
democracy, morale, and military leadership must have been a 
shocking revelation to the interested American reader. 
Editorials on France written during the western campaign had 
not prepared them for such a scathing denunciation. Not 
that the French defeat was completely unexpected; the press 
had speculated rather cautiously about the fighting strength 
of the Allies after the disheartening failure of the 
Norwegian campaign, and some writers had considered the 
possibility of an Allied defeat as early as May 11.55 Yet 
while the surrender of The Netherlands and Belgium and the 
emergency evacuation at Dunkirk gave cause for grave 
pessimism regarding the British and French capability to 
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resist Hitler, criticism of Britain and France had remained 
remarkably subdued. Out of sixty-two editorials in H.ha..t 
.America Thinks, which assessed the sit ua ti on in France 
between May 10 and June 16, only fifteen expressed .any 
criticism of the conduct of the war by the Allies, and of 
these, only six singled out France for their attack.56 
This restraint was probably not accidental but the 
result of a self-imposed censorship or even pressure from 
the White House. Quincy Howe, an avowed isolationist, the 
former editor of Living~' and in 1940 a news commentator 
on station WQXR in New York, charged in September, 1940, 
that pressure had been exerted on Washington writers during 
the western campaign. They had to adhere to the slogan of 
the hour--"national unity"--and "anyone who hinted that the 
French might lose or capitulate (even as late as June 10, 
the day the President delivered his Charlottesville 'stab in 
the back' speech) was branded a Fifth Columnist. 11 57 
Howe's remarks illustrate to what degree the American 
press had made the struggle against Hitler their own. 
Patriotism, a general revulsion against Hitler's 
aggressions, and worry over a breakdown of Allied morale as 
a result of criticism kept American editors from expressing 
their views freely. Since this attitude was discernible so 
early in the war, when the United States was still 
officially neutral and would remain so for one and a half 
more years, one could expect restrictions to increase 
significantly during the following months and years. 
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In view of the clear bias of the writers in favor of 
the Allies, one must ask why criticism ot France, of her 
democratic institutions and her way of life, was suddenly 
unleashed after the armistice conditions had been published. 
The first reason was that France had left the war and was no 
longer a major factor to be considered in the continuing 
struggle. Secondly, a constraint on criticism was no longer 
serving the purpose of strengthening Allied morale; indeed 
it had become counter-productive. Hitler's stunningly easy 
victory over France would appear less awe-inspiring to the 
American public if it could be shown that he had toppled a 
hollow giant. Accusations that French morale had been 
"thoroughly bad" prior to the war, and statements to the 
effect that "France was not conquered, France collapsed," 
would imply that Hitler had not overpowered a healthy nation 
and a well-led army. Deprecatory remarks like "P~tain bowed 
meekly to the conqueror" signalled that France, even after 
defeat, could have stood up to Hitler and forced him to 
modify his terms. The American press thus imitated Premier 
Reynaud, whose violent denunciation of the Belgian king at 
the news of the Belgian surrender was probably also an 
effort to stem defeatism.58 
The publication of the armistice conditions also 
inaugurated the transformation of Marshal P~tain's image in 
America from the "Victor of Verdun" to a stooge of Hitler or 
even a traitor to France. P~tain was probably the best 
known French military figure in the United States in the 
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period before World War II. He was revered as an old friend 
of General John Pershing, and he had visited the United 
States in October, 1931, for the 150th commemoration of 
Cornwallis's surrender to Washington at Yorktown. As the 
official representative of the French government, he had 
been much honored and had even received a Doctor .b.Q.n.Q~ 
causa from the College of William and Mary at Williamsburg, 
Virginia. In several speeches during his visit he reminded 
his American hosts of the ancient link between the United 
States and France and affirmed the need for continuing close 
relations. On one occasion he referred to criticism leveled 
at France for its large military expenditures, which he 
defended as being purely defense-oriented. He also rejected 
doubts about France's peaceful intentions and repudiated 
charges of French imperialism.59 Ironically, nine years 
later, France would be reeling under a devastating defeat, 
and again Americans would criticize the French governments 
of the thirties--this time for their lack of military 
preparedness and for having relied too much on a strategy of 
defense--and who but Marshal P~tain-would be the main target 
of their criticism. 
However, in April, 1940, P~tain's image was still 
untarnished, and Tim~ magazine speculated about the 
possibility that the French President, Albert Lebrun, might 
recall P~tain from Spain to have him form a new cabinet. 
l'..im.e. pointed out that "in every recent French crisis the old 
Warrior, strictly non-political, has been thought of as a 
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possible Savior." After his appointment to Reynaud' s 
cabinet on May 19, ~ referred to the old Marshal as "the 
shining symbol of French courage and resistance," who had 
repelled the Germans at Verdun and who had restored "the 
spirit of victory" in the French Army in 1917. Again, ~.m..e 
emphasized that "more than once in the past five troubled 
years the old man has been talked of as the man to rally a 
united France. 11 60 
Such praise became rare within a month after the 
armistice request, and a new Marshal P~tain, who had little 
in common with the man they had known, was introduced to 
American readers. One caricature showed him as a little old 
man squirming under Hitler's heel and proposing an 
armistice.61 Both the Nation and the Au.f..b.ru.l alluded to 
sinister connections between P~tain and the extreme right-
wing Cagoulards, a terrorist group bent on overthrowing the 
government. Even~ Christian Science M.Q.Il.i..t.o.1: regarded 
Petain as "tainted" on account of his "enthusiasm" for 
fascist General Franco of Spain.62 Not only did Petain's 
loyalty to the Republic become suspect, but also his 
soldier's reputation for courage and patriotism was 
attacked. Sometimes the attacks were ludicrous, revealing 
an astounding ignorance of France. ~ ~~ .B..eD.ub.J.i.c., for 
instance, counted Petain among the "appeasers" and went on 
to explain that appeasers were "almost without,exception 
conservative in politics and Catholic in religion." The 
writer was obviously unaware that 98 percent of all French 
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citizens were at least nominally Catholic.63 
Not all political writers and analysts turned against 
Petain, however. H. v. Kaltenborn continued to esteem him 
as an "honest soldier" and agreed with Petain's analysis of 
the causes of the French defeat. The Catholic monthly 
magazine, America, praised Petain to the hilt, using even a 
Biblical allusion: "greater love for France has no man than 
Mar sh a 1 Pe ta in. " Am.e.~ b 1 a rn e d the "traitor s" of the 
Popular Front for the def eat, accusing them of having 
"suppressed every patriot who loved France more than he 
loved the Soviet." Now, Petain, the symbol of "heroic 
France" had to shoulder the humiliating task of begging for 
peace. In a similar vein, the editor of the Aberdeen World 
of Washington state commented on Petain's address to the 
French on June 20, wherein the Marshal tried to encourage 
his people but also blamed self-centeredness, too much love 
of pleasure, and the desire to avoid exertion for France's 
misfortune: 
Marshal Petain could not have made his 
address a few years ago, for there would have been 
few to 1 i sten and none to heed. Hi s6rould have been a voice crying in the wilderness. 
So, by the end of June, 1940, there was no longer a 
consensus among Arner ican editors and political writers on 
Petain's image. In hindsight, the extreme viewpoints of 
1940--"Petain the Savior," and "Petain the Traitor"--
resemble uncannily those advocated by his supporters and by 
his enemies during his trial in July and August of 1945. It 
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seems that in June, 1940, praise and condemnation of the 
Marshal were basically ideological judgments, since Petain 
had not yet taken any action to justify either. "Savior" 
and "Traitor": these terms were attached to him for 
representing a certain value system, not for imposing those 
values on others. 
Conservatives, who largely shared Petain 's values, 
tended to look with favor on the Marshal, while liberals 
feared that his conservative attitudes bespoke a fascist 
mentality. However, many American writers were not yet 
ready for an assessment of Petain as a statesman. They 
continued to give him credit for his past achievements and 
refused to doubt his patriotism. They realized that he was 
confronted with incredibly difficult problems, and reserved 
their judgment for the time when it would be possible to 
evaluate his statesmanship from his record. 
Obviously, the American press was intensely interested 
in the military developments and to a lesser degree in the 
political events in France during May and June of 1940. In 
spite of the war, news reached the United States through 
many channels. Newly returned American tourists, French 
refugees, and political exiles who had lost their haven in 
France contributed eyewitness accounts. However, the most 
important, regular, and dependable sources for the American 
press were the foreign correspondents. Some among them were 
accredited to the Allied, German, or Italian armies; others 
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were roving correspondents, sent by their newspapers to 
crisis areas. Still others worked for the Paris bureau of 
American papers or for one of the news agencies, such as the 
Associated Press, the United Press International, or the 
International News Service. These agencies as well as a 
number of the leading American newspapers like .The N.e.li YQ.r.k 
.'.llm.e..s, .Th.e. .N.e.li X.QI..k .H.e..La.ld Tr i bu o~, .T.h.e. ch r is t.i.rul ..s~ i e o c e 
Monitor, .T.h.e. ~hicago Daily N.e.lY..s, and .The. ChicagQ Tribun.e., 
kept permanent offices and staffs in France.65 When the 
French government moved to Vichy on July 1, these papers, 
with the exception of .T.b.e. Christian Science Monitor, set up 
permanent staffs there. 
Among the American correspondents who lived in France 
at various times during the war were many well-known 
journalists (Table I). Working in Vichy were G. H. 
Archambault, Percy J. Philip, and Lansing Warren of .T.b.e. N.e..li 
XQ.r..k Times, Edgar A. Mowrer, Peter Dewey, and Paul Ghali of 
.T.b.e. Chicago Daily .N.e.li..a, John Elliott of .The~ .YQi:.k Herald 
Tribune, David Darrah of .T.h.e. Chica.9.2 n.a.il~ Tribun.e., and 
Taylor Henry (AP) and Ralph Heinzen (UP) of the news 
agencies. In Paris, Philip Whitcomb headed the Associated 
Press staff, while Glen Stadler was chief of the United 
Press bureau. Both Whitcomb and Stadler and thirteen AP and 
UP correspondents in occupied France were interned by the 
Germans when Germany declared war on the United States on 
December 11, 1941. After the Allied landing in North Africa 
on November 8, 1942, the Vichy government severed diplomatic 
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TABLE I 
AMERICAN FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN FRANCE 
Employer 
AP 
~ Chicago 
Daily~ 
~ Chicago 
Daily Tribune 
~ Christian 
science 
Monitor 
Correspondent 
Taylor Henry 
Roy Porter 
Philip Whitcomb 
Peter Dewey 
Paul Ghali 
Edgar A. Mowrer 
David Darrah 
Alex Small 
Mallory Browne 
William H. Chamberlin 
Joseph Harsch 
Sisley Huddleston 
Sherri Mangan 
Richard de Rochemont 
~ lieli XQL.k John Elliott 
Herald Tribune Walter Kerr 
~ lieli .I.Q.r.k 
Times 
.s.a..t..... Evening 
.£Qfil 
UP 
CBS 
G. H. Archambault 
Percy J. Philip 
Lansing Warren 
Demaree Bess 
Ralph Heinzen 
Glen Stadler 
Eric Sevareid 
William Shirer 
Edmond Taylor 
Departure Age in 
from France 1940 
July 1, 1940 
Oct. 31, 1941 33 
Dec. 1941 49 
Early summer 1940 24 
Jan. 1942 35 
June 1940 48 
1942 45 
Nov. 1940 45 
1938 
Summer 1940 43 
Dec. 1940 (stayed 35 
2 weeks) 
June 1940 (stayed 57 
in Monaco during 
the war) 
August 1940 
1942 
Feb. 1942 
Nov. 1940 
1942 
Feb. 1942 
Summer 1941 
June 1940 
June 1940 
June 1940 
37 
63 
54 
47 
29 
28 
36 
32 
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relations with the United States, and German troops occupied 
the Free Zone three days later. By that time, all American 
correspondents had either left unoccupied France or were 
interned by the Germans. Both Paul Ghali and G. H. 
Archambault had already moved to Switzerland in the early 
spring of 1942 and continued their work from Berne. Only 
the former longtime correspondent for .!he Christian Science 
.M.Q.Ilil.Q.r., Sisley Huddleston, stayed close by in Monaco 
throughout the war. From there he visited France 
periodically. 
Some of the journalists had access to highly placed 
personalities. Ralph Heinzen, for example, was known as 
Pierre Laval's favorite correspondent, and Paul Ghali 
received special consideration from his friends in the 
French Foreign Office, since he was the nephew of the 
Egyptian ambassador to France and for a time had served as 
his secretary before joining the staff of l'.h.e Chicago Daily 
Ne~. Ghali, a Franco-Egyptian, and British-born Huddleston 
later became French citizens, while Archambault was a French 
native. It was common for the foreign bureaus of American 
newspapers to employ natives and other non-American 
correspondents who were intimately acquainted with the 
culture and mentality of the country, since they would not 
only provide information but interpretations of events from 
an insider's point of view.66 
The years between 1940 and 1944 were among the most 
traumatic in French history, bringing suffering to the 
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nation and pitting Frenchman against Frenchman in opposing 
concepts of patriotism. Reporting and interpreting military 
and political events with a degree of detachment was 
difficult for even a seasoned journalist. Since the 
correspondents of the American newspapers reporting from 
France differed in cultural background and nationality, it 
is intriguing to examine how the correspondents' 
nationalities and affinities influenced their attitudes 
toward the war itself as well as toward the Armistice and 
its consequences for France. 
The American-born correspondents most critical of the 
French war effort were Edgar A. Mowrer, William L. Shirer, 
Peter Dewey, and William H. Chamberlin. Mowrer, of~ 
Chicago Daily~, who left Bordeaux for Lisbon on June 22, 
wrote several reports about the military and political 
situation in France after his arrival in Portugal. To him, 
the defeat of France and the possibility of Britain's 
collapse meant the destruction of civilization itself. He 
bitterly observed that "so far, Americans have not taken 
part in the battle for saving the heritage of the Occident," 
and he was shaken by "France's military defeat and moral 
collapse." 
After the French government's request for armistice and 
peace conditions became known, he noted that "few foreigners 
believe the situation would permit further resistance, even 
if it were ordered." However, he was convinced of the 
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feasibility of continuing the war from the French colonies 
overseas and thought this was the wish of "the best of 
France." He called the government's decision to end the 
fight "a flight into submission," and accused the new 
leaders of "forcing the capitulation down the throat of 
France at the price of betraying Great Britain." Mowrer 
especially blamed them for keeping the public in the dark 
about international developments which would have encouraged 
a spirit of resistance among the people. To him, the new 
French leaders were quite capable of betraying Great Britain 
and eventually of turning against the United States in 
exchange for easy armistice conditions and eventual 
partnership with Germany. Mowrer also suspected that the 
P~tain government used the armistice as a means to escape 
"punishment" for "slackness" and "incompetence" during the 
western campaign, and even to avert a revolution by French 
workers, for "German machine guns would perhaps aid in 
shooting down French workmen who dared to revolt." Given 
the stridency of these accusations, Mowrer's description of 
P~tain sounds almost benevolent: "a noble figure totally 
conservative in trend, 84 years old,~ personal friend of 
Spanish leader Generalissimo Francisco Franco, and 
completely swayed by Laval and [Foreign Minister] Baudoin 
[sic]." 
Behind Mowrer' s strident er i tici sm of the French 
government and its armistice agreement was his conviction 
that Great Britain was not only defending its own interests 
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but had shouldered the defense of "world democracy" as well. 
A British defeat therefore meant grave danger for the United 
States, a primary concern of Mowrer. On the other hand, 
Mowrer was unperturbed by the idea that the Germans might 
take vengeance on France in case the government departed to 
North Africa to continue the war from overseas. Indeed, he 
mentioned such consequences airily, even callously, when he 
referred to the probable fate of a French "caretaker 
cabinet" in occupied France: "Judging by the 
correspondent's knowledge of Hitler and the Nazi methods, 
martyrdom would be a mild word for the fate of such a 
cabinet. But the French seem ripe for it. 11 67 
In a similar vein, William Shirer, who had spent the 
months of the Phony War in Berlin as a war correspondent and 
who entered France only on the heels of the German troops in 
June, 1940, criticized the French mercilessly. He saw the 
Fall of France as a "complete breakdown of French society--a 
collapse of the army, of government, of the morale of the 
people." On his journey through France, he had noticed only 
limited damage wrought upon the French countryside along the 
invasion route, and he concluded after talking to French and 
Belgian prisoners of war that "France did not fight." 
In 1969, almost thirty years later, Shirer published 
his massive work,~ Collapse Qf .the Third Republic. While 
his judgment had somewhat mellowed, he could not refrain 
from pointing out that France had been saved by other 
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countries in both world wars. While admitting that France 
"had done more fighting than the others" in World War I, he 
felt that in 1940 the French soldiers "had lost the old 
determination to defend their soil to the bitter end." He 
tried to prove his point with examples of civilians who had 
kept army units from dynamiting bridges and of soldiers who 
had prevented their officers from continuing to fight. 
Twice, France's allies had rescued the nation, and Shirer 
warned that "over the centuries, a nation's decent survival 
depended upon itself. n 
As far as the armistice was concerned, Shirer was in 
complete agreement with de Gaulle that it had been 
dishonorable: "The country, the government [and the Marshal 
were] reduced to servitude," he declared. Even in 1969, 
.. 
Shirer remained convinced that continued resistance from 
North Africa had been feasible, basing his opinion on Andre 
Truchet's book ~mistice ~ ~ ..e..t. L'Afrigue dl1 Nord, 
which rejected General Weygand's assessment of the 
situation. 68 
Peter Dewey, a newly appointed reporter for~ Chicago 
Daily~, shared Shirer's view of low morale in the French 
Army during the Blitzkrieg. Unlike Shirer, Dewey had 
participated in the western campaign as an ambulance driver, 
and he wrote about his wartime experiences in~~~, 
a book which was posthumously published in 1946. In the 
book, he complained bitterly about "the fleeing brass," as 
he described the chaos in June, 1940, when he gathered 
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wounded soldiers and refugees in the area around Paris. 
Retreating soldiers told him that only sergeants were left 
to command them, since "the officers [were] all gone." At 
S~zanne, the highest ranking officer he met was a 
lieutenant, while the streets of Orl~ans were "thick with 
majors and colonels." Upon arrival at Bordeaux, he found 
the roads "pullulated [sic] with golden kepi'd generals." 
Still shaken by his first encounter with war, Dewey did 
not comment on the pros and cons of the request for an 
armistice. He only noted wearily in his diary, "though I 
feel the presence of the end, I hardly care." Indulging his 
nostalgia, he then lovingly described the Frenchman who 
represented to him "Old France," the country he loved, as "a 
Frenchman whose ability to cooperate was not perverted by 
misconceptions of individualism: the Grognard of Napoleon's 
legions, the Poilu of the last war, a man whose patriotism 
isn't rotted with political agnosticism, in short, a man fit 
to live in France.n69 
While Dewey criticized the officers for leaving their 
troops, William H. Chamberlin, who had been a foreign 
correspondent in the Soviet Union for twelve years and who 
worked in France during 1939 and 1940, blamed the mediocrity 
of French military and political leaders for neglecting to 
prepare the population psychologically for a total war which 
required "every ounce of national strength and energy." He 
observed that throughout the Phony War, life in France had 
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remained remarkably normal. The government refrained from 
imposing restrictions on food and other consumer goods, 
neglected to enforce the blackout of the cities, and through 
a strict censorship of the press prevented accurate 
reporting on German military strength. This failure to 
impress the reality of the state of war on the population 
allowed the French to relax after the initial shock of the 
Polish campaign. 
In Chamberlin's view, France lacked a leader like 
Churchill, capable of arousing the nation to determination 
and passionate will to fight. Cradled in comfort and lulled 
into a feeling of false security by the long and uneventful 
months of the Phony War, the population was no longer 
prepared for a German invasion. Many had taken refuge in 
the formidable reputation of the French Army and the much 
vaunted sophistication of the Maginot Line in their refusal 
to come to grips with a harsh reality. The shock of the 
Blitzkrieg proved all the more devastating to the profoundly 
war-weary and unprepared people. Chamberlin's diagnosis was 
somber. He thought the rebuilding of France's strength 
would be an "ungrateful and complicated task, infinitely 
more difficult than after 1871."70 
Mowrer, Shirer, Dewey, and Chamberlin castigated French 
leadership for its share in contributing to the defeat 
and revealed little sympathy for the defeated nation. Among 
this group of journalists, only Mowrer had been in France 
for several years and knew the French well. His experience 
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in Germany and Austria, where he had worked for a decade 
before coming to France in 1934, had made him aware of the 
ruthlessness of Nazism and of its threat to democratic 
countries. His severe judgment of the French may have 
stemmed from his frustration about their failure to realize 
the danger. 
With the exception of Eric Sevareid, who had come to 
France only in 1938, the second group of correspondents, 
including Percy J. Philip, Edmond Taylor, and Sisley 
Huddleston, had spent long years in the country. Philip and 
Huddleston had worked in France since World War I, Taylor 
since 1933. They were less prone to write condescendingly 
and judgmentally. All of them tried to convey their insight 
into French attitudes and opinions to their readers, often 
revealing their empathy with the French. 
In his dispatch on June 19, Philip, the head of the 
Paris bureau of~ Ne~ :iJU.k, ~m~, analyzed the French 
response to the defeat. First, he registered a feeling of 
relief combined with "a dim hope" that the Germans would 
offer acceptable terms. Then, during the days of 
apprehensive waiting, a realization of the defeat in all its 
bitterness set in. At this time he began to sense a 
stiffening, a resistance within the population, and wrote: 
"in Munich they may be dividing the bear's skin but the bear 
is far from dead." He attributed the swift defeat to the 
"collapse in the organization of the country under the force 
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of the German hammer blows" and pointed out that France 
still had strong remaining assets: the fleet, much of the 
air force, and many divisions of troops. He hoped the 
French Empire would be engaged by the government to help 
"turn the tide of the war."71 
Edmond Taylor, who became an associate ot radio 
broadcaster Eric Sevareid in the spring of 1940, had long 
been interested in his French friends' opinions about the 
war. He wrote about his inquiries in the book~ Strategy 
.2.f. Terror (1940); its final entries dated from the early 
days of May, just before the German invasion. His account 
is especially interesting since he wrote about the popular 
reaction in France to the then "Phony War." Taylor detected 
a new phenomenon, the "cold" war, as he called it, the 
rejection of war per se: "This was the first time in 
history that civilized nations had gone to battle 
unsustained by spiritual intoxicants, the first cold war." 
Taylor's friends were deeply troubled. They regarded 
war as a perennial scourge that bled Europe every twenty-
five years. He divided them into two groups, the 
"defeatists" and the "bitter-enders," emphasizing that "the 
bitter-ender does not feel proud in anticipation of his 
victory, and the defeatist does not feel proud of his 
negotiated peace. Each chooses what he considers the lesser 
evil." One young physician in his circle argued for peace 
negotiations and American mediation "before two or three 
million men" were killed. Others foresaw "Europe in 
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shambles" and "frightful massacres" committed before an 
Allied victory could be achieved. Taylor concluded: 
The horror of war among the peoples of Europe 
was far deeper than any of their rulers had 
realized, men held peace to their hearts long 
after it was no more, like a female ape cradling 
her dead baby in he.r arms, until only a few strips 
of skin are left.-72 
Eric Sevareid, Edmond Taylor's colleague who drove with 
him from Paris to Bordeaux in June, looked for the causes 
underlying the French weariness with military victory and 
glory. In 1946, he reflected on the French mentality at the 
beg i n n i n g of the w a r i n h i s book , .N.QJ:. £Q N.i.l...d A Iu...e..am : 
Their last experience had taught them that 
there is no such thing as true victory for 
civilized men who have no desire to conquer 
others. Their tragedy was that they had reached a 
high point of human progr7!s too soon, they were living before their times. 
Sisley Huddleston, longtime head of the Times bureau in 
Paris, and from 1919 until 1936, the European correspondent 
of The. .Cfil.istian ~~ .M..Qnil..Q.i:, felt deeply for the 
French. He decided to become a French citizen during the 
war, as his testimony of love for the country where he had 
lived and worked for so long. His views were diametrically 
opposed to Shirer's belief in military prowess as the 
guarantor of a nation's decent survival. In his book, 
France: ~ .'..U.a.Sll Years, 1938-1947 (1952), he wrote: 
Military defeats and victories are ephemeral things. They 
solve nothing, and, until the world revolves to renounce the 
recourse to arms, there will be no solution to the 
70 
fundamental problems that affect mankind.74 
Evidently, the American correspondents drew very 
different conclusions from their contact with the French. 
Taylor, Sevareid, and Huddleston detected a new mentality 
surfacing in France: a total rejection of war, a conviction 
that nothing justified the deaths of millions and the 
destruction of centuries of human achievements. "Anything 
was better than war." Mowrer, Shirer, Dewey, and 
Chamberlin, on the other hand, characterized French war-
wear iness not as a fundamental change in the people's 
attitude toward war per se, but as a symptom of weakness. 
In their opinion, the government had failed to arouse the 
nation's will to fight for survival; the population had 
become indulgent, self-ce·ntered, and fragmented, and 
therefore incapable of gathering its strength in a national 
crisis. In addition to that, they believed that treachery 
within the government and subversion by foreign elements had 
undermined morale. These correspondents recognized the 
revulsion against war among the French but they probably did 
not realize how deeply France had been marked by its 
experience in World War I. 
Less than a generation before, the population had gone 
through the experience of seeing home and country 
devastated. France had lost twenty-eight percent of its 
male population between twenty and fifty, a million and a 
half French soldiers had been killed, and more than three 
and a half million had been wounded out of a total 
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population of forty million. More than 600,000 war widows 
and one million orphans were left without husbands and 
fathers. Large areas in northeastern France had been 
devastated during four years of trench warfare.75 
Rebuilding had taken years and had been very costly. Losing 
their homes was especially traumatic for the French, who 
build for generations to come and for whom the home is the 
symbol of the family's past, present, and future. To 
witness its destruction for the second time within one 
generation seemed unbearable especially, once there was no 
longer any hope for success. To many Frenchmen, it did not 
make sense to continue fighting for "honor's sake," when an 
armistice agreement appeared within reach. To continue 
fighting in North Africa seemed desirable to Mowrer, Shirer, 
and Philip, but was unimaginable for most Frenchmen~ who 
longed for the end of a war that had been forced on them. 
The government's flight from Paris, the absence of official 
directives, and the lack of organized care and protection 
for the refugees on the roads conjured up the specter of 
chaos and panic. The government lost its credibility, and 
its projected move to North Africa was seen by many as a 
cowardly flight covered up by bold rhetoric. Several 
senators and deputies realized this when they tried to board 
the Massilia and were greeted by the crew with contempt and 
hatred. 
Differing experiences with war deeply separated 
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Frenchmen and Americans. While the French associated death, 
mutilation, destruction, and broken families with war, 
relatively few Americans had suffered personal losses during 
World War I, and they associated glory, quick success, and 
an enormous gain in prestige with the American involvement 
in that war. The American losses had been light, with 
125 ,000 soldiers killed. Destruction of civilian lives and 
property had never touched the United States, and due to its 
late entry into the war, the conflict had been mercifully 
short. 
The reactions of American citizens to the fall of Paris 
demonstrated this clearly. Rather than provoking fear and 
repugnance, the news stimulated them to become more actively 
involved in the war, as was evident in newspaper headlines 
throughout the country. On June 16, ~ E~~ YQ_[k ~m~~ 
reported the following headline from Boston: "New England 
for Aid to Allies at Once." From Chicago the headline read: 
"Midwest is Swinging From Isolation View"; and from San 
Francisco came the news that "The Demand For Support to the 
Allies Rises." Other cities and regions reported similar 
reactions.76 
As in their views concerning the broad question of 
defeat, there was little consensus among the American 
correspondents as to Petain's decision to negotiate the 
armistice. Some of them, including Edgar A. Mowrer and 
William Shirer, saw in him a defeatist who chose surrender 
over continued resistance from North Africa or Great 
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Britain. Others, like Eric Sevareid, despised P~tain for 
accepting the task of asking Hitler for terms, yet admitted 
that France was in no condition to fight on. A third group, 
with Sisley Huddleston, Edmond Taylor, and G. H. 
Archambault, regarded the armistice as inevitable, and 
admired the Marshal for shouldering the thankless burden of 
conceding defeat and trying to save as much as possible. 
Percy Philip and Paul Ghali, on the other hand, while 
acknowledging the need for an armistice in metropolitan 
France, vaguely hoped that the French colonies and the Fleet 
might still be used on the side of the Allies. Not one of 
the correspondents doubted the finality of the French defeat 
in the homeland. 
It is interesting that even for those American-born 
reporters who had sympathy for the French and grieved with 
them over the defeat, France was finished, at least for the 
time being. In fact, many American journalists lost 
interest in France after the armistice became effective. 
Some correspondents returned to the United States; some, 
like Eric Sevareid and Edgar Mowrer, were magnetically drawn 
to London, now the heart of the resistance against Hitler's 
aggression. A few journalists, however, remained to 
accompany the French government to its provisional seat at 
Vichy, just twenty-five miles south of the demarcation line 
between "free" and Occupied France. Among them were Paul 
Ghali, G. H. Archambault, Lansing Warren, John Elliott, 
David Darrah, 
correspondents 
Occupied Zone: 
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and Ralph Heinzen. A handful of 
even braced themselves for life in the 
Philip Whitcomb worked in Paris as head of 
the Associated Press bureau, and Glen Stadler became 
director of the Paris bureau of the United Press. Alex 
Small and Roy Porter also worked in Paris. These 
journalists focused their interests on the political 
developments in France and the day-to-day problems ot life 
in a divided, oppressed, and partially occupied country. 
G. H. Archambault's dispatches to .'..the .N..eH ~ .!.im..e..s 
mirrored the transition from the chaos of defeat to the slow 
return of order during the first months after the armistice. 
They clearly distinguished him, the Frenchman, from his 
colleagues. He showed no interest in the continuation of 
the war and was eager to see France's return to normalcy. 
He sharply criticized the policies of the French governments 
during the inter-war years, blaming them for their lack of 
foresight, for their indulgence in "declamatory speeches" as 
a substitute for action, and for their party politics which 
covered up lack of statesmanship. Archambault set all his 
hopes on the new leadership he expected from Marshal P~tain, 
a "disinterested, dignified and truthful" leadership from a 
man who had "always kept aloof from politics." 
The correspondent wrote that it was no secret that 
P~tain had been appointed President of the Council because 
his reputation might procure "less Drakonian conditions" for 
France. He defended the government's decision to stay in 
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France and agreed with Laval that "leaving the country is 
not the way to serve it." In the midst of chaos, he dreamed 
about a political and economic reconstruction of Europe, 
"even the world," and hoped that by the time of the peace 
conference, France would be in a position "to make her voice 
heard at the council table. n 
Archambault remained silent about Germany's role in 
this "reconstructed world" but stressed the importance of 
the United States' participation in such an endeavor, 
hinting that "the longer this [peace] conference is delayed 
the better the prospects will be." In view of the strict 
censorship at the time, one has to surmise the meaning of 
Archambault's somewhat cryptic words. Since the United 
States' opposition to Nazism was well known, and since 
Archambault emphasized the "great part" the United States 
had to play in the reconstruction of the world, one can 
conjecture that he hoped for an eventual American 
intervention in the war and a compromise peace in which the 
Americans would exert considerable influence. 
Despite his hopes for a new French future, Archambault 
knew that the consequences of the defeat would only be felt 
in the days to come. He was worried because the bitter 
truth of the def eat had not yet "sunk in" among the French. 
For too many, "the defeat is not that of France but only of 
the regime," he wrote on June 20. They felt that it was up 
to the government to "get out of the mess.n77 
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This survey of the foreign correspondents shows that 
they came to very personal, diverse conclusions about the 
significance of the fall of France and of the armistice. 
Their opinions range from Shirer's view that the defeat was 
the "total breakdown of French society," to Sevareid's 
feeling that the French had "reached a high point of human 
progress too soon." It is interesting that both Shirer and 
Sevareid attributed the fall of France to French mentality. 
They thought the conduct of the war as well as its issue 
said something about the state of French society and 
civilization. The defeat was not only a failure of the 
armed forces and of the government which had been 
responsible for national defense policies but also the 
failure of French society to stand up to the rigors of war. 
A totally different mentality emerges from 
Archambault's description of Frenchmen who thought that 
"only the regime" had been defeated and that it was the 
regime's affair "to get out of the mess." In their eyes, 
only the government had been discredited by the military 
collapse. The German victory did not mean that German 
society was either healthier or less spiritually advanced, 
it just meant that the German government had been better at 
making war. The French regime had failed, as many Frenchmen 
had predicted it would after the Munich agreement of 1938, 
but it could be replaced. The French had survived a 
multitude of regimes and constitutions. While the 
republican form of government had become generally accepted 
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since it had almost accidentally become established in 1871, 
both monarchy and empire still evoked memories ot French 
power and glory. A republican government in France did not 
have that quality of the "sacred" institution it had come to 
signify to Americans. As Cecilia Kenyon observed, after 
1776, Americans "tended to associate all characteristics of 
good government with republicanism, and with republicanism 
only. n78 
Not surprisingly, the American editors and 
correspondents were to regard the fall of the Third Republic 
as the culmination of the French collapse. For many 
Frenchmen, however, the fall of the Third Republic was the 
deathknell of a despised regime and the rejection of 
corruption and deceit. For them, it was the first sign of 
hope that France would recover. 
Journalism As the First Draft of History 
Journalism has been defined as the first draft of 
history. It is intriguing to compare the opinions of 
journalists and historians on key events. Even more of 
interest is the question how well journalists in the past 
have been able to distinguish between significant trends and 
short-lived fads, and if they were able to recognize what 
historians later would call key events. One historian who 
believed that contemporary observers should play an 
essential role in the writing of history was Leopold von 
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Ranke, who wrote: "I see a time corning when new history 
will be built up from the reports of eyewitnesses and the 
most genuine immediate documents." 7 9 
Today it is possible to compare the assessment of the 
French defeat and armistice by American editors and foreign 
correspondents with their evaluation by American historians. 
Both journalists and historians agree that the French defeat 
in 1940 was an event of great magnitude with far-reaching 
consequences. Both groups also agree that the defeat was 
decisive and that a continuation of the war in metropolitan 
France would have been pointless. 
With regard to the causes of the defeat, there is 
remarkably good agreement between journalists and 
historians. Particularly striking is the compatibility 
between Mallory Browne's analysis of June 24, 1940, and the 
historians' conclusions at the conference on "The Fall of 
France: Causes and Results," at Harvard forty years later. 
Browne's dispatch, written from London the day betore the 
armistice became effective, could have been used as a 
summary of the historians' list of "causes for the defeat." 
He cited French political passions, the lack of great 
leadership, and an overly defense-oriented military policy 
which failed to incorporate new ideas in communications, 
strategy, and tactics. Human factors included widespread 
pacifism, lack of confidence in political and military 
leaders, and a guts-feeling that Germany would win a war 
against France. 80 
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There is disagreement, however, on the question of low 
morale among the French troops. Several correspondents had 
commented on the "flight of the Brass." One historian, 
Henry Chabert, who searched for the "root cause ot the 
disaster," came to the conclusion that "the collapse was 
really caused by the lack of fighting spirit ot a few 
divisions located side by side at a key point in a crucial 
moment." Chaubert's thesis clashes with the now generally 
accepted theory of the "strategic surrender.n81 While 
historians Patrice Higonnet and Michael Mandelbaum 
acknowledged that certain divisions had panicked, they did 
not blame the rout of the French Army on low morale; rather 
they stressed that overall the French had fought well. Like 
Browne, in 1940, they attributed the swiftness of the German 
victory to the French army's lack of flexibility and 
inferior communication capabilities.82 
Journalists had disagreed on the necessity of the 
armistice and on the feasibility of a continued struggle 
from the French Empire. The disagreement is just as sharp 
among historians, and Canadian historian John c. Cairns 
noted that "no question {had] been more sharply debated". He 
bluntly rejected those who perpetrated "the legend of the 
unnecessary surrender" and argued that the war was over for 
France at home. He was skeptical about the North African 
project. Cautioning historians against facile judgments in 
retrospect, he wrote: "No doubt, the armistice and the 
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P~tain regime spared the French little, but this no one, 
perhaps not even Hitler, could have known before the 
event.n83 
Most American historians examined the armistice from a 
pragmatic point of view. Prominent among them was William 
L. Langer, who published his classic study, .Q.lu: Y~Y 
.G..am.b..l~, i n 1 9 4 7 • He unequivocally endorsed P~tain's 
decision to conclude the armistice. Not only did the French 
government retain territory free from occupying forces, it 
also enjoyed a certain amount of independence. Besides, the 
armistice was popular, and the people "revered" P~tain as 
"the father who stood by his people in adversity.n84 
Only two American studies focused specifically on the 
armistice. Both date from 1958, when Brenton Hoyt Smith 
wrote his dissertation on "The Collapse of France in World 
War II, and the Armistice Convention of June 1940," and Paul 
Kecskemeti published his study, Strategic Surrender. Both 
of them considered the armistice as the best solution for 
France under the circumstances. Smith examined the question 
of honor as well as the conditions leading to the agreement 
to find out if the decision to negotiate was "right," and if 
it represented "effective diplomacy." Lastly, he wondered, 
"was there a wiser course to follow?" 
The first question concerned France's commitment to 
Great Britain not to conclude separate armistice or peace 
agreements with Ge rm any. Smith argued that precedents in 
European history showed that "obligation ends, where a 
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plausible chance of fulfillment ends." The author cited 
many examples of breaches of promise in modern European 
history, emphasizing that "no one can claim that the French 
were being whimsical, let alone treacherous, in their 
withdrawal from the war," since the French only decided to 
negotiate when the military situation had become hopeless. 
Regarding the wisdom of the decision, Smith concluded: 
"It is hard to deny that in 1940 the Vichy [sic] analysis of 
affairs, though pessimistic, was frighteningly sound." He 
pointed especially to the German-Russian non-aggression 
pact, and to the close relations between Germany, Italy, and 
Spain. Great Britain was the only opponent left, and there 
was no indication that the United States would enter the war 
in the near future. 
Regarding P~tain's decision not to carry on with the 
war from overseas, Smith stated that 
in the annals of coalition warfare in Europe, 
there is no instance where the government of a 
great power abandoned its territory after 
disastrous defeat and exiled itself to pursue a 
struggle from some other quarter. 
He refused to compare the case of France with those of 
Poland, The Netherlands, or Norway, who had no chance of 
negotiating with Hitler. Smith added that De Gaulle's and 
Churchill's determination to continue the war were 
"glorious" and unique. 85 
While Smith analyzed the armistice in the context of 
the military situation in 1940, Paul Kecskemeti examined it 
82 
primarily as "a diplomatic and military agreement between 
two governments at war." He reminded his readers that in 
the past such agreements had been the norm, and only in 
World War II had "unconditional surrender" or even surrender 
of the enemy become "final objectives" of war and proclaimed 
as such. 
Kecskemeti classified the Franco-German armistice of 
1940 as "strategic surrender;" that is, a surrender "where 
winner and loser agree to dispense with a last round of 
fighting." Both sides had to be motivated by various 
considerations to renounce an all-out fight; among the 
factors to be considered were the foreseeable consequences 
for France and the war-weariness of a significant sector of 
the population. 
Kecskemeti diagnosed the French as "defeatist," but 
noted that such an attitude was the consequence of 
"overwhelmingly strong military pressure." He left no doubt 
about the complete rout of the Allied forces. Normally, 
France could not have expected that Hitler would be ready to 
bargain under such circumstances. But because the Allies 
had retained their fleets and their colonial empires intact, 
they could choose between surrender and total war. 
Kecskemeti called the French decision for strategic 
surrender a combination of "cold calculation" and 
"emotionalism:" France wanted to negotiate from the best 
bargaining position. Resentment toward the British for 
their half-hearted support during the western campaign made 
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the breaking up of the coalition easier. Domestic 
considerations favored a quick end to an unpopular war. 
Some politicians waited for the opportunity to effect 
changes in the political system, but many Frenchmen agreed 
with the decision because it seemed the only adequate 
solution. In Kecskemeti's opinion, Petain had a popular 
mandate to end the war, but he did not have one to start a 
counterrevolution.86 
Stephen Ryan, whose disseration on P~tain was published 
in 1969, under the title ~..t.a.in ..the ~~ldier, came to the 
conclusion that "the only thing Petain could do was to try 
to pick up the pieces, to assume responsibility for the 
armistice and provide the leadership and authority which the 
crisis demanded."87 
However, several authors challenged the idea that the 
armistice was necessary and beneficial. Philip Bankwitz, 
for instance, insisted in an interview with this writer that 
the transfer of military forces to North Africa would have 
been possible during the first week of June, 1940, and that 
a continued resistance based in the Empire would have been a 
viable option. Bankwitz regarded the armistice as a 
mistake--France would have been better off with a Gauleiter, 
since Hitler never intended to treat France as he had 
treated Poland. Bankwi tz ref erred to Hitler's .Mein .EaJIU2f., 
as proof of the Fuhrer's special hatred toward the Slavs. 
In his opinion, traitors who wanted to overthrow the Third 
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Republic deliberately used the threat of "Polonization" as a 
scare to influence the parliamentarians.88 
Bankwitz's point of view is supported by Robert Paxton 
in his book Vichy Franc~ (1972), in which he argued that 
France probably would not have suffered more had the French 
cabinet decided to go to North Africa, leaving a caretaker 
government in France. In 1981, Paxton pointed out to this 
writer that in 1940 the Germans could have ill spared the 
troops required to occupy all of France and maintain strict 
control. Total occupation would not have made much 
difference, since two-thirds of the country was already 
occupied. He saw no reason to assume that German demands 
and requisitions would have been more onerous in the absence 
of the Vichy regime. Paxton acknowledged that the living 
conditions in France from 1940 through 1942 were better than 
those in other occupied countries, but he argued that this 
was no longer true after 1942, implying that Vichy did not 
deserve any credit for it.89 
A number of studies contradict Paxton on this point. 
British historian R. T. Thomas, for instance, wrote that the 
British government regarded the armistice as an 
exceptionally good deal for France. It openly resented the 
idea that on account of the armistice the French could 
"'browse on chocolates' and sit out the war with a minimum 
of discomforts." After concluding the secret Hal if ax-
Chevalier agreement between Great Britain and France on 
December 6, 1940, Halifax wrote: "I have the uncomfortable 
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feeling that the French government is getting the best of 
two worlds." The agreement permitted the passage of French 
freighters from Africa to Vichy France without British 
interception.90 According to Adrienne Hytier, two thousand 
ships carrying more than three million tons of freight 
delivered wheat, barley, oils, fruit, and vegetables to 
ports in the Unoccupied Zone from the fall of 1940 to the 
fall of 1942.91 The importance of these food supplies for 
the French population is manifest in contemporary accounts 
of the drastic decline in rations after the transports were 
stopped in the aftermath of the Allied invasion of North 
Africa on November 8, 1942. Vichy must be given credit for 
the Halifax-Chevalier agreement, which would have been 
unthinkable without a free zone created by the armistice.92 
Robert Paxton and Stanley Hoffmann differ from other 
historians mentioned above, because they are less pragmatic 
and emphasize ethical aspects of governmental policies. 
This is evident in Paxton's judgment of the fall of the 
Third Republic (see Chapter III), and in Hoffmann's 
condemnation of the armistice. Like de Gaulle, Hoffmann 
considers the armistice as the "poisoned well" to which 
every evil of the Vichy period can be traced. In an 
interview with this writer as well as at a conference on the 
fall of France, he acknowledged that the armistice "at least 
diluted" the harshness of the German occupation, and that it 
kept the number of French casualties in World War II much 
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lower than in World War I. However, in his opinion, the 
incidence of loss and the degree of suffering could only 
serve as a yardstick for the merits of the armistice to 
"people who believe in numbers." Because of the French 
government's commitment to the terms of the agreement, it 
necessarily became implicated in German actions and policies 
and therefore in their crimes. Had the government gone into 
exile, the blame for any abuses committed by the Germans 
would have fallen on the perpetrators alone. Hoffmann 
admitted that the French population, and specifically the 
Jews, might have suffered more as a consequence, but it 
would have been clear that the Germans were responsible, and 
the French government would have remained untainted. 93 
This argument is singularly abstract and divorced from 
reality and elevates the government above the people for 
whom it had been created. It echoes the French view of the 
state as being not only the representative of the general 
interest but as a superior entity in itself. Hoffmann's 
opinion in this matter is all the more puzzling as it 
contradicts his own guidelines for responsible behavior in 
international relations, as set forth in his book, Duties 
~~ Borders (1981). He acknowledged there that neither 
pure Kantean ethics nor utilitarian principles alone can 
guide a statesman. 
Hoffmann tends to be severe in his judgment of Petain 
in all his writings. He condemned him, for instance, for 
having tried "to obtain France's survival by concessions 
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that mortgaged both French honor and French independence." 
Yet, Petain could not have mortgaged the independence of 
France, since it had already been lost on the battlefields. 
Most importantly, the survival of a nation must be of higher 
priority than its honor or its independence, and no national 
leader has the right to risk it. Survival has pre-eminence 
over other values, since it allows future generations to 
redress the score, to redeem lost honor, and to reestablish 
a nation's sovereignty. The only alternative to survival is 
extinction, while values like honor and independence can be 
regained under more favorable circumstances. The case of 
Poland's resurrection after World War I is a striking 
example of independence rewon after 121 years. 
Hoffmann's condemnation of Petain raises the question 
of the national leader's primary responsibility toward his 
people in the event of a crushing defeat. Political 
scientist Peter Merkl responded in an interview that in his 
opinion, 
a leader's responsibility is to corporate 
survival; in other words, if whatever the leader 
does insures the survival of most of the people 
entrusted to him, then that is what he must do. 
To the question, if there was a justification for a leader 
to try to save a country's "soul" even if that endangered 
the nation's survival, Merkl answered: 
This is a very tricky point of view, in part 
because a "soul" is something that doesn't have 
really any scientific status, so to speak, in 
political science. You could say that by 
destroying the self-respect of a people in the 
eyes of the vast majority of these people, thereby 
you might be destroying the nation. 
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Merkl added that Petain could not be accused of having 
destroyed the self-respect of the French. "I would suspect 
that probably most Frenchmen wanted him to do exactly what 
he did, and did not at all feel that the soul was 
jeopardized. 11 94 
It is significant that the population of occupied 
European countries reacted with "bitter resentment" against 
their exile-governments. They felt the government's duty 
was to represent the nation and its interests before the 
invader, and to do its utmost to mitigate the consequences 
of the defeat. This grass-roots reaction was not confined 
to Europe. The American press reacted with considerable 
sarcasm to the exodus of European royalty in 1940, and 
American officials were long reluctant to take seriously 
French politicians who had left France for Great Britain or 
the United States. An OSS report of July 1, 1942, for 
instance, questioned their acceptance by the French public 
after the end of the war, since 
Persons who have remained in France will doubtless 
have, for psychological reasons, advantages over 
leaders of the Free French. It would not be 
surprising if someone like Herriot, Blum, or 
Mandel should become Premier ••• 95 
In the same vein, Sisley Huddleston attributed the universal 
popularity of Petain partly to the fact that he had chosen 
to stay in France. He wrote, 
The same ordinary Frenchmen rallied to P~tain not 
only because Petain was a venerable figure but 
chiefly because he had remained in the hope of 
protecting the French. After all, forty million 
Frenchmen could not go to England or to America or 
even to Africa ••• 96 
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However, the armistice agreement achieved much more 
than giving the population a measure of comfort. It 
established a foundation for all relations between France 
and Germany until August 19, 1944, when Marshal Petain was 
taken prisoner by the Germans and deported to Sigmaringen, 
Germany. Specifically, the extent of the rights and 
privileges of the German occupying forces were defined and 
circumscribed. In his dissertation, "Coercion and 
Resistance - Dependence and Compliance: The Germans, Vichy, 
and the French Economy" (1976), Simon Karter showed that the 
armistice gave the French government considerable power to 
refuse, to circumvent, or at least to dodge German demands 
which violated its terms. Through the Armistice Commission 
at Wiesbaden, procedures and lines of communication were 
established. For two years, the Germans adhered to the 
rules and rituals of negotiation. Even after the total 
occupation of France, habit and routine kept them from 
reverting to a more brutal and facile use of their power.97 
Adversaries of the armistice have accused the Petain 
government of near-sighted egotism, claiming that France not 
only wanted to avoid further bloodshed but also hoped to 
gain a favorite place among the German satellites, while 
other defeated countries could point out that their exile-
governments continued the battle against Nazism and 
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preferred suffering to dishonor. Both Paxton and Hoffmann 
referred to The Netherlands in this context. 
Again, recent studies have challenged this picture of 
heroic resistance. Adrian Manning's "The Position of the 
Dutch Government in London up to 1942" (1978), and Gerhard 
Hirschfeld's "Collaboration and Attentism in The Netherlands 
1940-1941" (1981), show that continued resistance from 
abroad was not a foregone decision. Manning described the 
"painful discussions" among members of the Dutch government 
on the possibility of reaching a separate peace together 
with Belgium and France. They had become distrustful of the 
British government, especially after the destruction of the 
French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on July 3, when England 
demonstrated its ruthlessness and uncompromising 
determination to pursue its national interest. Therefore 
the Dutch were "in a particularly defeatist mood in June and 
July. 1198 
Gerhard Hirschfeld also noted a willingness in The 
Netherlands during the first months of occupation to accept 
the "political consequences" of the defeat and to come to a 
modus vivendi with the Germans. Hirschfeld explained that 
the conservative Dutch bourgeoisie "would have liked to 
combine with it a revision of the traditional Dutch state 
and social system. 11 99 Obviously, the Dutch government and 
the Dutch people drew conclusions from their defeat which 
closely resembled the French reaction. Through its action 
at Mers-el-Kebir, Great Britain had made it clear that one 
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could no longer speak of "allies," and more than ever, each 
nation involved acted in its own behalf. 
It was not a singular phenomenon, as Jeffery Gunsburg 
found in his research for Divided .aru1 Conquered: .The French 
~~mm~n~ ~ng ~h~ D~I~~~ ~I ~h~ N~~.tL l~iQ (1979). He 
concluded that "all nations involved gave priorities to 
national concerns, not to the common war effort.nlOO It 
seems that Richard Challener's statement in "The Third 
Republic and Its Generals" (1962), that "General Weygand and 
Marshal Petain had an exclusively nationalist outlook" and 
"the nation and its interests formed the farthest horizon of 
their thinking," placed the two leaders squarely among their 
peers. 101 
Petain has also been blamed for his belief that Hitler 
had won the war and that Great Britain would shortly give 
in. His "defeatism" is compared to de Gaulle's unwavering 
faith in the eventual victory of the Allies. It must be 
noted that neither of the two men foresaw the entry of Japan 
into the war or predicted Hitler's attack on the Soviet 
Union, events which were crucial factors in the duration and 
final outcome of the war. Just recently, John Lucacs has 
reminded his readers in an essay on Hitler, that it took the 
combined forces of both the United States and the Soviet 
Union to stem the powerful aggression of Fascism, and that 
neither of the two world powers by itself could have 
succeedea.102 Clearly, the future was beyond P~tain's and 
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de Gaulle's imagination. Besides, they assessed it from 
very different positions. De Gaulle was an officer without 
political mandate, responsibility, or power at the time of 
the government's request for an armistice. Petain, as 
President of the Council, was responsible for the survival 
of the French nation and the French state. He had to weigh 
the consequences of the German victory under the 
circumstances of capitulation and armistice. The model of 
the Treaty of Versailles did not augur well for the 
defeated. As one of the victors in 1918, P~tain had 
advocated a harsh treatment of Germany; in turn, he expected 
that Hitler would impose severe terms on France, including 
loss of territory and in all probability a long-term 
occupation of strategic areas. France had to reckon with 
German influence and pressure in all spheres, including 
foreign policy, the economy, and even education and culture. 
However, the government's exodus to North Africa would have 
removed all barriers to total German penetration. Petain 
saw it as his duty to preserve French authority, French 
institutions, and French civilization; to accomplish this, 
an armistice was necessary. 
It would be hard to deny the realism and sagacity of 
P~tain's assessment of the situation. The Polish precedent 
proved Hitler's ruthlessness toward a nation left without 
leaders. The exodus of a government, as well as 
unconditional surrender, leave a nation at the mercy of the 
victor. The example of Allied policies after World War II 
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demonstrates that all victors are capable of inhumane abuse 
of power, given the opportunity. One only has to think of 
the expulsion of 12.4 million Germans from their homeland. 
Worse yet, Germany lost its existence as a state and its 
national identity: it suffered the fate Petain had been 
able to ward off by concluding an armistice. 
Obviously, the American historians remain divided over 
the question of the necessity of the armistice, and they 
disagree on whether it was morally defensible and 
beneficial. However, the large majority agree that an 
armistice was the best deal France could hope for under the 
circumstances. Furthermore, the studies by Thomas, Hytier, 
and Karter contradict Paxton's contention that the armistice 
was not beneficial to the French. The research by Manning 
and Hirschfeld indicates also that a separate peace with 
Germany had been seriously considered by the Dutch 
government -- a fact which discredits Churchill's claim of 
August 20, 1940, that the Dutch had "valiantly and 
faithfully" persevered with "sword in hand." It also 
contradicts the notion that armistice or peace negotiations 
with Germany were generally regarded as immoral. Finally, 
Hoffmann's view of the armistice as morally wrong, since it 
inevitably involved the French government with crimes 
committed by the occupying forces, is not corroborated by 
post-World War II policies. Negotiating an armistice has 
not been regarded as dishonorable for a defeated nation, not 
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even in cases where a long-term occupation by the victor or 
a partition of the country ensued. 
It is interesting that in the eyes of the American 
editors and correspondents, the fall of France was not 
symbolized by the armistice but by the fall of the Third 
Republic. For the first time, the American belief that a 
republican government was the only good -- and therefore 
strong and affluent -- government, had been successfully 
challenged by a totalitarian system. Hitler's achievements 
had been spectacular. Within six years, he had overcome the 
Great Depression, rebuilt Germany's armed forces, and 
galvanized a demoralized people into a united, dynamic 
nation. In the spirit of Calvinism, Americans had always 
associated success with inherent superiority. The French 
disaster was all the more upsetting as France had been 
regarded as the cradle of republican thought. Fear and 
doubt spread among American intellectuals, already shaken by 
a decade-long depression. Inevitably, they wondered if 
totalitarian systems were better suited to surmount times of 
crises. Could democracies survive the onslaught of 
Comm uni srn and Fascism without concessions to totalitarian 
methods and even principles? 
Some Americans, like Anne Morrow Lindbergh, wondered if 
a new age was dawning, announcing itself in social upheaval, 
in revolutions and war, and if the democracies were just as 
blind in fighting against it as French aristocrats had been 
blind in trying to stern the French Revolution.103 
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Horrified, American commentators watched how quickly 
democracy in France gave way to an authoritarian system. 
Did the development in France foreshadow the future of 
democracies everywhere? 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FALL OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC 
On June 25, 1940, France's armistice agreements with 
Italy and Germany became effective. Barely two weeks later, 
Pierre Laval, in the name of the French government, 
campaigned among the members of the French assemblies for 
their support in establishing an authoritarian regime under 
Marshal P~tain and initiating a constitutional reform. The 
plan, conceived by Laval and his fellow cabinet member 
Raphael Alibert, had the approval of President Albert Lebrun 
and of Marshal P~tain, the Premier (Pr~sident .dlJ. Conseil). 
Since July 1, the government had resided at Vichy, and 
upon Laval's suggestion, press and radio called on all 
parliamentarians to meet there for a session of the National 
Assembly. Radio Paris broadcasted its agenda: to vote on a 
proposal authorizing Marshal P~tain to promulgate the new 
constitution which the circumstances required. Laval argued 
that the government must be capable of swift, decisive, and 
unencumbered actions to solve the countless problems caused 
by war and occupation. Continued Parliamentary control 
would hinder efficiency and block necessary but unpopular 
measures. Furthermore, since two-thirds of France was 
occupied by German troops, Franco-German contacts and 
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negotiations needed to be handled by a government with 
extensive authority. 
Laval's efforts to have his proposal adopted were 
successful. On July 9, the National Assembly voted in two 
separate sessions that there was cause to revise the 
constitution. The Chamber of Deputies voted 398 to 3 for 
the proposition; the Senate's vote was even more deci s 1 ve, 
230 to 1. Herriot, President of the Chamber, strongly 
recommended revision, but insisted that republican 
principles were still as valid as ever. Jeanneney, the 
President of the Senate, made a plea for national reform and 
a return of moral values and authority. Neither Herriot nor 
Jeanneney gave any indication that the Republic would be 
overthrown by the planned revision of the constitution. 
On the following day, the National Assembly unanimously 
accorded Marshal Petain full authority to represent the 
nation and direct its reconstruction. However, twenty-seven 
representatives of both houses solemnly refused to vote on 
Laval's proposal which, in their opinion, would unavoidably 
lead to the disappearance of the republican regime. A group 
of war veterans also campaigned against it. But Laval's 
promise that the government would not tolerate the 
nazification of the country and his argument that the 
purpose of the constitutional revision was to obtain the 
least damaging peace possible succeeded in reassuring the 
overwhelming majority of the parliamentarians. In the 
afternoon, the National Assembly voted 569 to 80 (with 17 
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abstentions) in favor of the revision. The text read as 
follows: 
The National Assembly grants all powers to 
the government of the Republic under the authority 
and the signature of Marshal Petain in order to 
promulgate through one or several acts a new 
constitution of the French State. This 
constitution must guarantee the rights of work, 
family, and country. It will be ratified by the 
nation, and applied by the assemblies which it 
will have created. 
Marshal Petain thus received not only the constituent but 
also the legislative and executive powers from the Assembly, 
except the right to declare war without prior consent from 
the National Assembly. He was the "absolute" master over a 
defeated, partitioned, and occupied nation. 
On July 11, Petain promulgated his first three 
constitutional acts. They abolished the Presidency of the 
Republic, outlined his powers as Head of State (~ ~ 
~.t..a.t.), and suspended the assemblies until he would call 
them into session. The following day, a fourth 
constitutional act regulated the succession to the Head ot 
State and named Laval as P~tain's successor. The same day a 
law established the number of cabinet members at fifteen. 
Cabinet members were appointed by the Head of State and were 
responsible to him. The fifth Constitutional Act of July 30 
decreed the creation of a Supreme Court of Justice. While 
the Third Republic had not been officially abolished, and 
the assemblies had formally adjourned, these constitutional 
acts had in fact replaced the parliamentary regime of France 
with an authoritarian government.I 
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The events of July 9-12 were the response to many years 
of criticism and frustration. The Third Republic had been 
under attack for decades because the parliamentary system 
was considered corrupt and inefficient, an impediment to 
modernization, and a system incapable of pulling the country 
out of a long economic crisis. While the constitution of 
the Third Republic had originally been designed with a 
strong executive, the legislative branch soon won control 
because the cabinet members were responsible to the Chamber 
of Deputies and depended on its approval. The result was 
political instability and a frequent change of cabinets. In 
the twenty-two years between 1918 and 1940, France had 
forty-four governments, with an average lifespan of less 
than six months. Innovative, comprehensive, and continuous 
policies in domestic and foreign affairs could not be 
developed. When the Great Depression hit France belatedly 
in 1932, the declining productivity, frequent bankruptcies, 
and growing unemployment which it entailed remained 
unresolved. In the meantime, across the border, Hitler's 
economic policies had led to full employment, and Germany's 
remilitarization raised the specter of another Franco-German 
war. By the mid-thirties, many Frenchmen believed that only 
a reform of the constitution could save France from economic 
decline and military defeat. 
Among the numerous plans for reform proposed at that 
time, a special place belongs to Gustave Herve and his 
scheme for an authoritarian republic, which received much 
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publicity during the 1930s. Like many patriotic Frenchmen, 
Herve regarded the parliamentary republic as the root cause 
of French stagnation and decline. By 1935, he assessed the 
situation as genuinely dangerous for French security and 
proposed drastic steps in his famous pamphlet, C'est P~tain 
gu'il rn faut! CN'.e ~ litain!). The author blasted the 
government for its dependency upon powerful interest groups 
and the press, and he accused the parliament of neglecting 
the vital interests of the nation in its partisan quarrels. 
Worst of all, French foreign policy was linked to and 
dependent upon allies whose national interests were not 
compatible with those of France. Herve proposed a drastic 
remedy: like the ancient Roman Republic in times of 
emergency, France should appoint a dictator for six months 
to steer the country onto a new course. The man he proposed 
for this task was Marshal P~tain. He would be called upon 
to promulgate a new constitution for an authoritarian 
republic on a corporate basis and to begin reforms which 
would be implemented by the new regime. Under a head of 
state with full legislative and executive powers, France 
would achieve the efficiftncy and dynamism of modern 
totalitarian countries. Christian ideals combined with 
social justice would protect the French from the twin 
dangers of Communism and Fascism. Technocrats would replace 
politicians to direct a streamlined, modern administration 
and economy. France would regain her great power status 
through an independent foreign policy. 
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In his opinion, Petain had the necessary qualifications 
for a dictator who could claim the support of the nation. 
He was acceptable to the whole spectrum of political 
parties. As a non-practicing Catholic, he did not violate 
the sensibilities of the pious nor those of the anti-
clericals. He also had a loyal following among war 
veterans, who revered him as a great and humane leader. One 
of the most important reasons for Herve's belief in Petain's 
success was his public image as a good republican. Herv~ 
was convinced that Petain could reform the government 
"without disruption or scandal, without civil war, and 
without damage for the republican form of government to 
which the whole nation still clings, in spite of its disgust 
with the parliamentary republic." Petain's age was a 
further guarantee that as a dictator he would not be tempted 
to stage a coup d'etat and that the authoritarian republic 
would be established after six months. 
Unlikely as the idea of an emergency dictatorship may 
have been, the pamphlet was a success, and a revised edition 
was published in 1936. Herve's proposition to draft Petain 
won support from several newspapers, from the National Union 
of War Veterans, and from the Catholic right-wing movement 
Action Francaise. 2 But contrary to Herve's hopes, the 
elections of 1936 brought the Popular Front to power. The 
failure of the Blum regime to overcome strikes, 
unemployment, low productivity, and the flight of capital 
caused a further polarization of the population. Communist 
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party membership grew from 30,000 in 1933 to 300,000 in 
1937, and the rightist .I:a..r..t.i. Social Eiancais counted two 
million adherents. 
Proposals for governmental reform continued. Herve, 
who had acknowledged in 1935 that Petain was perhaps not 
charismatic enough to inspire French youth, could take 
credit for having turned the spotlight on him. By 1938, 
Petain's name had become a household word, associated with 
patriotism, leadership, and an almost magical power to save 
France. Articles in newspapers and journals proposed him 
for the presidency of the Republic, and at the age of 
eighty-three he was urged to become a candidate for the 1939 
presidential elections.3 Herve's campaign had been 
immensely successful in projecting Petain as the "Savior" to 
whom France could confidently turn in the hour of danger. 
France's domestic problems were the topic ot some 
extraordinarily incisive essays by American correspondents. 
Percy Philip, the head of the Paris bureau of~ ~li Y.QI..k 
Times, and Mallory Browne of~ Christian Science Monitor 
were acutely aware of the general dissatisfaction of 
Frenchmen with the performance of their government. Their 
articles and dispatches proved prophetic in their assessment 
of the troubled future of French democracy. 
As early as March, 1938, the American journal Living 
A.g.,e published twin essays on "French Uncertainties," by 
Percy Philip and by the French deputy Gaston Bergery. 
Bergery described the French crisis as not merely economic 
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and financial but as political in nature. It had become a 
crisis of the authority of the state versus the power of 
interest groups. He explained that the same problem had 
arisen in Italy and in Germany after World War I, and the 
governments of both countries had failed to solve it with 
disastrous consequences. Bergery concluded that 
It was the growing number of strikes, the 
tolerance of illegality, the feeling that 
government was powerless against the coalition of 
political or ec~nornic interest that brought 
Fascism to Europe. 
In his contribution, Percy Philip attributed the notorious 
weakness of the French government to the parliamentary 
system, to the long-term effects of human and financial 
losses during World War I, and to the egotism of the French. 
He blamed the labor confederation for having tried to 
compete with the government for power, and also the 
financiers for pressuring the government by manipulating the 
currency. He was hopeful, however, that France eventually 
would achieve "that perfect balance between liberty and 
authority for which she is always searching."5 
Only six months later, the picture had dramatically 
deteriorated. The Munich agreement had brutally awakened 
the French to the fact that France could not measure up to 
Hitler's power. Again, reform plans abounded, corning from 
all directions of the political spectrum. A remarkable 
essay on the French crisis was written on November 9, 1938, 
by Mallory Browne of l'.he Christian Science Monitor, who was 
just about to leave France after a stay of seven years. He 
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gave it the ominous title: "Dictatorship or Democracy for 
France?" (For text of essay see Appendix B). According to 
Browne, many observers considered the Munich agreement a 
severe diplomatic defeat for France and a sign that the 
Third Republic was moribond. Sooner or later, a 
totalitarian regime would take its place. Browne made it 
clear that such was not only the thinking of the enemies of 
democracy, but also of sincere democrats. Frenchmen of all 
walks of life, ranging politically from the Left to the 
extreme Right, were worried about the future of the French 
Republic. They argued that France had to be reorganized 
before she could meet the challenge of Germany's sixty 
million people in close alliance with an equally 
totalitarian Italy. 
Browne explained to his American readers that the term 
"totalitarian regime" was no longer implicitly linked to 
Communism or Fascism. To millions of Frenchmen, 
totalitarianism had come to mean 
that all the resources of a country--manpower, 
labor, capital, currency, trade, industrial 
equipment--are so organized and co-ordinated and 
controlled by the State as to be virtually in a 
condition of mobilization, and directed 
principally toward making the State more powerful 
militarily. 
According to Browne, "Frenchmen of all classes" were 
convinced that all the resources of the French Empire had to 
be brought together under a strong, dynamic leadership. To 
be sure, there was total disagreement on the methods to be 
used to achieve this goal. Among the groups who advanced 
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programs of salvation were the Communists and the Royalists. 
A new group, the war veterans, wanted a "cabinet of experts" 
to govern France. They dreamed of playing a dominant role 
in a para-military government. While they encountered 
strong opposition from the left, they struck a resonant 
chord in many Frenchmen who had come to despise party 
politics. As Browne pointed out, 
The essential idea--that of a group of men who are 
specialists in their fields and who would govern 
France free from party considerations--receives 
widespread support throughout the country. 
Even though Browne foresaw an inevitable crisis ot the 
regime, he did not expect a dictatorship in the near future. 
The individualistic French would not give up democracy and 
liberty without a hard struggle, he believed.6 
Browne's forebodings were echoed by Percy Philip, who 
by December, 1938, detected a profound malaise in France. 
He wrote that for the first time, even in the rural regions, 
people felt that the Republic was "used up" and talked about 
the need for a "firmer form of government." For the first 
time, too, "the mass of people" no longer believed that 
France would ever invade Germany, due to a lack of self-
confidence and a solidly backed foreign policy. Philip put 
it in a nutshell: the French wanted "a leader and 
discipline." He did not think France would have to choose 
between Communism and Fascism, as Trotsky had predicted 
since 1934. Some type of "collectivist" regime would direct 
military and economic affairs, he guessed, but it would not 
interfere in the "spiritual and free intellectual life of 
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the people." 7 
These articles show that Herve's ideas had caught the 
imagination of the French population, and they convey also 
how deeply impressed the French were with the success of the 
totalitarian systems across their borders. Italy and 
Germany had overcome the Great Depression and were engaging 
in imperialist ventures. They had become a menace for 
France, which was no match for their aggressiveness. 
Only one and a half years later, France had been 
defeated and had inaugurated a new regime. In the meantime, 
the demands for a thorough change in the leader ship of the 
country had not ceased, but became even stronger. Herve's 
remedies seemed particularly well suited to French needs 
after the Armistice. First, advocates of an authoritarian 
regime argued that Hitler would welcome the rejection of the 
parliamentary system as a sign that France would "mend her 
ways." Secondly, a strong executive was needed to restore 
order to France and to communicate effectively with the 
Germans. Third, a system where parties were excluded from 
government would free the country from one ot the main 
causes of strife and governmental paralysis during the Third 
Republic. Such a republic would not be vulnerable to either 
Communist or Fascist takeovers, since both ideologies 
expressed themselves through parties. In addition, 
corporatism had apparently worked in Italy and might be the 
economic system of the future. Avoiding the excesses ot 
both communism and capitalism, it could make possible the 
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dream of a society in which a harmonious cooperation between 
employers and employees would be insured by the arbitration 
of the state. 
P~tain had never commented publicly on Herv~'s campaign 
in his behalf nor on the other writers who had so many times 
called on him to lead the nation. Petain had never 
advocated a constitutional reform. Yet the plan proposed by 
Laval on July 10, 1940, was strikingly similar to the six 
months' emergency dictatorship envisioned by Herve, 
including the idea that a new constitution should be written 
and submitted to the people in a referendum. A number of 
the features of Herve's "authoritarian republic on a 
corporate basis" were literally adopted by P~tain, including 
the title of the Chief of State, the Supreme Court, 
decentralization through the establishment ot regions, and 
the designation of the successor by the Chief of State 
himself. Even the multiple vote for fathers of minor 
children was contemplated by P~tain and publicly discussed 
by Vichy government officials. 
The American foreign correspondents could hardly have 
been unaware of these links between Herve's plans and the 
government's proposal of July 10, 1940. This may well 
account tor the fact that not one of the correspondents 
described the new regime as Fascist; no American 
correspondent compared Pe tain with Hitler or Mussel ini or 
saw him as their imitator. The most negative reaction to 
the new regime came from the Associated Press dispatch which 
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called Laval a "canny rightist and long-time apostle of 
friendship with dictators," but even this report used the 
term "authoritarian France" in describing the new 
government's character. The reports by G. H. Archambault 
and Paul Ghali approved strongly of the new regime, and 
Lansing Warren stressed that its purpose was to keep France 
under French control. 8 
With regard to P~tain's public standing, several 
reports indicated that his leadership was more secure after 
the British attack on French naval units at Oran, Algiers, 
on July 3, in which 1297 French sailors died. No action by 
the Germans could have wounded French feelings as deeply as 
this unprovoked and, in every Frenchman's mind, unjustified 
act by an erstwhile ally. In bitterness and anger they 
rallied around the French government, and Alex Small of~ 
Chicago Tribune reported that "a wave of indignation" had 
"swept away practically all opposition to the government of 
Premier P~tain and silenced Frenchmen who believed Britain 
would lead France to victory. 119 
As far as governmental reforms were concerned, the 
expectations of many Frenchmen were tempered with skepticism 
and a realistic appraisal of the immense difficulties the 
government had to overcome. An anonymous correspondent 
reported on July 11 from Bordeaux that real, lasting reform 
could only be expected from new men with a new mentality. 
Otherwise, "the same old gang of politicians would pull the 
old, graft-worn ropes." David Darrah of~ Chicago Tribune 
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wrote that many Frenchmen hoped for the restoration of the 
balance between the legislative and the executive branches. 
He expected much more drastic changes, however, such as 
assemblies which would only be called into session at 
P~tain's request and whose membership would not be chosen 
along party lines.IO 
Paul Ghali of~ ~~SQ Daily Ne.~~ dryly announced 
the forthcoming demise of the French parliament. He was not 
fond of the representatives and thought it was their 
patriotic duty to commit "harakiri"--implying that 
"harakiri" was an honorable way of admitting and atoning for 
failure. He was sure that an overwhelming majority of the 
National Assembly would vote for Laval's proposal. 
Parliamentarians like Etienne Flandin, who had tried to 
rally opposition to Laval, had been "immediately dissuaded 
from doing so." In Ghali's opinion, France was in dire need 
of strong leadership. Already, the Germans had begun to 
interfere in the Occupied Zone, dismissing and replacing a 
prefect in Britanny and threatening to reopen factories 
under German administration if the owners did not come back. 
Ghali was convinced the French government under P~tain could 
be relied upon to defend its administrative rights in both 
zones. 
On the same day, July 8, Ghali was granted a special 
interview with Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin, who outlined 
the composition of the new government for him and who wanted 
to assure the American public that France would continue as 
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a democratic state. Under the new constitution, the Prime 
Minister would be the Head of State with broader powers in 
response to the need for solving the "dramatic problems" 
France had to face. Baudouin emphatically rejected the idea 
that France would abolish parliament and live under a 
dictatorship: 
Never will Marshal P~tain or any other member 
of government be a dictator. France will keep its 
parliament a true and effective one, elected by 
universal suffrage. French families will have a 
larger share in the elections. The number of 
children will be the number of the father's votes. 
Baudouin also denied a statement by Duff Cooper, the British 
Minister of Information, that the French government was not 
free from German interference: "We shall either be free or 
in jail, but Marshal P~tain's government will never stand 
for foreign influence." The Foreign Minister concluded the 
interview by telling Ghali: "France wants to keep America's 
friendship. 1111 
Lansing Warren of ~ ~lt YQ.L:.k lim..e.s described in his 
report of July 11 what he considered the aim of the new 
regime: to keep the French administration free from foreign 
influence. "Its purpose ••• is to preserve the French 
nation." He clearly wanted to convey to his readers that 
France was not going to be a puppet of Hitler.12 G. H. 
Archambault wrote along the same lines, anxious to explain 
to the American people that France had chosen the best 
solution under the circumstances. He saw only three 
alternatives: a "peaceful and deliberate" reconstruction of 
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the nation under Petain; a civil war; or a German-imposed 
regime. He reminded his readers that France had once before 
chosen a strong leader after a defeat--Adolphe Thiers 
following the Franco-Prussian War--who guided the nation 
until a new constitution was written. Thiers had not 
betrayed the people's trust. Archambault endorsed Petain's 
leadership wholeheartedly and stressed that a wide spectrum 
of politicians supported the "new order," including Xavier 
Vallat of the extreme Right and Charles Spinasse of the 
extreme Left.13 
It is obvious that the foreign correspondents made a 
concerted effort to explain to Americans that France had not 
turned Fascist and would remain a democracy, even though 
Marshal Petain had received dictatorial powers. They wanted 
to convince their readers that the French public trusted the 
Petain regime to defend French interests against German 
encroachments. Finally, they argued that the grave 
situation in which France found herself required a stronger 
leadership than that provided in a parliamentary republic. 
Headlines and editorials in American newspapers in 
July, 1940, show that the correspondents' efforts remained 
largely ineffective, however. The headlines spelled it out 
in big, bold letters: France had become Fascist. Not one 
among the correspondents had used the hated word, but this 
did not keep their editors from branding the Vichy regime as 
Hitler's disciple and puppet. ~ Christian Science Monitor 
announced, "Swastika over Petain. Totalitarian France is 
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Born." ,X.he .N.eli XQ.l:k Times carried the headline, "France to 
be a Fascist State", on July 9. ~ Ne1t ~ Herald Tribune 
and .The Chicago Daily~ emphasized, too, that France had 
adopted Fascism. Editorials reiterated the same idea but 
with more subtlety and not so uniformly strident a tone. 
~ .N.eli XOz..k .T.imil editorial, for instance, was much more 
circumspect than the headline suggested. Acknowledging that 
the Third Republic was "dead," it pointed out that the 
parliamentary system had degenerated before the French 
defeat. The writer thought it unwise to attribute much 
significance to the proceedings in France, since decisions 
could only be provisional as long as the war continued and 
France remained under German domination and occupation.14 
.T.im.e mag a z in e a 1 so assessed the situation sober 1 y, 
acknowledging the need for "some kind of new order" but also 
admitting the narrow limits of action under the 
circumstances. The fact that neither .T.im.e magazine nor 
Newsweek devoted a cover picture to the fall of the Republic 
denotes that they did not regard the event as one of first-
rate importance.ls 
Two newspapers, however, totally rejected the 
suggestion that the Vichy government could have a policy of 
its own. An editorial in .T.h.e .N.eli .I.oL.k Herald Tribune 
declared categorically that "no Frenchman is free", and 
asserted that "neither Marshal P~tain nor any other French 
leader can possibly be any more than a Nazi puppet." The 
editor disregarded any news from France which did not fit 
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his preconceptions as the product of Nazi censorship. The 
foreign editor of~ Chicago Daily B~lia, Carroll Binder, 
took the same position. 
A very interesting and revealing conflict of opinion 
developed between Binder and his paper's correspondent in 
Vichy, Paul Ghali. An editorial on July 10 at once 
characterized the new regime as Fascist. Three days later, 
two assessments of the P~tain government, by Ghali and 
Binder respectively, were published on the same page. They 
contradicted each other totally. Ghali described the Vichy 
regime as "a new form of government" which could be 
"authoritarian or parliamentarian depending on 
circumstances." He admitted that the executive of the new 
regime was a very strong one but pointed out that the 
government was authoritarian only out of necessity to deal 
with the crisis. Ghali concluded: 
P~tain's government has promised to safeguard 
French liberties, and the French people remain 
deeply liberal and democratic. In France, more 
than in any other country, a text is one thing and 
the spirit in which it is applied is another. 
Carroll Binder saw the situation in a very different light: 
"Pierre Laval and his anti-democtatic associates have 
officially killed democracy and liberalism in its. 
traditional home, France." In his view, the outlook was 
gloomy. Even though the reactionaries' goal was to 
ingratiate themselves with the Germans, they would not be 
successful. Germany was draining the country of its wealth, 
and French enterprises were working for the Germans' 
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benefit, while the P~tain regime was "wreaking vengeance" on 
former French leaders. "It is a sorry fate for a once great 
nation," he concluded.16 
During the following weeks, Ghali continued to portray 
the Vichy regime in a rather favorable light. He was 
annoyed that the foreign press had only been informed about 
the new regime after it had been established, but he was 
impressed with the quality of the men P~tain had chosen. 
Ghali observed that 
the new cabinet is surely the strongest France has 
had for the last ten years ••• The French 
Marshal and his advisers have put aside all party 
questions and have appointed the right man in the 
right place. Maybe for the first time in French 
constitutional history only personal 
qualifications serf to have counted in the choice 
of new ministers. 
In Ghali's opinion, this was the government France needed; 
the country could no longer indulge in partisan squabbles 
and parliamentary intrigues. Only one thing counted: 
France's salvation. The fact that the German press gave the 
new regime a "tepid" welcome, considering it too "French," 
was one more proof that the regime was the right one. The 
German invader had obviously counted on a more "servile" 
attitude from the French leaders. In spite of these 
positive signs, Ghali entertained no illusions about the 
difficulties France would face in the days ahead. "Marshal 
P~tain has decided for a policy of negotiations with Germany 
in order to preserve French independence. The near future 
might tell whether he has been right or not." 
Binder and Ghali remained at loggerheads during the 
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following months. On August 17, for instance, Binder 
rebuked Ghali in a telegram, calling the dispatches "good 
but too long," and telling Ghali he should omit "personal 
expressions of approval or disapproval, and stress 
explanations of what was actually transpiring." His 
objections to the length of the reports is surprising, since 
American newspapers at the time were still complaining about 
the dearth of news from France.18 The number of American 
correspondents had dwindled since the fall of France, and 
those who remained were restricted by the lack of 
transmission facilities. 
By July, 1940, only four American newspapers maintained 
correspondents in France who wrote under their own byline, 
though both AP and UP kept staff~ in Paris and Vichy. Alex 
Small of .'.rh.e Chicago Tribune was the only one stationed in 
Paris, while his colleague, David Darrah, and the two .N.e.li 
YQ..[.k T.i.m~ correspondents, G. H. Archambault and Lansing 
Warr en, as w el 1 as John E 11 i ot t of the .'.!'.he. .lieli .YQ..t..k Her a lg 
Tribune and Paul Ghali wrote from Vichy. Occasionally, 
American news magazines would send a reporter on temporary 
assignment. In August, 1940, Frank Norris and George Streck 
went to Vichy for lLi.f.e magazine, and Joseph Harsch from~ 
Christian Science .Monito.t. visited France in December. 
Sherry Mangan and Demaree Bess, as well as Janet Flanner and 
Kaye Boyle, also authored articles for a number of 
magazines. News on political developments came, however, 
mainly from the newspaper correspondents in France and from 
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Associated Press and United Press reporters in Switzerland 
and 1n England. Those from London especially were written 
from a distinctly anti-Vichy bias • 
.The ~.h.i..&.a.g,Q Ila~~~~~' a paper owned by Frank Knox, 
the newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, normally 
permitted its correspondents to voice their own political 
views forcefully. It seems, however, that editorial policy 
did not permit enthusiasm for the Vichy regime. Comparisons 
between Paul Ghali's typescripts and their published 
versions reveal deletions of information wnich had already 
passed the French censor. These deletions are significant, 
since they usually concerned Ghali's assessment or the Vichy 
regime, his approving remarks about Marshal P~tain, or his 
appeals to American readers for sympathy and understanding 
for the difficult situation in which the French government 
found itself. Sometimes, when Ghali seemed to express 
Vichy's point of view, editing substantially weakened nis 
argument. For instance, he wrote shortly after the 
armistice: "In her whole history France has perhaps never 
found herself in such a dramatic position." The edited 
version read: "Apologists for the French reaction explain 
that France in all its history has perhaps never found 
itself in such a dramatic position as today. 1119 
Paul Ghali's dispatches were generally much more 
personal and more emotionally involved than those or his 
colleague, Lansing Warren. This is understandable, since 
Ghali's mother was French, Ghali himself had studied in 
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France, and he had strong personal ties to the country. The 
difference between the style of Ghali and Warren is very 
evident in their reports of Marshal Petain's first press 
conference to seventeen foreign correspondents representing 
newspapers from the United States and Latin America. 
Unknown to the reporters, the conference had been 
suggested by President Roosevelt to Pier re Laval's son-in-
law, Count Ren~ de Chambrun, at the White House on August 1. 
The President had promised to see to it that the Free Zone 
would receive "regular food shipments, particularly 
condensed milk, for the duration of the hostilities," in 
return for a "pro-American statement" by Marshal Petain 
endorsing United States rearmament and the democratic ideal. 
On August 20, Chambrun arranged the interview and introduced 
the correspondents to the Marshal. They received from him a 
written statement whose central theme linked France and the 
United States on the basis of common values. Lansing Warren 
wrote to~ .N.e.Yl XQL..k Times that P~tain told the assembled 
reporters, France 
will remain firmly attached to the ideal that she 
professes in common with the great American 
democracies, an ideal founded on respect for the 
human individual, on the cult of family, community 
and country, on love of justice and humanity. 
Warren commented that the Marshal was reasoning with 
"remarkable lucidity," and he mentioned also that he spoke 
with "greatest calm and clearness" and held himself erect in 
spite of his 84 years. The press conference gave Petain a 
chance to speak directly to Americans about the 
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constitutional reform and its consequences for France, and 
he left no doubt that it was up to the French voters whether 
or not France would remain a republic under the new 
constitution. While authoritarian states had certain 
advantages in competing with pluralist democracies, he 
maintained that in the presence of patriotism and 
discipline, national unity could be achieved in a democracy. 
The correspondents also inquired about the limitations 
which the German occupation of two-thirds of France imposed 
on the administration's liberty of action. P~tain noted 
tnat his government was "bound absolutely" by the armistice 
agreement, adding, "The Germans hold the rope and twist it 
whenever they consider the accord is not being carried out." 
He insisted, however, that in the Unoccupied Zone he was in 
complete control of the administration, and no pressure was 
exerted on him in internal affairs.20 
While Lansing Warren gave a precise and straightforward 
report of the news conference, Paul Ghali's dispatch to .'.I.he. 
Chicago Daily~ was more personal, and he seemed intent 
on presenting the Marshal as a man in full control, 
completely at ease with critical, aggressive journalists, 
and physically and mentally in full vigor. His editor's 
deletions, however, considerably weakened the force of 
Ghali's argument. For example, in the following transcript 
of Ghali's dispatch of August 19, the deletions have been 
underscored to show how these omissions alter the tone of 
the report: 
'This country refuses to die. I know that it 
will survive.' ~ man wh.Q speaks .Qf. Cthel future 
~f l.b.i..al beloved count~~ .a..s if centur~ w.e.r..e 
before him ll eighty-fouI ~..r..s ~.l.d - Marshal 
P~tain who received the American press [in] Vichy 
th i S a f t e r n O On• .H.e li 1.a.l Y i V id im.ase J..Q:fl w.ha.t 
patriotism .c.a.n make, ~ .ia ~ younger Il.Oli .than 
..t..e.n years .as..o. because he Chasl So.t A~ ia.b· 
In [his] yellow panelled living-room full 
[ofl flowers he looks straight .a.t Y-Q.U wi.t.h hi.a 
light .b.l.l1.e eyes, .a..ru1 .the ~m ~Anew Erance 
..s~m..s .t..Q .t.a.t.e ..a.ha.g.e in hi...s w~. France will 
return [to her] former traditions. She will 
cultivate the virtues of strong countries and 
honor [the] truths [of] Christianity without which 
a country cannot live. 'I can assure you she will 
never give up this ideal which is also [anl 
American ideal [: l respect for [ the l human being, 
love [of] family, love [of] justice [and] 
humanity.' 
~h.e .f..ll.t~I.e ~~m.e..s b.ef~I.e l.th.el ~A..S.t f~I 
M~hal. ~.tai.n. He explains why France [was] 
beaten: she [was] materially [and] morally 
unprepared [for] war. Under [the] name [ofl 
democracy France [was] simply corrupted. 'Don't 
be mistaken,' says [the] old Marshal with quick 
wit, 'to be strong a democracy must be united and 
face peril with all its strength. Patriotism [isl 
needed. Look at Switzerland for instance. Is 
Switzerland weaker because [of] democracy?' How 
will you teach patriotism [and] self-force [sic] 
to [the] old generations [ofl this country? was 
[the] question put forward [by] your 
correspondent. '[The] old ones will have to learn 
it through discipline,' was [his] quick answer. 
'Youth of course will learn it easily.' 
Other questions. Carel ~ ~w.il..d .a..ru1 il.h.el 
Marshal answers w.i.t.h Cthel .s..am..e .g,QQg, grace. Will 
France remain [al republic? 'How can I know? 
There is something called popular vote.' 
The Marshall took [his] guests to [the] 
dining-room for [al friendly chat. He [had] just 
received [al letter from General Pershing. 'The 
friendship between us,' says the Marshal, 'will 
last up to my last day. I know that if General 
Pershing was in better health, he would be here 
today beside me,' concludes P~tain. The old 
Marshal does not seem to know what a defeat is. 
This is why h 21 is today the image of France, of 
future France. 
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Clearly, the positive image which Ghali sought to convey was 
not congenial to the editorial policy of .'.r.h.e ,Chicago Ila~ 
129 
~-
Both Warren and Ghali portrayed P~tain as a man who had 
nothing in common with the pessimistic, defeatist leader 
depicted by his adversaries. Indeed, Petain seemed 
excessively optimistic to Ghali, whose personal assessment 
of the French situation in a second dispatch on the same day 
was quite somber. In his opinion, the Vichy government 
would have preferred a bad peace to the present uncertainty 
and its detrimental effect on public opinion, but an early 
peace seemed now unlikely, and reform efforts would have to 
remain tentative as long as the German peace conditions 
remained unknown. Ghali was also concerned about the 
relentless criticism of the French leaders by the German 
press, and he suspected that it was a prelude to German 
intervention in French domestic affairs. He felt that the 
case was stacked against the French government, and he 
closed his second report on the day of the news conference 
with a plea: "French leaders li.i..t.b their hands .f.Jl.li lii~.h 
internal a..n.d external problems, deserve comprehension," The 
French censor let the remark pass--not so the foreign editor 
of T.h.e ~.hi~.ag.Q D.aii~ .N.eli.S.· Ghali's request for a 
sympathetic attitude toward the new men in France was 
deletea. 22 
Since only Ghali's typescripts are available at this 
time, it is not known whether the other newspapers imposed a 
censorship on their correspondents' dispatches. But it is 
nevertheless evident that editors and correspondents 
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evaluated the political situation in France very 
differently. One would assume that editors had at their 
disposal a very wide range of sources: visiting French 
officials who tried to explain their government's actions; 
refugees from France; diplomats and U.S. government 
personnel; in addition to international newspapers and 
correspondents' dispatches from Switzerland and England. 
These could have made for a richly varied picture. Yet 
editorials have a tendency to exaggerate and simplify. 
Editors torgot that no government ever enjoys being another 
power's puppet and that every government tries to preserve 
and increase its own authority. After a defeat, it will 
make every effort to undermine the power of the victor. 
That editors described the Vichy leaders as willing puppets 
of Hitler reveals a lack of understanding of the 
relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed. 
One might argue that the editors unconsciously revealed 
their lack of faith in the strength of French patriotism and 
democratic ideals when they assumed that the people could be 
turned into Fascists and mindless slaves overnight. A more 
plausible explanation for such editorials is that they tried 
to hide a lack of comprehension or a genuine indifference 
toward France by exaggerated profusions of sympathy or 
inordinate criticism. 
The correspondents, on the other hand, lived among the 
French and shared their daily problems in coping with lack 
of food, shortages of goods, disrupted communication and 
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transportation, and crowded living conditions. They knew 
from firsthand experience the difficulties which had to be 
overcome by the government. While the editors writing from 
a life of ease and abundance in the United States "mourned" 
the loss of democratic freedoms in France, correspondents 
hoped for a government that would be capable and efficient 
enough to pull the country out of the misery which had been 
caused by the war. In the face of hunger, lack of shelter, 
unemployment, and worry about family members in prisoner-of-
war camps, ideological debates lost their relevance. 
The Fall of the Third Republic 
and the American Historians 
The fall of the Third Republic has fascinated American 
political scientists and historians ever since the French 
National Assembly--always notorious for its inefficiency--
managed in two days to delegate legislative and executive 
powers to Marshal P~tain and to charge the head of the new 
government with the revision of the constitution. The first 
studies were published as early as 1940 and 1941, in answer 
to questions regarding the motives for the action and the 
legality of the proceedings, as well as the characteristics 
of the new regime and its popular base. 
William H. Chamberlin, fpreign correspondent and 
historian, published his assessment of the demise of "the 
slack, easy-going, middle-of-the-road, slightly left-of 
center Republic" in his article "France in the Shadows," of 
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September 1940. He refrained from attributing the fall of 
the old regime to defeat or German pressure alone and 
regarded it as inevitable. Chamberlin argued that 
Something quite different, something harder, 
more authoritarian, would almost certainly have 
been put in place, even if the French people were 
free agents, able to consult only their own 
inclinations. In view of the chaotic French 
situation and the difficult times ahead, an 
authoritarian system would be more efficient than 
the slow, easy-going methods of democracy. 
However, he did not underestimate the fundamental factor of 
the German occupation and thought that the French had to 
adopt a government along the Fascist pattern. In his 
opinion, the new regime followed not the German or Italian 
model but rather the examples of Dollfuss of Austria and 
Salazar of Portugal. P~tain, whom Chamberlin characterized 
as a representative of French Catholic conservatism, 
followed their example in creating an authoritarian state 
incorporating "Catholic social principles." 
Chamberlin left France shortly after the change of regime, 
his impression of the French population's attitude toward 
the new system could only be a cursory one. He had detected 
neither enthusiasm nor brooding hostility or resistance 
against i t.23 
Among the scholars interested in the fall of the 
Republic, Karl Loewenstein examined the legality of the 
National Assembly's decision for a complete revision in his 
study "The Demise of the French Constitution of 1875" 
(1940). Loewenstein called the fall of the Third Republic a 
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Fascist revolution from above, referring to the absence of a 
Fascist mass party in France as well as to the absence of a 
charismatic leader. He saw in P~tain only a "French 
Hindenburg," "mummified in the prestige of Verdun." He came 
to the conclusion that the establishment of the new regime 
had followed prescribed procedures completely. This 
adherence to legality was exceptional, since "not a single 
one of the nine constitutions since 1789 Chad] been 
abrogated or replaced according to law." But this did not 
mean that the French had been in favor of the demise of the 
Third Republic, since in Loewenstein's opinion, 
never in the years since World War I has a nation 
as a whole voluntarily submitted to authoritarian 
government; the step was always the work of an 
activist minority assuming power against the will 
of the people. 
Answering charges raised in Great Britain and the 
United States denying the legitimacy of the new government, 
Loewenstein pointed out that the actions by the assemblies 
on July 9 proved "irrefutably that the P~tain cabinet was 
considered by Parliament as the legally constituted 
government of France and not as only a gouyernem.e.n.t .de 
L~~~-" He also affirmed the authority of the French 
National Assembly to vote for a total revision of the 
Constitution. In conclusion, he wrote, "It must be admitted 
that the National Assembly had jurisdiction to transform 
France from a democracy into a fascist state." It is 
interesting that he noted that "juridically, totalitarian 
government is not incompatible with what is called the 
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republican form of government." He saw no clear break 
between the Third Republic and Vichy and considered the 
plebiscite which was to ratify the new French constitution 
as "the essential link between the old order and the new 
regime of France." 
A grave problem, in his opinion, was the lack of a Bill 
of Rights in the Constitution of 1875, since there were "no 
legal obstacles ••• to the enactment of arbitrary, 
unequal, discriminatory, and unjust laws" by the new regime. 
Some of the consequences could already be observed in the 
laws prohibiting secret societies and the deprivation of 
citizenship of persons considered undesirable by the 
government. Loewenstein attributed these infractions to the 
"common fascist pattern of arbitrariness disguised as raison 
d'Etat." There was still a chance, however, that the regime 
would stop short of violating the basic liberties which 
France had upheld since the French Revolution.24 
Was the P~tain regime Fascist? J. G. Heinberg, author 
of "French Government under Pe tain," in Governm.e.n.t .in 
wartime Europe (1941), accepted Loewenstein's view that the 
abolition of the Third Republic had been legal. It was, in 
his opinion, too early to decide whether the Petain regime 
was just a "swing to the political right, combined with a 
more extreme form of parliamentary abdication" than France 
had experienced during the past six years, or whether it was 
a revolutionary type of government. He doubted the latter, 
since as he put it, "Octogenarian Frenchmen do not begin 
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anew." P~tain's power, even though it encompassed 
constituent, legislative, and executive powers, was 
fundamentally limited by the fact of the German conquest and 
occupation and by the continuing lack of a peace treaty. 
Though he was far from being a powerful dictator, P~tain had 
a certain independence in domestic affairs, as his dismissal 
of Laval on December 13, 1940, proved, and the government 
also seemed to resist German demands "by means of delays and 
half-hearted execution of Hitler's directions." 
Heinberg was puzzled by P~tain's political stand, which 
he characterized as "carrying water on the Right and the 
Left shoulder." Also, P~tain's aversion to parties did not 
fit the pattern of contemporary dictatorships. While pre-
war criticism had pointed in the direction of a stronger 
executive, the "complete absorption of constituent and 
legislative powers by that executive" was novel. France did 
not have a revolutionary mass party or a new ideology, and 
nobody suspected P~tain of having monarchist leanings. The 
suspension of parliament deprived Frenchmen of the 
traditional way of exerting control over the government and 
using their manhood suffrage. 
In spite of the governmental changes, Heinberg was not 
ready to call Vichy a counter-revolution because it lacked a 
doctrine and did not employ Fascist methods. The social 
theory behind the recent changes was French, not foreign, in 
his opinion, and he was comforted by the fact that Marshal 
P~tain appointed the well-known Law Professor Joseph 
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Barthelemy as Minister of Justice. It was very unlikely 
that Barth~l~my would tamper with the~ penal (criminal 
law) or with criminal procedure. 25 
Would the Third Republic have fallen had there been no 
defeat? This question intrigued historians in 1940 as well 
as their colleagues in 1980. R. K. Gooch, in "The French 
Counter-Revolution of 1940" (1940), thought this would be 
"impossible to prove and exceedingly difficult to believe." 
The shortcomings of the Third Republic had, in his opinion, 
been more a matter for improvement than for an overthrow of 
the regime. The demise of the government had been legal, 
but those who were responsible for it were men who had never 
accepted the French Revolution. They were not republicans 
at heart; they wanted to establish an undemocratic 
government modelled after Germany and Italy. 
These three authors were lenient in their assessment of 
the Third Republic, and did not address the question whether 
a parliamentary republic could stand up to an aggressive 
totalitarian state, as many American writers did. 
Loewenstein and Heinberg were intrigued by the fact that the 
Vichy regime did not fit the normal pattern of contemporary 
dictatorships, but they were obviously unaware of Herve's 
ideas which had found such a striking realization in 
Petain's leadership and in the composition of the French 
government. While both Loewenstein and Heinberg regarded 
the demise of the Third Republic as a revolution from above, 
they were cautious in speculating about the eventual 
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character of the new regime.26 
In the years after the war, American historians studied 
various aspects of the fall of the Third Republic: Petain's 
rise to power; Laval's role in the proceedings of July 9 and 
10, 1940, the motives of the delegates in according full 
powers to Petain, and the links between the military defeat 
and the abolition of the Republic. The causes of the 
general discontent with the parliamentary republic were 
studied, as well as the popular desire for a stronger 
government and a less fragmented polity, especially in view 
of the spread of the totalitarian regimes. They did not 
successfully address the questions raised by the apparent 
rush of the French to commence reforms under the very eyes 
of the Germans or the reasons for the unprecedented support 
which Petain enjoyed in 1940 among the population and the 
politicians. 
The legality of the proceedings at the National 
Assembly on July 9 and 10, 1940, was not challenged, but 
historian Jacques Szaluta examined in his dissertation, 
"Marshal Petain Between the Two Wars" Cl969), the question 
as to whether Petain's rise to power had been the result of 
a plot to overthrow the Third Republic. He came to the 
conclusion that Petain "did not actively participate in any 
illegal action" and that his character would not have 
allowed him to seize power illegally.27 Petain's lawful 
ascendancy was much less problematic than Laval's part in 
the abolition of the parliamentary regime. Philip Bankwitz 
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wrote in his dissertation, "Weygand: A Biographical Study" 
(1952), of Laval's "assault" on the republic and of his 
"singular triumph" in orchestrating the political suicide of 
the parliamentarians.28 Sister Evangeline Steinmann, in her 
study, "The Vichy State and French National Unity" Cl 95 0), 
also placed the responsibility for the vote of July 10 on 
Laval, but she blamed the parliamentarians as well for their 
compliance.29 Gordon Wright also commented that "almost 
every parliamentarian was ready to entrust France to P~tain 
at least for the immediate future, and many were prepared to 
see a permanent shift to authoritarian government. 1130 This 
picture did not change in the later years, as historians, 
without belittling Laval's crucial role, emphasized the 
almost universal support P~tain received for his proposals 
in the National Assembly. 
The immediate and underlying causes for the abolition 
of the parliamentary regime were examined by a number of 
historians. According to some historians, among them 
Stanley Hoffmann, it had become a French tradition that a 
major military defeat be followed by the overthrow of the 
unsuccessful government. Brenton Smith showed that in the 
twentieth century this procedure had spread worldwide.31 
For many historians, however, the establishment of the Vichy 
regime was not an inevitable consequence of the French 
defeat. Among them was Paul Farmer, who wrote the first 
thorough American study of the Vichy regime, Vichy Political 
Dilemma (1950). He argued that there was no German pressure 
13 9 
on France to change her system of government. After all, 
the armistice agreement had already been concluded, and the 
Germans had not stipulated any political alterations. 
Farmer acknowledged that under the circumstances of defeat 
and occupation, an authoritarian regime was advisable for 
sheer efficiency and flexibility. But he noted that after 
the outbreak of the war the cabinet had become the decision-
making body, and parliament had regularly been side-stepped. 
There was no need to establish a new regime. 32 
Several authors contended, however, that the defeat 
brought to the fore an immense hostility toward the Third 
Republic. Gordon Wright expressed it best: 
The shock of the defeat produced an intense desire 
for vigorous leadership and an equally intense 
revulsion against the men and the system that had 
failed to avert the debacle.33 
Even William Shirer, who described Laval as the great 
conspirator in his .'.Ill.e ~llapse .Q.f ..t.h.e l'..h.i.IJ:1 Republic 
(1969), argued that many delegates voted full powers to 
P~tain because they thought the popul~tion held them 
responsible for the defeat. They considered it their 
patriotic duty to make room for a new and hopefully more 
successful crew.34 Robert Paxton also saw the defeat as the 
crucial element, because it not only confirmed criticism 
which had been brought against the parliamentary regime for 
years, but it also robbed France of her great power status. 
In his opinion, the consequence was a "massive repudiation" 
of the regime and at the same time a general willingness to 
explore alternative models of government--even the 
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totalitarian ones which had just proven their superiority in 
aggression and conquest.35 So unanimous and profound was 
the hostility against the Third Republic that even de Gaulle 
was unable to prevent the rejection of the Constitution of 
1875 after World War II, as Stanley Hoffmann remarked at the 
Harvard Conference on the Fall of France in 1980. He also 
reminded his colleagues that there was a tendency to get on 
the bandwagon of success. Among others, Laval was convinced 
that totalitarian states were an aspect of the wave of the 
future.36 
Most striking is the unanimity among historians about 
the unprecedented popularity of P~tain among politicians and 
with the public. Gordon Wright pointed out that not a single 
party voted as a bloc against him. Peter Novick wrote in 
1968 that "No French political leader in modern times--with 
the possible exception of General de Gaulle at the moment of 
Liberation--ever enjoyed such wide confidence and 
support.n37 Paxton acknowledged that P~tain was not only 
entrusted with the executive and legislative powers but also 
had a broad mandate to promulgate a new constitution.38 
All historians agreed that P~tain's cabinet represented 
a wide spectrum of political opinions. Nevertheless, Paxton 
detected a trend favoring technicians, bureaucrats, and 
conservatives over "the more political, and the more 
parliam~ntary and the more left elements of the old regime." 
He also called attention to the fact that France was the 
only one among Hitler's victims which changed its system of 
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government and even began domestic reforms under the German 
occupation. He attributed the sudden desire for "national 
revival," for "unity," and for social justice to the 
government's fear of social disorder as a consequence of the 
defeat and its attempt to prevent that possibility through 
reforms. Both Paxton and Hoffmann linked the desire for 
change to the defeat and did not think that the criticism 
levelled against the Third Republic before the war was 
crucial to its fate. As Hoffmann remarked, "I don't think 
too many people were looking for alternatives. 113 9 
Contemporaries and Historians Compared 
Edi tors, correspondents, and historians commenting on 
the fall of the Third Republic wrote from different 
perspectives, with different suppositions, and with 
different goals in mind. Editors generally wrote about 
France from the point of view of American interests and how 
events in France influenced or affected these interests. 
During the summer of 1940, Hitler was considered a threat 
not only to England but also to the United States, since he 
seemed intent on dominating the world. Assuming that he 
would succeed in conquering Great Britain, many feared that 
German power over Europe would be undisputed. The United 
States would than have to contend with a formidable land-
and-sea power. Moreover, the threat was not only a military 
one: Hitler's Germany was feared also for its aggressive 
ideology, as contemporary reports of subversion and fifth 
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column activities prove. The fall of the Third Republic was 
therefore not perceived as a change of regime to improve the 
efficiency of the government and to reform it for the sake 
of France, but rather as an orientation toward Fascism which 
alienated France's allies. 
Editorials tended to exaggerate the consequences of the 
vote on July 10, and assumed that the new regime would be 
Fascist. They also overestimated the extent of the German 
occupation and refused to believe that Unoccupied France had 
any degree of independence or that the French were indeed 
able to pursue domestic reform programs of their own. The 
frequent editorial charge that Vichy was a Fascist regime 
has not been sustained by the American historians. They 
have confirmed Chamberlin's view that P~tain was a 
conservative Catholic nationalist. 
The correspondents, on the other hand, were remarkably 
accurate in assessing the significance of events and 
developments in their host country. They had the advantage 
of access to the major political figures of the day and were 
able to tap the insight of experts as well as the attitudes 
at the grass roots. There is consequently a high degree of 
agreement between the views of correspondents and historians 
in several areas. Both groups agreed that the Vichy regime 
was not Fascist, and neither the historians nor the 
journalists doubted the legality of the proceedings which 
gave P~tain full powers and a mandate to write a new 
constitution. Both groups also agreed that P~tain had the 
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full support of the French people. 
There is, however, an interesting discrepancy between 
historians and correspondents regarding the repudiation of 
the Third Republic. The historians concentrated on the 
military defeat as the root cause of the demise of the 
parliamentary regime and as the major reason for the reforms 
undertaken under Vichy. The correspondents, on the other 
hand, regarded the defeat as a consequence of the failure of 
the Third Republic to reform the government in time to 
withstand German aggression successfully. For instance, 
Mallory Browne's dispatch of November, 1938, already 
enumerated the reform proposals which Paxton considers a 
result of the impact of the defeat. Both Philip and Browne 
wrote that the French strongly desired a more professional, 
bureaucratic, and less political administration. The call 
for national unity, for a stronger government-·-if need be, 
even a dictatorship--was described as widespread by both 
journalists. 
None among the historians mentioned Herv~'s influence 
on the Vichy regime. Jacques Szaluta wrote about his 
campaign for Petain in 1935, but he seemed unaware of the 
fact that several Vichy institutions were identical to those 
proposed in Herv~'s blueprint for a new constitution.40 The 
correspondents, on the other hand, seemed familiar with 
Herve's ideas, even though they did not mention his name. 
It is significant that they were not surprised by the change 
of regime; neither were they astonished that an eighty-four-
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year-old Marshal was drafted as head of state with 
dictatorial powers in the most critical period France had 
ever experienced. In fact, they expected the 
parliamentarians to commit "harakiri" several days before 
the decisive vote. 
Farmer and Paxton argued that the demise of the Third 
Republic had been unnecessary. The government could have 
ruled by decree during the remainder of the war. Both 
historians seemed baffled by the eagerness with which the 
French parliament voted itself into oblivion. The 
correspondents' dispatches, however, point out that the 
Third Republic was much more profoundly discredi tea before 
the defeat than the historians assumed. Browne's and 
Philip's articles in 1938, as well as the dispatches by 
Archambault and Ghali in 1940, emphasize the general 
contempt for the parliamentary system and the frustration 
felt by millions of Frenchmen who watched France decline 
without being able to prevent the disaster. Only a deep 
revulsion against the Republic before the defeat can explain 
the "unique" urge to commence reforms even under the 
restrictions of German occupation. 
Only the frustration with a weak and dependent France 
can explain the astounding popularity of P~tain in 1940. 
Since 1934, his name had been associated with those who 
wanted to restore France as a great power, and he had become 
the symbol of a France that had held Verdun against all odds 
and finally won victory in 1918. The reform plans of the 
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1930s had been specifically designed to restore the power 
and status of France. The defeat of 1940 had not destroyed 
these plans but had rather made their realization more 
imperative. For American historians, as for the editors in 
1940, the fall of the Third Republic was the culmination of 
the French decline. The correspondents' dispatches show 
that a majority of Frenchmen perceived the fall of the Third 
Republic as the first step toward the renewal of France. 
The Trial of the Third Republic at Riom 
Many Frenchmen were not content merely to see the Third 
Republic abolished but clamored for the punishment of its 
leaders as well. On July 9, Deputy Tixier-Vignancourt 
suggested before the National Assembly that an investigation 
of the "political, administrative, and military 
responsibilities for the defeat" be held and that those 
responsible be punished, but his request was rejected for 
technical reasons. 41 Nonetheless, the call had been heard, 
and it seems that in the summer of 1940 many people indeed 
wanted to see those leaders punished whose policies had 
proven so disastrous for France. Among those clamoring for 
a trial were the Communists, who protested against their 
treatment by the Daladier government. In September, 1939, 
Daladier had dissolved the Communist Party and later he 
excluded its delegates from parliament. Hundreds of 
Communists had been arrested and were still imprisoned in 
July, 1940.42 
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Other Frenchmen objected to a trial of their former 
leaders or thought the idea was premature under the 
circumstances. Nevertheless, on July 30, 1940, Marshal 
Petain created a Supreme Court to try crimes against the 
security of the state, and one day later the new court 
initiated the investigation of Edouard Daladier, General 
Maurice Gamelin, Leon Blum, Paul Reynaud, and several 
ministers. All of the accused were arrested during the fall 
of 1940 and underwent pre-trial interrogations. The court 
collected 100,000 pages of documentation and testimony from 
900 witnesses. Therefore, the proceedings went slowly and, 
under German pressure,43 Petain appointed a Council for 
Political Justice in September, 1941, to assess the case 
against the defendants. Two weeks later, the Council found 
imprisonment at a military prison for an indefinite period 
justified for Daladier, Blum, Gamelin, Reynaud, and Georges 
Mandel, while the others were interned at a country 
estate.44 The Supreme Court finally finished its 
preparations, and the court opened its public sessions on 
February 19, 1942, at Riom. The indictment charged 
Daladier, Blum, Gamelin, and three other high officials with' 
the responsibility for the nation's lack of preparedness for 
war. 45 
The trial was plagued by controversy. Opponents of the 
indictment declared that the Third Republic had not been 
formally abolished and that impeachments should have 
followed the rules laid down in the Constitution of 1875. 
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They considered the Supreme Court unconstitutional and its 
actions invalid. Moreover, they rejected Petain's decree 
from January 27, 1941, which gave him the power to charge, 
prosecute, and punish any wrongdoings of government 
officials retroactively within the past ten years, as 
violating French legal tradition. Other major objections to 
the trial involved the arbitrariness in selecting the 
defendants, and the time frame of the accusation, which made 
the Popular Front government solely responsible for 
insufficient preparation and excluded any discussion of the 
actual conduct of the war. As was to be expected, the 
Supreme Court rejected these arguments. 
Each of the defendants was provided with defense 
counsel, but Gamelin decided to remain silent, arguing that 
he had already been condemned by the Council of Political 
Justice in complete contempt of his right to defend himself. 
Moreover, he did not want to involve the Army in his case. 
The other defendants, however, put up a spirited fight to 
exonerate themselves, and did not hesitate to accuse the 
military leadership, including Marshal Petain, of 
incompetence. They asserted that the government had 
provided all the funds requested by the military and that 
the French armed forces were roughly equal in armament and 
equipment to the German army. In their opinion, it was an 
overly defense-oriented mentality and an outdated military 
doctrine which caused the French defeat. They also charged 
French armament manufacturers and industrial workers with 
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sabotage of the government's efforts to step up defense 
measures by pursuing selfish interests on the one hand, and 
by undermining the nation's morale with propaganda about 
Allied imperialism on the other. Finally, Blum declared in 
the presence of two hundred reporters from all over the 
world: "The public conscience of the world knows without 
any need for a supreme court where the responsibility for 
the war lies." The accused had turned prosecutors, 
indicting the government for its defamation of democracy and 
condemning the conquerors for their policy of aggression.46 
"Riom" became an international sensation for the most 
contradictory reasons. First, it was unheard of that the 
accused at a political trial could freely speak out and even 
accuse the Head of State who brought them to trial. 
Secondly, the government's indictment against the leaders of 
the Third Republic revealed its fierce determination to 
defend its independence. Under the very eyes of the 
conqueror, Vichy dared to prosecute them for having lost the 
war. The point was not lost on Hitler, who berated the 
trial in a speech in the Reichstag on March is.47 The 
Germans had hoped that the accused would be tried for having 
declared war against Germany, and that the war guilt of the 
Third Republic would thus be established. The trial, 
how ever, convinced Hitler irrevocably of the profound 
hostility of the P~tain government toward Germany, as one of 
his advisers pointed out. 48 
To the great surprise of the German press, the judicial 
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proceedings were not halted after Hitler's angry speech. 49 
However, a combination of domestic and German pressure 
forced P~tain to suspend the trial one month later. The 
defendants remained in French custody until they were 
deported to Buchenwald in November, 1942. With the 
exception of Georges Mandel, who had been returned to France 
and was subsequently assassinated by the Milice, the former 
leaders remained in Germany until the end of the war, when 
they were finally freed after five years in French and 
German prisons.so 
From its very beginning, Americans were very interested 
in the trial, not the least because one of the accused, 
Pierre Cot, former Minister of Air, lived in the United 
States and used the American press as a forum for both his 
defense and his accusations against Vichy. The major news 
magazines and journals of opinion followed the hearings at 
Vichy closely. Not surprisingly, the American reaction to 
the political trial against the leaders of French democracy, 
was one of contempt. lim..e wrote of the "shameful job" of 
the newly created Supreme Court, and NBC news analyst H. v. 
Kaltenborn declared that 
The so-called treason trials have created an 
unfavorable impression everywhere. They have 
reduced the prestige of the Petain government and 
emphasized its efforts to curry favor with the 
Nazi regime ••• The Nazis will develop increased 
contempt for a government that attempts to 
besmirch its g~n political leaders because they 
made mistakes. 
When the court finally convened on February 19, 1942, 
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the· American journalists and editors found to their surprise 
that the French government was obviously interested in 
permitting the international community to have a front seat 
at the hearings. The main audience consisted of journalists 
from all over the world~ among the two hundred reporters 
were about twenty German correspondents. The situation was 
somewhat awkward, because Germans and Americans sat side by 
side, even though the two nations were at war. The American 
correspondents in Occupied France had been arrested and 
interned when Germany declared war on the United States 
after Pearl Harbor. But since the Unoccupied Zone was 
considered as "sovereign, neutral France", American 
journalists were still free to work there. While the French 
government nad promised that the dispatches of the foreign 
correspondents would not be censored, the French reporters 
received "guidelines" for their reports to Vichy papers. 
This selective censorship did not work very well: the 
German journalists were free to write for papers in the 
Occupied Zone without being subjected to censorship, and the 
public in Vichy France was then able to read in the press 
from Paris what had been stricken by the censor at home.53 
For three American journalists, the trial at Riom 
signalled the end of their career in France. Ralph Heinzen, 
the head of the United Press bureau in Vichy, and Paul Ghali 
found that their credentials had been revoked and that they 
would not be allowed to cover the tria1.54 It is possible 
that the French authorities had discovered that Heinzen 
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wrote a weekly letter for the American Intelligence Agency, 
C.O.I. (Coordinator of Information).55 His colleague, 
Ghali, fell into disgrace because he had written an article 
in which he blamed General Corap for the French disaster on 
the Meuse in May, 1940, an accusation which the Vichy 
government considered an insult. Even though G. H. 
Archambault received permission to attend the trial, he left 
France for Switzerland before it was suspended. Both Ghali 
and Archambault reported from Berne for the duration of the 
war.56 
The trial turned out to be highly interesting on 
several accounts. Paul Ghali had been correct in 1940, when 
he rejected the assumption that the French government wanted 
to placate the Germans. In his opinion, the real purpose of 
the trial was "to research and punish the use of a 
degenerate regime by those in power.n57 As the hearings 
progressed it became more and more obvious that German 
wishes or considerations really played no part. In the 
first place, the judges allowed the accused full freedom of 
speech, and Archambault was able to write: "there is 
unanimity--even among the accused, as this correspondent can 
testify--on the sincerity and impartiality of the court. 1158 
This surprising information delighted American editors, who 
had expected a "show trial", with forced confessions and 
self-incrimination. The author of "Topics of the Times" 
wrote: "Riom offers the extraordinary spectacle of a state 
trial in which the people are allowed to plead 'not 
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guilty.11159 One week later, .1'..h.e. .N.elY. X.Qll fi.m~ affirmed 
again that "even in Nazi-dominated France a sense of 
j us t i c e " s u r v iv ea. 6 0 .1'..h.e. ch r i s t i an s c i enc e .M.Qru...t..Q.r. a 1 so 
praised the judges--"they turned out to be Frenchmen." 
In their delight over the freedom of speech accorded 
the defendants, the newspapers forgot that the accused 
naturally spoke in their own interest and that their goal 
was not to establish "the truth," but to exonerate 
themselves. Thus, .1'.h.e .Ch.I..i..S..t.i.a..n .S.c..i.e.n.c..e .M.Q.Il.i.t.Q.I. 
uncritically accepted Blum's and Daladier's accusations 
against P~tain and the military and stated that the 
defendants showed that "the P~tainists, military 
traditionalists, and fascist-minded arms manufacturers were 
very largely to blame for disunity and military defeat.n61 
j'..i.m.e, which at first denounced the trial as a "disgrace" and 
found that it was "without gallantry, showing only misery, 
and recrimination and bitter remembrance," sounded very 
different in its next issue. Only secret sessions could 
prevent the hearing from turning into a "trial by proxy of 
P!tain and Vichy," it now declared.62 Only the editorial 
"Topics of the Times" dared to voice a cautious critique of 
Daladier's charge that the High Command had been 
incompetent. The writer quietly reminded his readers that 
only the German success had definitely proven the 
feasibility of the Blitzkrieg strategy, and of separate 
mechanized divisions. Earlier experiences at Guadalajara 
during the Spanish Civil War had sustained the French High 
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Command's position. 63 
While editorials expressed immense gratification that 
the accusations against the republican government, 
symbolized by Daladier and Blum, had backfired and 
embarrassed Vichy, a grudging respect for P~tain 
occasionally came to the fore. Within days after the trial 
had been suspended and Laval had been appointed Premier 
under German pressure, unusually friendly remarks about 
Petain appeared in~ Chicago Daily .N.eli~· Carroll Binder 
himself described P~tain as "the aged victor of Verdun" and 
as a "decent and patriotic Frenchman."64 lim~, which had 
just enjoyed Daladier's and Blum's attacks against him, 
praised his "creaking stubbornness" in defending the French 
fleet and the Empire.65 Anne O'Hare McCormick of~ .fu!li 
Y.Q.t..k ~.im~.s w r o t e th a t i t w as t i m e t o a c k now 1 edge Pe ta i n ' s 
"magnificent job of stalling." She added: 
Reports from France agree that even those who 
disagree with his ideas and believe he has made a 
tragic mistake in 1940 feel instinctiv6ty that he has been holding out against the enemy. 
The reasons for this unexpected surge of respect were 
Petain's decision to allow the defendants to speak freely, 
even to his detriment, and Petain's quiet resistance to 
German pressure during the trial at Riom. The fact that he 
did not bow to Hitler's demand to charge the accused with 
war guilt impressed even the American government. The term 
"war guilt" evoked memories of World War I and the Treaty of 
Versailles, where the Germans were forced to shoulder the 
burden of guilt--and therefore of financial reparations--
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alone. An admission of war guilt by the defendants at Riom 
could have had immense consequences for future peace 
negotiations, and not even Hitler's wrath could compel Vichy 
to commit such an irreparable blunder. As an OSS report of 
April 22, 1942 explained, Petain's resistance to strong 
German pressure "eased Franco-American relations:" 
It was felt that the course of the trial showed 
that Petain's government was more than a mere 
puppet regime and that Germany was not succeeding 
in forcing a policy of collaboration on France. 
The report concluded that the trial had the opposite 
effect on Franco-German relations, since the French 
stubbornness irritated the Germans and taught them that 
France still regarded herself as a great power. The very 
fact that the leaders of the Third Republic were punished 
for losing the war against Germany was proof of undiminished 
French pride. The German government considered this "a 
complete misunderstanding of France's present position and 
of her place in the 'New Order.'" The OSS report inferred 
that the Franco-German crisis, culminating in Laval's return 
to the government as Premier, had been hastened by the 
events at Riom.67 Leo Gershey, who wrote two articles in 
Current History in April and May, 1942, on Riom and Laval's 
return, realized perhaps best that P~tain's politics 
unerringly tended to protect French interests and that 
American or German concerns only entered into his 
considerations as either positive or detrimental influences 
on his goals.68 
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In contrast to the intense American interest in the 
trial in 1942, "Riom" has not provoked American historical 
studies. This is regrettable, since the trial had 
repercussions on France's foreign relations with the United 
States and with Germany. Moreover, the trial reveals two 
important aspects of P~tain' s politics: his jealous watch 
over French rights and his constant defense of French 
interests. 
"Riom" has been mentioned among others by Paul Farmer, 
Adrienne Hytier, and Joel Colton, but has been omitted in 
Paxton's classic study, Vichy France. Joel Colton dedicated 
two chapters of his biography of Leon Blum to the trial. 
The author's main concerns were the irregularities of the 
political trial, such as the creation of the Supreme Court, 
the establishment of a Council of Political Justice, and the 
arbitrariness in choosing defendants, topics ot accusation, 
and the time-frame of the inquiry. He also showed that the 
judges tried to accomplish the impossible--to conduct an 
unjust trial fairly.69 Paul Farmer and Adrienne Hytier 
mentioned the trial in a cursory fashion in their works. To 
Paul Farmer it was a "farce," but like Colton, he was 
unaware of the fact that the hearings were subjected to 
censorship only in Vichy France.70 Adrienne Hytier 
described the trial as a blunder of the Petain government, 
covering it with "ridicule" and "discrediting the government 
even more. 11 71 She did not connect the thaw in Franco-
American relations in April, 1942, to the trial, as 
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suggested by the OSS report. 
A comparison between the reaction by foreign 
correspondents to the announcement of the trial in 1940 and 
their reports of its eventual suspension shows the immense 
difference between the P~tain regime of July, 1940, and what 
it had become by 1942. Paul Ghali's dispatches in the 
summer of 1940 mirrored the attitude of a very self-
confident government, out to clean up the debris left behind 
by an incompetent regime. The emphasis was on punishment 
for wrongdoing and satisfaction of "the people's" desire for 
revenge on those who were responsible for leading France 
into the war and bringing disaster to the nation. In spite 
of many misgivings about the wisdom of a political trial, 
the government confidently opted for an "open" trial with 
hundreds of witnesses. Two years later, the people of Vichy 
France were not permitted to read uncensored reports about 
the proceedings. One of P~tain's reasons for suspending the 
trial was the fear that public opinion would succumb to the 
"exaggerations of the defense," and French unity would be 
threatened. This was a far cry from two years earlier, when 
the government was sure of the people's trust. Worse yet, 
the defendants of 1940 had become the prosecutors of 1942. 
They dared take pride in their achievements in view of their 
successors' shortcomings. 
The trial at Riom hurt P~tain's image in 1940 because 
it was seen as an ignoble act by a much respected leader. 
In 1942, the trial had become an anachronism, and the Vichy 
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government had become vulnerable through failures of its 
own. Only P~tain's courage in permitting the accused 
politicians to attack him in return, and his stubborn 
defense of French independence and French interests 
mitigated the contempt aroused by the trial against the 
Third Republic. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION 
The impact of war in itself provides men with 
a tremendous power for the reshaping of their 
institutions. Without regard to political belief, 
war unleashes forces for social change; it burns 
away weak and ineffective forms of social 
behavior; it destroys many firmly established 
routines; it forces change that ,ight otherwise 
take decades -- Pendleton Herring. 
Normally, French domestic programs were of little 
interest to Americans, since life styles and social 
conditions in the United States were altogether different 
from those in France. The National Revolution of Marshal 
Petain, however, aroused considerable American curiosity. 
It also offered political observers an opportunity to study 
a great nation's reactions to defeat, foreign occupation, 
and oppression. To some analysts it served as a case study 
of a nation's effort to repair the failure ot its 
institutions, policies, and methods by political, 
administrative, social, and economic reform. 
Two days after he received full powers from the French 
National Assembly, and again on October 10, 1940, Marshal 
Petain outlined the main goals and methods of the reform 
program which he called the "National Revolution." The most 
important political changes had already taken place: France 
had replaced a weak executive and an unmanageable parliament 
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with a head of state endowed with dictatorial powers. In 
time, appointed mayors replaced elected officials in the 
larger towns and cities, and D~partements were combined into 
R~gions under the authority of regional prefects. The goal 
was to decentralize authority, diminish the dependence of 
the provinces on Paris, encourage cultural diversity, and 
stimulate the citizens to active participation in local and 
regional affairs. 
Knowing that no mere political or administrative reform 
would diminish tension caused by social injustice, Petain 
opted for a corporate system where employers and workers 
would cooperate, where differences would be resolved through 
negotiation and, if necessary, arbitration by the state. 
His Labor Charter, published in October, 1941, provided for 
the first time a subsistence wage, the right as well as the 
duty to work, and social security. It, however, denied the 
worker the right to found a free union and the right to 
strike. Similarly, the employer lost his right to a 
lockout. He too was forced to cooperate with the employees 
to the benefit of all, including the enterprise.2 
France had suffered a severe population loss in World 
War I and had not fully recovered when the Second World War 
began. To increase the low birthrate and to promote the 
well-being of French families, a Family Code had been 
established in 1939. Petain enacted major legislation to 
improve its provisions. The government provided grants for 
young couples and gave financial aid to pregnant mothers. 
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Families with children received allowances, and those with a 
single provider were granted a special stipend to allow 
mothers to care for the children instead of having to work 
outside the home. 
In keeping with Petain's view that rights incur 
obligations, families were expected to assume increased 
responsibility for the welfare of their members. Divorce 
was permitted only after three years of marriage. Abortions 
were prohibited, and child abandonment was severely 
punished. Partly because so many families were left without 
a father at home, the wife's legal rights were enlarged. 
The term "head of the family" was no longer confined to the 
husband, but defined a function which could be filled by a 
woman as well. Married women could now also enter a 
profession of their choice.3 
But the reconstruction of France involved more than 
social justice and adequate living conditions. Only a high 
degree of unity and determination could hold the nation 
together and restore its will to survive. The country 
needed a unifying faith, and French youth had to be educated 
for citizenship and prepared physically and mentally for a 
technological era. Consequently, the French educational 
system was reformed. Besides courses in civics, classes in 
manual skills, home economics, and physical education were 
offered for the first time. Classes in Christian moral 
principles completed the program. While the Church did not 
intrude into the public schools except for a few months, its 
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role was strengthened through state aid to Catholic 
education.4 
Petain shared with many conservatives an aversion to 
individualism. He considered it sterile and parasitic. He 
was an implacable enemy of Communism and international 
capitalism, in his eyes the manifestations of rootless, 
faceless individualism. He saw Jews as the exponents of 
these religions without God and insisted on excluding them 
from education and from positions as judges. In October, 
1940, the P~tain Government published its first statute on 
Jews. A second followed in June, 1941, and the legislation 
was completed by a decree on the Aryanization of Jewish 
property. By June, 1941, Jews in France had been excluded 
from education, the media, commerce, finances, and the 
professions. Only old established Jewish families, former 
soldiers who had fought for France, and those who had 
achieved distinction were exempted from these disabilities.5 
Beside the Jews, other groups in the population were 
stigmatized as unreliable. Almost three million foreign-
born, among them half a million recently naturalized 
citizens, were no longer permitted to work for the civil 
service. Only Frenchmen whose fathers had. been born in 
France were considered trustworthy.6 Another decree 
proscribed Freemasonry because of its leftist tradition and 
its political clout. 7 
In January, 1941, a National Council was established to 
act as a liaison between the government and the citizens and 
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to elaborate the new constitution. Its 188 members were 
influential men in politics, economics, and culture and were 
charged with advising P~tain. He was very conscious of the 
fact that the new constitution could only fulfill its 
purpose if it was accepted by the French people. Regarding 
the parliamentary republic as obsolete and incapable of 
reforming itself, he asked the Council for advice in 
creating a form of government which, though no longer based 
on the majority principle, would still be acceptable to the 
nation. As a military man, P~tain correlated power with 
responsibility. The hierarchical system worked in the 
military, but how could one translate this principle to a 
modern country? How was the political "weight" of a citizen 
to be defined? What would be the scale of merit? Would a 
man's political role be determined by his position in the 
family, the community, and his profession? Unlike a 
dictator, P~tain left these questions for the councillors to 
ponder and to provide solutions. 8 
However, by July, 1941, to the frustration of many 
supporters of Vichy, the new constitution was not ready, and 
French citizens were still without representation. In the 
meantime, a fratricidal war in Syria had opposed de Gaulle's 
Free French troops against Vichy's army. In June, 1941, 
Germany and Russia had gone to war, and the French 
Communists who had lain low as long as Moscow and Berlin 
were on friendly terms began their guerrilla war against the 
German occupying forces and intensified their propaganda 
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against the Vichy regime. The population, frustrated by 
economic misery, the division of the country, and the 
oppressive German occupation, and realizing that peace was 
farther in the future than ever, was increasingly open to 
anti-government propaganda. The French could choose between 
Gaullist dissent, Communist opposition, 
collaborationist attacks against Vichy in 
and ultra-
Paris. The 
Communists were the most dangerous opposition for the 
regime, since terrorism against the German occupation army 
resulted not only in cruel reprisals but sparked new 
opposition as well as resentment against a government unable 
to protect innocent lives from both terrorist attacks and 
German revenge. 
Clearly the French government was confronted with 
unsolvable problems. The original idea that France could 
begin her reconstruction while a peace treaty was being 
prepared had vanished. The future portended more severe 
economic problems, terrorism, and in its suite civil war. 
It was in this climate of impending disaster that P~tain 
spoke on August 12, 1941, to the French people: "For the 
last several weeks I have felt an ill wind rising in many 
regions of France."9 His speech closed the period of the 
National Revolution and inaugurated a time of repression and 
terror. Only three years later, after France had once again 
become a battlefield in the summer of 1944, was she again 
mistress of her own destiny. 
American Journalists and 
the National Revolution 
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In spite of the difficulties the foreign correspondents 
encountered after the Armistice, the transmission of news 
soon resumed its normal flow, and an immense number of 
dispatches reached the United States. Editorial interest, 
however, was very sporadic. For instance, from June 17, 
1940, until the end of the year, only seventeen editorials 
in .'.r.h.e. ~li YQll limli de a 1 t w it h France. Not even the f i r st 
statute on the Jews aroused the interest of the editors. Of 
these editorials, none concerned the National Revolution.10 
The correspondents themselves seemed much more interested in 
political and diplomatic developments than in Petain's 
efforts to revitalize France. One of the rare topics which 
really excited them was the legislation against the abuse of 
alcohol. It is amusing to read how these representatives of 
a profession so well known for its affinity with bars 
praised the salubrious effects of the new law.11 
Generally, correspondents were in favor of reforms 
which would put an end to corruption, inefficiency and 
irresponsibility in government. G. H. Archambault and Paul 
Ghali had expected and hoped for reforms even prior to the 
fall of the Third Republic. It is difficult to know what 
the American-born journalists thought of the National 
Revolution, since they only wrote about certain aspects of 
it and did not make generalized statements. Three 
correspondents wrote at least about their impressions of the 
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first six months of P~tain's regime. 
These first assessments of P~tain's new regime were 
written by Joseph Harsch, the brilliant Berlin correspondent 
of ~ .Ch.ti st i an s c i enc e .M.QJl.i..t..Q.t., John E 11 i o t t of .The Helt 
XQ.I..k ~.lg Tribune, and G. H. Archambault of .The .N.eli YQ..r.k 
~~m~~. Harsch spent two weeks in Unoccupied France and 
wrote four incisive articles about the experience. What he 
found there surprised him: Vichy was not a German "puppet 
government," and it was not Fascist. According to Harsch, 
P~tain let Laval deal with foreign policy as long as he did 
not jeopardize French honor. The Marshal himself 
concentrated on "trying to make France function." P~tain's 
ideas on government and order were typical of any old 
soldier unfamiliar with the workings of a democratic 
government. The anti-democratic trend of the Vichy regime 
lacked unity, purpose, and popular support, in Harsch's 
opinion, and was merely an expression of a general revulsion 
against the "corrup~ion and machine politics" of the past. 
Referring probably to the ,Chantiers .de~ Jeunesse, Harsch 
described the youth movement as similar to the CCC and the 
WPA in the United States, which were also established to 
provide work relief and to keep unemployed youths off the 
streets. Harsch attributed censorship and the anti-Jewish 
legislation, on the other hand, to German pressures. 
The Berlin correspondent was astonished that public 
opinion had not awakened to a full realization of the defeat 
and its consequences. Since Har sch was used to the German 
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public's acceptance of a strict rationing system, he was 
shocked by the public disregard for similar measures in 
France. Living conditions in France varied immensely, and 
he found the French "living off stored-up resources of the 
past heedlessly or desperately, or sometimes even gaily." 
At the same time, real misery existed in the cities 
overcrowded with refugees and among the one million 
unemployed. Harsch's report suggests that it was much 
easier to abolish the outward trappings of the Third 
Republic than to destroy its spirit. P~tain's pleas to the 
population to unite in common purpose and sacrifice had not 
been heard by the wives and mistresses of officials and 
diploma ts, who astonished Harsch with their luxurious 
attire; nor had they been heard by the haberdasher who had 
only a dozen pairs of socks left to sell but nevertheless 
went all out to sell the correspondent several pairs. 
Coming from austere Berlin, Harsch called Vichy a "tinseled 
bit of unreality." He thought the hungry, angry masses 
would one day shred it all to bits and scatter "its dreams 
of kings and corporative states and obedient workers, and 
army style civil service to the winds." As to public 
opinion on the new regime, he wrote that the populace 
watched Vichy "with a disassociated eye, conforming, when it 
chooses, to Vichy edicts, but ignoring with equal freedom 
when it is so inclined." Among the government officials, 
the only one to inspire trust was P~tain, and the people's 
faith in him was "compounded of affection, pity, and 
172 
confidence in his integrity.n12 
About a month later, John Elliott reported on the state 
of France. He painted a somber picture. Half a year had 
passed since the Armistice. One and one-half million 
Frenchmen were still prisoners of war in Germany. The 
National Assembly and the general councils of the 
D~parternents remained suspended; a number of mayors and town 
councils had been dismissed for "persistent hostility" 
toward the regime; and one could not be sure what the French 
people thought about the new government and its program. 
"The 'vox populi' has had little chance of making itself 
heard," he added. One thing was certain -- the Marshal was 
personally popular .13 
The circumstances surrounding G. H. Archambault's 
essay, "Frenchman of the Hour," on January 19, 1941, are 
interesting. P~tain had already been severely criticized in 
the United States for his authoritarianism and for his 
statute on the Jews. But President Roosevelt had decided to 
send his friend, Admiral Leahy, as ambassador to Vichy, to 
counteract German pressures on P~tain. Before this goal, 
"minor considerations" such as discrimination against the 
Jews fell by the wayside. 
Archambault dwelt mainly on P~tain's personal 
qualities, and he portrayed him as a natural leader and a 
soldier. In an account of his career, he underscored 
P~tain's leadership qualities: independence of thought and 
decisiveness coupled with careful examination of a given 
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problem. He sternly told liberals who were hostile toward 
P~tain because of his authoritarianism that "the fact stands 
that today he personifies faith and hope throughout the 
unoccupied zone, and the occupied zone also is rallying to 
him." Nevertheless, he was not optimistic about P~tain's 
chances of success, because of the German occupation and 
also because the Vichy leadership had not yet proven 
trustworthy. 14 
This skepticism regarding the chances for success of 
Petain's reform program was shared by all the 
correspondents. Ghali's dispatches especially reveal the 
staggering impediments against it. Among those who actively 
worked against P~tain's efforts to keep all Frenchmen united 
were Germans, French collaborationists, Gaullists and other 
dissidents, and, by the summer of 1941, a growing segment of 
the population which had expected peace and normal living 
conditions to return within a few months after the 
armistice. Ghali's reports show a long decline from the 
hope and confidence in the new regime to its beleaguered 
position by 1942. The correspondent belonged to those who 
had been glad to see the politicians go in 1940 and who 
supported political and administrative reforms as necessary 
for France's survival. He regarded the slogan "Family, 
Work, Country," not so much as a substitute for "Liberty, 
Equality, and Fraternity" but rather as a program for the 
hard and somber times ahead. 
Ghali deplored P~tain's failure to explain to the 
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population how difficult the government's task was. 
Especially in the Occupied Zone, the public needed to hear 
that the French government had shown firmness and was doing 
its best to reisist German demands. "French national pride 
[isl undoubtedly very shaken these days," he wrote, "and the 
country needs all [that] can enhance national prestige. 11 15 
In July, 1941, P~tain made a trip to Savoy where he outlined 
the Labor Charter and talked about his plan to decentralize 
France and to resurrect the ancient R~gions. Ghali thought 
the popular Marshal would find it "relatively easy" to 
convince the public in the Unoccupied Zone that the new 
measures would be "for the good of France." However, things 
were different in the Occupied Zone, where P~tain's efforts 
"were terribly handicapped" and often derided as 
reactionary. To Ghali, the Marshal's enthusiastic reception 
in Savoy proved again that he was "the best propagandist for 
his regime." Ruefully, he repeated what he had written a 
year before: "Such trips [are] badly needed in the occupied 
zone." 
Ghali obviously wanted to inform the American public 
that the two parts of France had become alienated from each 
other, and the government at Vichy was too remote from daily 
life in the Occupied Zone to command the authority and 
allegiance it relied upon in the Free Zone. P~tain had been 
concerned about the unity of France on the morrow of the 
defeat. Since then the artificial division of the nation 
had further aggravated the problem. Ghali wrote that France 
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was becoming restless. One year after the fall of the Third 
Republic, France still did not have a new constitution. 
Well-informed sources indicated that the projected 
parliament would consist of two houses, but their members 
would not be elected by the voters at large. One house 
would consist of two hundred members; half of them would be 
appointed by the Head of State, the other half by 
corporations and provincial councils. The three hundred 
members of the other house would be elected by "families, 
trades, and the Legion of Veterans." Ghali noted that 
objections to this scheme had been raised in the Paris paper 
Nouveaux .!r..e.IDD.S with the argument that only the people could 
delegate power and that this delegation was "hardly clear" 
in the projected constitution.16 
Writing for an American audience, the correspondents 
concentrated primarily on the French government's dealings 
with Germany, on its defense of the Empire, and on the shaky 
Franco-American relations. They reported important domestic 
legislation but often without commenting on its significance 
or portent. Consequently, their dispatches rarely elicited 
editorial analysis. However, some of the new laws aroused 
an unusual interest in the United States, among them the 
decree interdicting secret societies and the creation of 
industrial committees to control all aspects of industry 
without consultation with labor. The announcement in July, 
1941, that the new constitution would be the foundation of 
an authoritarian, hierarchical, and social state aroused the 
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editors' contempt. The two statutes on the Jews of October, 
1940, and June, 1941, as well as the persecution of the Jews 
throughout the period of German occupation gave rise to 
sharp criticism of P~tain's government. 
The interdiction of the Masonic order on August 13, 
1940, was one of the first suppressive measures reported by 
Ghali, who explained that French rightists had achieved one 
of their most cherished objectives in crushing Freemasonry. 
He mentioned that French Masonry had always been influential 
in politics and had been accused "of being mixed in 
practically all financial scandals." It was widely believed 
that half of all the Freemasons were government officials 
and politicians. French Masonry, traditionally leftist, was 
accused of having been responsible for the close links 
between Socialists and Communists in 1936. According to 
Ghali, the government wanted to get rid of them now because 
they were Socialists. He thought if they had remained a 
purely philanthropic organization like the British and 
American lodges, they would not be in such difficulties. 17 
Ghali's opinion about the Masons was not to his foreign 
editor's liking. His dispatch was censored before 
publication, and the reference to the non-political British 
and American lodges was omitted. In addition, Carroll 
Binder published his own opinion about French Masonry two 
days later in an editorial, in which he wrote, "The 
reactionaries continued this week to reshape France after 
their heart's desire. They dissolved the Masonic lodges 
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which played such a large role in the liberal politics of 
pre-1940 France.nl8 That the lodges were not quite so 
harmless was revealed in li.m~ magazine's report which 
acknowledged that Masonry for years had been dominating the 
government behind the scenes.19 In france Qil ~J.in ~i.m~ 
(1941), Thomas Kernan accused French Freemasonry of 
controlling high political positions and of protecting 
corrupt politicians.20 
Vichy's labor policy was among the measures which 
aroused American criticism from the start. In August, 1940, 
the government permitted employers to violate the forty-hour 
work week and industrial committees began to direct industry 
without consulting labor. Ghali excused these actions on 
the grounds that defeated France could no longer afford the 
regulations which had been adopted when the country was 
"rich and happy." He called the projected cooperation 
between employers and employees on a corporate basis a 
"revolutionary step" toward social justice without bowing to 
Communist extremism.21 To the editor of~ Chicago Daily 
N.eJi.s,, however, corporatism meant nothing less than the end 
of organized labor: "they are just tossing out that corpse 
in the alley." Corporative labor was "slave labor," in his 
opinion. "It means go where you're sent, do what you're 
told, take what we give you, and carry your hat in your 
hand. 11 22 
As might be expected, Petain's announcement of the new 
constitution, which would establish an "authoritarian, 
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hierarchical, social state" was greeted with open derision 
by American editors • .T.b..e Ne.li Yru.:.k Herald Tribune editorial 
was entitled "Back to the Middle Ages," and TM .b~li.an 
~~.e .M.QnilJu called Petain "an agent of reaction." The 
Monitor concluded that Petain "simply [didl not believe in 
the democratic way of life" and that the state he envisioned 
fitted far better into Hitler's Europe than in a Europe of 
free nations • .The. Christian Century was just as categorical 
in its rejection: "What it boils down to is the denial of 
the right of the people to set up a government to protect 
their common interests, and the substitution of government 
by a clique. 
out.n23 
That is where the French Revolution went 
There is a striking contrast between the lack of 
interest shown by the liberal press in Vichy's social 
reforms and their passionate discussion in Christian 
mag a z i n e s 1 i k e Am.e..r..i..Q.a, .The ,CQ.m ID..Q.llli..e.a.l., and .The .clu..i..a.t.u..n 
Many of Vichy's concerns evidently struck a 
responsive chord among American Christians. In August, 
1940, .T.b..e Christian Century commented on Petain's call for a 
moral renewal: "There is more than regimentation for a 
fascist society in all this. Behind it lies the 
recognition, born of catastrophe, that moral laxity produces 
a sort of softness which is as suicidal for nations as for 
men.n24 
In Sept ember, 194 0, the Catholic monthly Am.e..I.ll.a 
published John La Farge's enthusiastic comments. He related 
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that French Catholic Action had worked for the same goals: 
Its aim was to realize on a lasting 
thoroughly popular foundation that regenerated 
structure of authority, family, labor and 
agriculture which the P~tain Government is now 
heroically trying to ere~~ in desperate haste amid 
desperate circumstances. 
Harvard professor Louis Mercier also recognized the long-
cherished ideals of French Christians in P~tain's "social 
justice," which he defined as "social realism." Mercier 
argued that 
For class war, social realism would 
substitute class cooperation, and for individual 
selfishness, self-consecration for the common 
good, warmed by feelings of pa[riotism and of 
Christian universal brotherhood.2 
Mercier saw the ideals of the National Revolution as the 
antithesis of Nazism. His enthusiastic article, "The New 
French Regime," published in March, 1941, in~ ~lll.Q.llli.e..a.l, 
provoked a heated but civilized debate over the following 
months. 
Yves Simon, of Notre Dame University, wrote a sharp 
rebuttal, which derided the idea that the Germans would 
tolerate "the antithesis of Nazism" under their very eyes. 
He defined P~tain's regime as "a 
' 
transitional regime, 
intended to make possible a thorough domination of the 
international Nazis over the French people. 11 27 In his 
counterattack, Mercier referred to the endorsement given to 
P~tain by the Catholic Episcopate and Pastor Boegner, the 
president of the Protestant Federation of the Reformed 
Churches, as a proof that his program was compatible with 
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Christian values. In turn, he enumerated Petain's 
implacable adversaries: "all the anti-Christian groups so 
ceaselessly active under the French Republic in 
dechristianizing France, all the communists, and all those 
for whom profit is the only fatherland would no doubt gladly 
sweep P~tain from power.n28 
A letter from France in response to Mercier's article 
supported Simon's opinion that under German occupation real 
reform was impossible.29 However, a few months later, Helen 
Iswolsky, daughter of the former Russian ambassador to 
France, wrote an essay, "Rebuilding in France," which echoed 
Mercier's views. She had been in close contact with French 
social workers during the previous year and had come to 
respect their work highly. Whatever Vichy's shortcomings 
were, it was clear that the government was "zealously 
devoting itself to social work." And, she added, "it is for 
the present that which is most important to the French." 
She left no doubt that the National Revolution was "a vital 
necessity," and that everybody agreed on that. In the 
domestic sphere, the P~tain government had a much wider 
range of freedom than in foreign politics, because the 
Germans did not interfere in such matters in the Free Zone. 
Unlike many Americans, she found it completely appropriate 
to start reforms before the war was over or the country 
liberated, since 
the old framework, which resisted all previous 
attempts to reform, has been broken up by war and 
def eat. There actually exists a sort o~ 0tabul..a 
~, on which the new state can be built. 
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She stressed that "what is best and most durable in the new 
order in France is based on the Catholic social movement." 
Iswolsky did not avoid the question posed by Americans like 
Simon, who asked whether the reformers were not in truth 
collaborating with Nazism, since they worked with the 
shackled Vichy regime. She denied the allegation, citing 
one of the reformers who described his job as strengthening 
French youth physically and morally to withstand the 
influence of Nazism. While Iswolsky was basically in favor 
of the National Revolution, she criticized some of Petain' s 
measures and rejected his "reactionary Catholic order" as 
well as the labor policies which suppressed free unions and 
tended toward state corporatism. 
In spite of the Church's initial support of Petain's 
ideals and goals, problems soon arose between many French 
Catholics and their government. Herbert Morris traced their 
gradual disenchantment with the Vichy regime for the readers 
of .The .,C.QmID.Qil~. Among other grievances, Catholic workers 
did not support Petain's anti-Semitic legislation. They 
joined the French unions to protest against discrimination 
based on race or creed for the first time in November, 1940, 
and reiterated this opposition on the occasions of May Day 
in 1941 an 1942. They also opposed the dissolution of the 
free labor unions and the establishment of state-imposed 
mixed corporate unions. Catholic youth, treated with 
benevolence by the government, objected to the intrusion of 
the Department for Youth Affairs into the training of 
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leaders by its organizations. While the "conformist mass" 
was still looking to P~tain for guidance, Morris insisted 
that critical Catholics were concerned about Vichy's 
increasing collaboration with the Germans and ashamed of the 
government's involvement in the rounding up and deportation 
of Jews.31 The increasingly authoritarian and anti-Semitic 
character of the Vichy regime also alienated American 
Catholic and Protestant magazines which had been intuitively 
sympathetic to many of the ideals of the National 
Revolution. 
The anti-Semitic aspects of Petain's National 
Revolution aroused more attention, concern, and comment in 
American newspapers than any other French domestic issue 
during the Vichy period. The first statute on the Jews, 
which excluded them from high public office, teaching, and 
the media, was issued in October, 1940, and came as a shock 
to most Americans. lim..e. magazine expressed this sense of 
disbelief and shame in the following editorial comment: 
Last week for the first time came words so un-
French, so very German in accent that the outside 
world found it hard to believe that they came from 
the mouth of a~ old fighte~ for France, Henri 
Philippe P~tain. 2 
They should not have been surprised. As early as 
August 28, Paul Ghali reported that the law against 
slandering racial or religious groups had been revoked. He 
expected the rise of "anti-Jewish feelings", even though the 
French people were not anti-Semitic and had no strong racial 
prejudices. While the law did not mention Jews 
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specifically, polemicists would undoubtedly use the 
opportunity to start a campaign against them because "they 
were richer, and had more political influence." Part of the 
reason was the massive unemployment, and, as Ghali remarked 
coldly, "getting rid of Jews [inl offices [and in the] 
professions would mean more jobs available." He added that 
personal attacks on individuals were still prohibited, and 
an "authoritative source" in the Ministry of Justice had 
assured him that the government would censure such a hate 
campaign severely.33 
On October 18, after the promulgation of the first 
statute on the Jews, Ghali wrote: 
Once again [the] wandering Jew has to pick up 
his pack [and] start again [his] eternal 
wanderings. France once [the] most liberal 
country in [the] world for them decided this 
morning [to] treat them as second rate citizens. 
He noted that France had practically been the "only country 
left for Jewish activities." He continued to insist that 
the country as a whole was not hostile toward the Jews. It 
was just that the bourgeoisie· presently in power "always had 
[al touch [of] anti-Semitism ever since the Dreyfus case." 
Moreover, he argued, the Vichy regime had decreed the law 
against the Jews because it desired to "place itself [in al 
better position [to] cooperate fully with [the] Germans." 
In the long run, Ghali believed, the decree would damage the 
country. It would not alter the attitude of French peasants 
and workers, and the Jews would merely "transfer [their] 
money activities in more hospitable soil" at a time when 
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France needed the help of all her citizens.34 
Not all correspondents agreed with Ghali that anti-
semitism was confined to the ruling circles of the regime or 
simply adopted as a ploy to mollify the Germans. Both Alex 
Small and William H. Chamberlin reported "growing anti-
semitism" among the population at large. It was alleged 
that many Nazi agents had slipped into the country under the 
cloak of Jewish refugees and then undermined the French war 
effort. Others blamed the Jewish refugees for plunging 
France into a hopeless war against Germany. They had, it 
was said, described the German armed forces as weak, 
underequipped, and demoralized and thus easy to defeat. 
Often the charges were contradictory; some Frenchmen branded 
the Jews as war-mongers; others linked them to Communism and 
accused them of defeatism in 1939.3 5 
Thomas Kernan, who had worked in Paris for the well 
known fashion magazine Vogue, advanced more specific reasons 
to explain the persistent resentment against the Jews. He 
blamed it partly on the unwillingness of Jewish refugees to 
fight for France during the war. In order to avoid 
obligatory military service, many alien Jews had lived in 
France for years without applying for citizenship, Kernan 
averred. When the war broke out, male enemy aliens, 
including Jewish refugees from Germany, were interned in 
camps. These internees, however, were offered freedom if 
they agreed to serve in the French colonial army. According 
to Kernan, only a few hundred men out of twenty thousand 
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internees preferred military service to internment. This, 
he said, was "a mystery and an outrage to the French," who 
felt that while the refugees had accepted French 
hospitality, they had "failed to requite it in France's hour 
of peril." Kernan, like Ghali, insisted that the French 
people were not anti-Semitic and that their hostility was 
reserved for foreign Jews; particularly they distrusted 
German Jewish refugees "because they never seemed to forget 
that they were Germans. 11 36 
Throughout the war, the American press coverage of the 
fate of Jews in France remained extensive. The anti-Semitic 
ordinances in the Occupied Zone, news of arrests, the 
rounding up of physicians in Paris, and the expulsion of 
Jews from the city of Vichy were all reported in detail. In 
1941 alone, .The. .N..eli YQL.k .'.r.i~ printed ninety-four articles 
on the subject, or an average of about two per week.37 
However, the small number of editorials on the persecution 
of the Jews, and the silence of the American government on 
the problem of discrimination and violation of human rights 
betrayed the dilemma in which Americans were caught. 
Because white America discriminated against black Americans 
far worse than Hitler or any other European government 
discriminated against the Jews, the Americans could not 
express their outrage. Only the deportation of Jews to the 
East exceeded acceptable limits and permitted government 
officials to speak out against such er iminal inhumanity .3 8 
In the meantime, private American efforts by Jewish 
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agencies, the Quakers, the American Red Cross, and other 
charities quietly improved the lot of many Jews and other 
refugees in France, helped thousands to emigrate, and made 
life in refugee and internment camps more bearable.3 9 
American foreign correspondents played their part in these 
endeavors. In March, 1941, nineteen foreign correspondents, 
photographers, and newsreel cameramen received permission to 
visit the refugee camps in France, where thirty thousand 
aliens were detained. Lansing Warren of~ N.e.li YQLk .T.i..m..e.s. 
reported in three lengthy dispatches about the five-day tour 
which brought the journalists to five camps: Recebedou and 
Noe for the elderly; Le Vernet for political detainees and 
"dangerous characters;" Rivesaltes for minors and their 
. 
families; and Argeles-sur-Mer for Spanish militiamen. 
Warren stated at the very beginning of his report that the 
correspondents were "distressed" by many of their 
experiences, but that they could not criticize France. The 
nation had "in an unexampled act of humanity" accepted 
hundreds of thousands of refugees. The Vichy government had 
been flooded with other requests for help from refugees from 
Belgium and the Occupied Zone and from French families 
expelled from Alsace and Lorraine. The lack of 
transportation equipment and the destruction of traffic 
facilities hampered efforts to improve the refugees' living 
conditions. Besides, Warren pointed out, 
One and a half million of France's finest men are 
war prisoners in other parts of Europe under 
conditions that can hardly be as favorable for 
most of them as for the majority of foreigners 
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guarded here. 4o 
Warren explained that the correspondents had requested 
permission to visit the refugee camps several months before. 
Government officials told him that their insistence had kept 
the refugees' problems on the agenda, and improvements had 
been made largely as a consequence of their inquiries. 
Warren described the conditions in the camps as varied --
from dirty, crowded Argeles to clean but crowded Rivesaltes 
and the decent quarters at R~c~b~dou and No~. Food rations 
were inadequate at all the camps. The camp commanders told 
the journalists that they gladly released their charges if 
they had a job or a visa which allowed them to leave France, 
a statement which was disputed by some internees. As 
squalid as conditions were at Argeles, however, the inmates 
staged demonstrations on the day of the journalists' visit 
against their extradition to Spain, where Franco's harsh 
vengeance awaited them.41 
Warren was overwhelmed and wrote of: 
the immensity of the international problem that 
these exiled internees will raise ••• The 
problem is to put these people or their 
descendants at least in a situation where they can 
again become members of something other than an 
outcast community. 
No nation by itself would be able to solve the problem, he 
observed, and France was under the circumstances the 
candidate least likely to succeed.42 The visit to the camps 
was not in vain, however. The American correspondents' 
effort and persistence proved beneficial for the internees. 
In April, 1941, the French government appointed Andr~ Jean-
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Faure to the newly created position of inspecteur general of 
internment camps and centers.43 
In June, 1941, the much more restrictive second statute 
on the Jews practically excluded Jews in France from most 
occupations besides those of craftsmen or workers. One year 
later, the Germans began to round up foreign Jews for 
deportation to the East. At that time, numerous clergymen 
and bishops protested against the inhumane treatment of the 
foreign Jews. The papal nuncio, Msgr. Valerio Valeri, 
warned P~tain and Laval that their salvation was jeopardized 
by such inhumanity. According to a correspondent's 
dispatch, P~tain was grieved by the deportations but saw 
himself helpless to prevent them. Laval, on the other hand, 
told the nuncio to "mind his own business." The writer 
repeated what contemporaries so often said: "No impartial 
observer in France doubts that it is the Germans who 
demanded the arrest and handing over of Jews and that the 
French are only acting as their instruments." The 
persecution of the Jews had long ceased to be a part of the 
National Revolution and had assumed a life of its own, 
directed by Germany.44 
Among Jewish immigrants in the United States, the 
discriminatory legislation in France naturally caused 
anguish and fear. The pages of their German-language Aufbau 
were filled with news from France, eyewitness reports from 
refugees who had reached the United States, and appeals to 
the readers to help Jews interned in French camps. The 
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pages of the Aufbau mirrored the relentless tightening of 
the net around the Jews in France, from the discriminatory 
Jewish statutes to the Aryanization of Jewish businesses, 
and finally to their deportation to Eastern Europe. The 
Aufbau, which alleged in July, 1940, that P~tain had been a 
right-wing plotter before the war, castigated him on many 
occasions for his part in the persecution of Jews in 
France.45 In November, 1940, a poem accused the "pious 
general" of besmirching and perverting the message of "La 
Marseillaise." In October, 1942, a French Catholic in 
London demanded in an open letter (reprinted in the Aufbau) 
that Petain protest publicly against the crimes committed 
against the Jews, even at the risk of losing his freedom and 
his life. Otherwise, the writer warned, history might 
regard him as another Herod. The Aufbau also published the 
letter by Archbishop Saliege of Toulouse, in which he 
condemned the treatment of the Jews as inhumane and un-
Christian.46 
Liberal journals, like ~ .N.a.t..i.Qn, and Christian 
magazines joined the protests of the A.u..f.b.a..u and condemned 
Vichy's policies regarding the foreign Jews sharply, as l'.he 
Christian Century's reaction to the news of the deportation 
of the Jews in July, 1942, proved. The editors wrote: 
Even those who have been inclined to reserve 
judgment on the Vichy government because of the 
difficulties which confront it must feel revolted 
by such a betrayal of elemental human decencies. 
It is to be hoped that the aged Marshal Petain 
will sense this, and even at this last moment 
intervene to save these otherwise doomed 
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victims. 47 
Like their French brethren, American Christians watched 
how the ideals of the National Revolution were perverted. 
Indications of an ominous change had already been observed 
by Morris in the summer of 1941, when two Catholic journals 
had been suspended by the P~tain government. Morris charged 
that P~tain had changed "his fatherly admonitions into 
threats and commands." This new tone had been noticeable 
for several months, clearly a sign that the crisis was 
severe. 48 Morris referred to P~tain's speech on August 12, 
1941, in which the Marshal acknowledged that the National 
Revolution had not become a reality. He attributed its 
failure to inexperience and ineptitude and to the opposition 
of all those who still adhered to the Third Republic, such 
as the political parties, government officials who had 
profited from the system, Freemasons, and, by implication, 
Communists. P~tain complained that the government was no 
longer backed by popular consent. In fact, it had become 
unable to govern. The crisis was so severe that a mere 
reshuffling of ministers would not suffice. France was 
condemned to change her methods or face civil war. To 
prevent this, P~tain increased Prime Minister Darlan's power 
and imposed what amounted to martial law: political parties 
were suspended, high officials of Masonry were no longer 
permitted to exercise any public functions; and 
parliamentarians would no longer receive their salaries. 
P~tain also planned to break the power of the trusts and to 
191 
punish those who profited from their positions of access to 
foodstuffs and other resources. In his long speech he 
avoided citing those by name who were largely responsible 
for the "troubled minds" of many Frenchmen, the Communists. 
Since the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the 
French Communists had begun their underground war against 
the German troops in France and had intensified their 
propaganda campaign against the Vichy regime. 4 9 On August 
20, Ghali acknowledged that the "unsigned alliance between 
Communism, Gaullism, and all the disgruntled who miss [the] 
Third Republic is becoming [the] chief preoccupation [of] 
Marshal P~tain's government." Ghali reported on two riots 
in Paris and a surge of sabotage acts, adding: "Up to now 
combined German [and] French police efforts seem [to] have 
been unable [to] dam [the] rising tide." The Communists 
were not only fighting against the Germans but opposing 
Vichy's economic collaboration with Germany. The 
traditional antagonism of French workers toward their 
employers was now fueled by the employers' image as 
collaborationists. While both Communists and Gaullists were 
less influential in the Unoccupied Zone, Ghali pointed out 
that even there the government had no easier task with all 
those who missed the Third Republic and wanted to see "the 
return of [the] free [and] easy life [of] that period.nSO 
Another correspondent, Richard de Rochemont, also noted 
that the National Revolution had failed. He considered its 
concept as inappropriate for a modern industrialized nation 
and concluded, 
It is moral, exemplary, Spartan and 
Christian. Even left-wing Liberals are obliged to 
admit that it might be a good trick if one could 
do it. But it can't be done. The French know it 
can't be done. So do the Germans. So today does 
Petain, and ,1f his recent speech he has admitted 
its failure. 
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Yet Thomas Kernan saw the National Revolution in a much more 
positive light. After his return to the United States he 
wrote: 
Except for the measures against the Jews, the 
social measures of the Vichy Government to date 
have most probably been good for France, whatever 
the reason for their adoption. A reform is a 
reform, even if the devil makes it. Reforms are 
extremely slow in a democracy, because there are 
few which do not encroach upon some vested 
interest, and each of Vichy's measures would have 
taken years ins~2ad of months to put into effect in normal times. 
The Scholars' View 
Given the intense interest of many Americans in the 
fate of the Jews in France, and given the lack of interest 
in French social legislation, it is no wonder that the anti-
Semitic legislation has become in the American mind the one 
issue besides collaboration that is associated with "Vichy." 
For a broader view of Petain's National Revolution, American 
readers had to turn to the pages of the more specialized and 
scholarly journals of the time, in which articles on the 
political, administrative, and social changes appeared. The. 
Monthly Labor Review explained French labor legislation in a 
strictly factual manner .53 The. Arner ican Political Science 
Review published a survey of "Recent Governmental Reforms in 
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France," by H. J. Heneman, which appeared as early as 
February, 1941.54 
More informative was Paul Vaucher's "The National 
Revolution in France," in the Political Science Quarterly of 
March, 1942. It offered an excellent summary and analysis 
of all aspects of the legislation of the Vichy government. 
Vaucher had remained in France until the spring of 1941, and 
was therefore able to observe some of the results firsthand. 
His aim was to call attention first to changes that he 
considered "likely to last," because they were appropriate 
to French circumstances. He was most negative in his 
evaluation of the political changes and concluded that 
Petain's principles led to a permanent dictatorship. In 
regard to administrative changes, he thought that local 
government in rural districts would benefit from the reforms 
which provided for salaried mayors and trained clerks and 
retained democratically elective municipal councils. He did 
not believe that the abolition of elected mayors and 
municipal courts in larger towns would be tolerated by the 
population in the long run, even though the reason for the 
change had been the frequency of corruption and the 
domination by political machines. 
Vaucher saw much promise in the economic changes that 
had occurred. He regarded the restoration of the ancient 
regions as beneficial, since they provided more resources 
and allowed a more efficient use of industry. The author 
also praised the government for quick action to repair war 
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damages and for a "huge plan of public works." Price-fixing 
by the government, the distribution of resources to 
industry, and the allocation of industrial products by a 
central office enabled Vichy "to succeed in keeping the 
French industry alive" while at the same time reducing 
unemployment by two-thirds within a year. Vichy kept all 
the social reforms of the Popular Front and even increased 
benefits, but, as Vaucher pointed out, many industrial 
workers were employed only part-time, and the improvements 
only helped to lessen the gap between income and cost of 
living. Vaucher, who expected a strong trend toward 
socialism after the war and extensive nationalization of 
industry, believed that Vichy's industrial policy would 
facilitate the transition. He gave much space to P~tain's 
agricultural policy, which was designed to increase 
agricultural production through modernization and halt the 
depopulation of rural areas by easy credits and financial 
inducem~nts to help young families stay on the farm. These 
reforms were overdue, since earlier attempts under the Third 
Republic had been frustrated by political inertia. 
Vaucher's assessment of the National Revolution was 
positive in many aspects. At no point did he suggest that 
the efforts of the government were inappropriate or that the 
reforms were impossible to accomplish under the 
circumstances. Indeed, he emphasized that many of the 
reforms might provide a lasting foundation for a future 
government.SS 
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Historian Shepard B. Clough wrote about French 
corporatism in "The House that P~tain Built," in March, 
1944, in .The. Political science Quarterly. Corporatism had 
old roots in France, the author pointed out, and he 
considered the Vichy regime as "an important landmark in the 
history of corporatism in Europe." After explaining the 
provisions of the Labor Charter, he described it as a tool 
in the hands of the "dictator" to exercise his power and to 
enforce discipline. While the directed economy served and 
saved France during the emergency caused by war, occupation, 
and blockade, ultimately it helped Germany to "milk the 
country." While labor had acquiesced for the time being, it 
could not be expected to renounce free unions for long. 
Clough did not believe that corporatism as practiced by 
Vichy would survive. However, he did not exclude the 
possibility that it would later be revived in some form, 
since a study by ranking French economists had shown a 
French trend toward corporatism for the period 1911-1936.56 
Shepard B. Clough's interest in the National Revolution 
was not widely shared by American historians during the war. 
Current History, the forum for historians c. E. Black, Leo 
Gershey, E. J. Knapton, Sidney B. Fay, and Bernadotte 
Schmitt, published more than thirty articles on France from 
1940 through 1945 -- none of them exclusively on the 
National Revolution. Several of the essays touched on one 
or the other pieces of legislation, be it the Labor Charter 
or the educational reform, but always in a cursory manner. 57 
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Leo Gershey once commented with scorn on "PAtain's toy," 
"the glorious reconstruction of France which few Frenchmen 
want, most misunderstand and all are skeptical about."58 
These historians focused on military, political, and 
diplomatic developments and on the state of the French 
economy. They showed little interest in the anti-Semitic 
legislation and in the persecution of the Jews in France, 
which they evidently considered as peripheral affairs. They 
obviously had no suspicion whatsoever that the deportations 
to the Eastern front could mean anything other than "forced 
labor." 
Among the legislative acts within the framework of the 
National Revolution, the application and the improvement of 
the Family Code were not recognized in America for their 
significance at the time. Yet this may well have been the 
most important and enduring reform by the Vichy government, 
and its decrees were so progressive that even forty years 
later they sound like Utopia to American women. One of the 
rare detailed contemporary American accounts of the Family 
legislation is contained in an OSS report entitled, 
"Psychological Warfare Significance of Recent Shifts in the 
French Social Structure." The report, written in January, 
1944, acknowledged that the legal status of married women 
had been improved to enable them to function as head of the 
family. Most importantly, the government took the financial 
burden off families willing to have children and enabled 
them to provide an environment which was favorable to the 
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childrens' development. The report also recognized the 
government's efforts to assure the health and well-being of 
the children through prenatal medical care, strict laws 
protecting children from abuse and neglect, and provisions 
for obligatory medical examination of all school children. 
The OSS report noted, however, that many of the projects, 
though decreed, were not yet realized.59 
This OSS report is of particular importance also with 
regard to the other aspects of the National Revolution 
because it reveals some of the obstacles P~tain had to face. 
His adversaries were not only Germans, or the Collaborators 
in Paris, or the Resistance, but also Allied propaganda 
which purposely undermined his efforts and blatantly lied to 
the French population to achieve its ends. A few examples 
may suffice. The report recommended that since the farmers 
of France were much better off than other groups, 
psychological warfare, i.e., U.S. propaganda, should 
concentrate upon stirring discontent among them. They 
should be told that an early Allied victory would provide 
them with seeds, fertilizers, equipment, fuel, etc. 
Workers, on the other hand, should be promised a fair share 
in the national income, and they should be told that the 
Vichy trade union reform was "purely artificial." 
Propaganda should persuade small industrialists that they 
were the victims of Vichy, and that industrial concentration 
was "ruthless." It should emphasize that "the little man" 
was a victim of Vichy's deflationary policy, and that banks 
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were the big profiteers. Government employees, 
collaborators, and black marketeers should also be depicted 
as profiteers.60 By mixing truth and lies, the Allies could 
increase the frustration and discontent of practically all 
social groups and turn them against the French government. 
In this way, radio brought Allied fifth column activities 
right into French homes. 
The Contemporaries and the 
National Revolution 
The contemporary assessment of the National Revolution 
by correspondents, editors, the Office of Strategic 
Services, and scholars offers a kaleidoscope of views. 
Correspondents saw the reforms in the context of a nation. 
beset by a multitude of problems. They agreed on the 
necessity of reforms but were skeptical about P~tain's 
chances of success. They perceived too many obstacles, 
including the division of the country and the influence of 
the German occupation in the Occupied Zone (Ghali), unproven 
leadership in Vichy (Archambault), the lack of a forum for 
public opinion (Elliott), and the pervasive spirit of the 
Third Republic (Harsch). Editors, on the other hand, tended 
to be very sensitive to the authoritarian aspects of the 
Vichy regime and watchful for signs of undemocratic acts by 
the French government, but were disinterested in Vichy's 
social reforms. 
Christian magazines, both Catholic and Protestant, as 
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well as the OSS were very interested in social reforms and 
Vichy's efforts to rally the population to effect a national 
renewal. American Christians recognized that the French 
government addressed burning social issues from a 
deliberately chosen Christian point of view. This was all 
the more remarkable as both Communism and Fascism had tried 
to achieve social justice by rejecting or ignoring Christian 
principles. The OSS, on the other hand, studied Vichy 
reforms to assess the state of French society for purposes 
of psychological warfare. 
None among the contemporaries objected on principle to 
reform, even structural reform. In fact, Helen Iswolsky 
mentioned that the war had broken down barriers to reform 
which no previous effort had been able to remove. The 
attention paid by the correspondents to the plight of the 
Jews was not reflected in newspaper editorials but rather in 
journals of opinion and in the AJ.1.f...bR.y. The latter focused 
on the Jewish question but was not interested in the other 
aspects of the National Revolution. Political scientists 
were the group most open to and most interested in the 
French reforms, while historians showed astonishingly little 
interest in the National Revolution. They focused almost 
exclusively on French politics and foreign relations and on 
the state of the French economy. Neither political 
scientists nor historians treated the discrimination against 
the Jews as a central issue or showed much interest in the 
problem of the foreign Jews in France. 
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The American Historians and 
the National Revolution 
The first American historian to write extensively on 
the National Revolution was Paul Farmer in his Vichy 
Political Dilem~ (1955). The main drawback of the National 
Revolution was, in his opinion, the fact that it was "from 
start to finish the work of intellectuals," an interesting 
point which has not been made so clearly since. None of the 
other groups, from farmers and workers to businessmen were 
ever committed to it. Vichy's most striking failure was the 
regime's inability to establish a stable cabinet, and Farmer 
called the civil service the real government of the period. 
By contrast, he considered the application and improvement 
of the Family Code a real achievement. Most of the other 
reforms were failures. The establishment of the statutes on 
the Jews was motivated by two contradictory considerations: 
first, some officials wanted to prove to the Germans that 
France was ready to participate in the New Order; secondly, 
for others, the legislation was a forestalling action, to 
prevent the Germans from encroaching on French authority.61 
The National Revolution has been more extensively 
treated by Robert Paxton, whose basic attitude toward his 
subject was stated early in his Vichy fi.a..n~, published in 
1972: 
In their excitement, Frenchmen committed the 
most elementary imprudence. In their impatience 
to avenge old wrongs and transform the conditions 
that had led to defeat, they made ma~or structural 
changes during an enemy occupation.6 
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Paxton's whole view of the National Revolution is colored by 
this premise. In 1980, during the Conference on~ i:a.ll .Q.f 
France; Causes .a.rui .RilJ.U.ll, he talked of the "fundamental 
reconstruction" decided upon in 1940, and declared, "the 
idea of waiting until liberation when the reconstruction of 
society could be accomplished calmly was hardly 
mentioned.n63 Paxton regarded the failings of the Third 
Republic as minor ones, not serious enough to merit a 
revolution. Yet the eagerness of Frenchmen to reform their 
country proved that they regarded the failures of the Third 
Republic as so looming and profound that not even the 
devastation by the Germans could divert their attention from 
their goal. The conditions for a reconstruction were 
therefore present. To postpone it until a hypothetical day 
of peace and quiet would have seemed to them like postponing 
an emergency operation until the life-threatening situation 
was over. 
Paxton himself described the incredible political 
immobility under the Third Republic, citing as an example 
the fact that twenty-four bills for an old age pension law 
had been rejected down to 1936, the last passing the Chamber 
in March of that year but failing in the Senate. Yet he 
belittled Vichy's pension law by calling it "unfinished 
business of the 1930s." Paxton's aversion toward the Vichy 
regime led at times to unfair assessments of the Vichy 
reforms. For example, he attributed the abolition of the 
French teacher-training colleges by the Vichy regime to its 
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desire to root out the "evil seminaries of democracy."6 4 In 
fact, as w. D. Halls' study, .'.r.b..e XQ..u.th Q£ Vichy EI~~~ 
(1981), has shown, the teachers' colleges were not only 
virulently anti-religious but discriminated against students 
who were perceived as being religious. Given the fact that 
about 98% of all Frenchmen were nominal Catholics and that 
one-fourth of all school children attended Catholic schools 
to which their parents paid tuition, it is safe to assume 
that a substantial section of the population objected to the 
anti-religious spirit of the teachers' education and 
approved of the change. 6 5 
Similarly, Paxton's conclusion that "Vichy preferred 
women barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen,u66 does an 
injustice to the provisions of the Family Code. The special 
stipend which was paid to families with one breadwinner was 
designed to permit mothers to take care of the children 
without depriving the family of the additional funds her 
outside work would have provided. The image of the working 
mother may be appealing to American women of the last 
decade, but not to French mothers during World War II, a 
time when washing machines, refrigerators, and central 
heating were extremely rare, and cars still made news in the 
neighborhood. Hours had to be spent standing in line at a 
number of stores to buy the family's rations each day, and 
toiling over the washboard. For a family it meant hardship, 
and for the mother a crushing burden if she had to work 
outside the home. 
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Paxton also dismissed the enormous efforts of social 
workers, priests, and educators too glibly when he wrote 
that "much of Vichy's promotion of a better moral order was 
a whited sepulchre.n67 Leadership schools like Uriage 
worked with genuine devotion to build character, promote 
physical fitness, and inspire young people for community 
service. John Hellman observed in his study, Bmmanuel 
Hounie~ .a..ru1 .the. He.~ ~holic ~.f..t 1930-1950 (1981), that 
"among the over four thousand alumni of the Ur iage 'school 
of elites' are many of the present ambassadors, generals, 
presidents in the private and public sector, bishops, and 
union leaders of France.n68 Gordon Wright, in his~ Rural 
Revolution in ]'.Lance (1964), also noted that the National 
Revolution stimulated the development of rural leaders and a 
lasting sense of unity among the French peasants. 69 
Paxton's evaluation of the administrative and economic 
reforms, and the establishment of the Peasant Corporation 
under the Peasant Charter, was more positive. He 
acknowledged that, primarily due to the imperative need to 
keep the French going, professionalism, concentration, and 
efficiency were fostered, and France was steered toward 
modernization.70 The trend continued after the war -- a 
fact which contradicts Paxton's own premise that the Vichy 
government should not have embarked on structural reforms. 
Paxton's severest indictment against P~tain' s National 
Revolution concerned its anti-Semitic legislation, the 
treatment of foreign Jews, and the French collaboration in 
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their deportation, which began in July, 1942. He called it 
"the blackest mark on the whole Vichy experience." Contrary 
to most of the correspondents and political scientists of 
the 1940s, he affirmed that the first statute on the Jews 
had not been the result of German pressure on the French 
government.71 His condemnation of Vichy was even more 
severe in Vichy .a.mi .the .J.e~~ (1981).72 A recent work by 
John F. Morley throws some of the blame for Vichy's 
treatment of the Jews on the Vatican, which assured P~tain 
in September, 1941, that it had no objections against the 
statutes on the Jews. Morley concluded that "a strong 
protest by the papal emissary in France might have dissuaded 
[P~tain] from accepting or passing the anti-Semitic 
measures.n73 
An important study on Vichy economic reforms was 
included by Richard F. Kuisel in his work, ~apitalism .a.rui 
..t.h.e state .in Hodern France, published in 1981. Unlike 
Paxton, Kuisel did not condemn the inception of reforms 
during the armistice period. The economic reformers were 
convinced that France had to secure her place in Hitler's 
Europe; their goal was to strengthen France's position by 
invigorating her economy. Among the Vichy innovations which 
not only left a lasting mark but endured after the 
Liberation was the Ministry of Industrial Production and the 
National Service of Statistics. The Labor Charter, on the 
other hand, was a failure. Vichy planners were not 
satisfied with emergency measures and developed a ten-year 
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plan in 1942 and a two-year plan in 1944 with far-reaching 
goals, as Kuisel pointed out. While P~tain did not support 
either plan, they were utilized by de Gaulle's government 
after the Liberation.74 Kuisel's study, as well as Gordon 
Wright's work on the rural revolution, proved that 
structural reforms during the occupation were possible and 
that a number of them proved durable and beneficial long 
after the demise of the Vichy regime. 
Unfortunately, two recent studies, one on youth camps 
in southern France, the other on an attempt at corporatism, 
turned out to be case studies of failures. Roger Austin's 
article, "The Chantiers de la Jeunesse in Languedoc, 1940-
44" (1983), showed that the leaders of the youth camps in 
Languedoc "were singularly unsuccessful in promoting 
P~tain's National Revolution," except during a few months in 
1941.75 According to Joseph Jones' study, "Vichy France and 
Postwar Economic Modernization: The Case of the 
Shopkeepers," the attempt to introduce corporatism into the 
retail trade proved also unsuccessful. During the war the 
shopkeepers did very well without it, and after the war it 
was rejected by merchants .pa jealous of their independence 
even at the cost of efficiency.76 
Contemporaries and Historians Compared 
Both wartime correspondents and Robert Paxton agreed 
that the National Revolution irrevocably waned in the summer 
of 1941, and the contemporaries and the historian gave the 
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same reason: the Communist resistance. Ghali added the 
general impatience of the population with wartime 
deprivations as a further cause for the increasing 
opposition which the Marshal faced. Both contemporaries and 
American historians showed remarkably little interest in 
P~tain's social reforms. This may well be the effect of the 
American disdain for socialist programs. Otherwise, it 
would be difficult to understand how a revolutionary measure 
like the special stipend for families with one breadwinner 
could have escaped a historian's interest. This is also 
true for the right to work philosophy of the Labor Charter, 
which gave unemployment compensation a different meaning. 
From now on, the worker had a right to life and sustenance, 
combined with the duty to work according to his capability. 
The most striking difference between the contempor-
aries' and Robert Paxton's view on the National Revolution 
concerns their attitude toward change. For Paxton, the 
appropriate time to reform the Third Republic should have 
been during a period of normalcy; for the contemporaries, 
the opportunity for change came in the wake of a great 
upheaval, when customary procedures were suspended for a 
moment. 
There is also a disparity in the way correspondents and 
historians looked at the Jewish question. Warren, for 
instance, primarily described the almost insoluble problem 
of caring for thousands of exiles when he saw the refugee 
camps. For the historians, the question has become almost 
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exclusively a moral one: who was guilty of neglect? Why 
did the government do nothing to prevent the deportations to 
the East? Marrus and Paxton dealt exclusively with the 
Jewish refugees, but thousands of workers were also deported 
in spite of government protests. Perhaps the power of the 
Petain government to intervene successfully has been 
overestimated by historians. Vichy has become the primary 
target of accusations of Jewish persecution even though only 
about 75,000 Jews were deported from France, out of a total 
population of 350,000, while the deportees from The 
Netherlands alone numbered 105,000, or 75 percent of the 
Jewish population. Historian Patrice Higonnet went so far 
as to say: "The anti-Semitism of Vichy is now becoming the 
moral touchstone around which the wnole regime is going to 
be considered." This is indeed an enormous change in 
attitude, since neither contemporary political scientists 
nor historians saw the Jewish question as a central issue. 
At the time, discrimination against minorities was common 
and accepted in Europe and the United States. The 
deportations were sharply condemned as inhuman, but they 
were not equated with genocide, since the Endlosung was kept 
secret. To condemn a government on an issue whose 
consequences were unforeseeable at the time is not history 
but polemics. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation focuses exclusively on the American 
evaluation of the armistice, the fall of the Third Republic, 
the trial at Riom, and the National Revolution. There is a 
natural unity to these topics which show P~tain's efforts to 
preserve the state and to limit the power of the German 
victor by negotiating terms with him. The Marshal tried to 
establish an authoritarian government with the goals of 
providing strong leadership for an unprecedented time of 
crisis and of excluding influences which had weakened 
national leadership. He wanted to design a program or 
reforms to boost the country's morale, eliminate class 
conflict, modernize its economy, and encourage population 
growth. 
Petain's decision to ask Germany for armistice and 
peace conditions earned him the epithet "defeatist" among 
American editors. And yet, he was the person who deserved 
it least. Since 1934, he had warned of the German danger 
and proposed ways to meet it. He had castigated the 
prevailing pacifism and tried to shake the French out of 
their war-weariness because they could not atf ord it: 
France was in mortal danger of being overrun by an 
aggressive, strongly motivated adversary. In World war I, 
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Petain had become known for his intensive study o~ enemy 
combat methods, which enabled him to achieve for the French 
Army the most significant progress in tactics during World 
War I. As a general, Petain had studied his enemy in order 
to emulate his strengths and avoid his weaknesses. It was 
natural tor him to do the same as a statesman. Historians 
have ridiculed him for his desire to become Minister of 
Education. 
Peta in. 
Nothing reveals more their misunderstanding of 
In 1934, he had called attention to tne 
totalitarian nations, which considered the education of 
their young among their top priorities, and had called their 
programs "the greatest attempts at nationalist education in 
history." The main aspect of this education was the link 
between school and army which made a superb preparation for 
war possible. In view of the demands total war would impose 
on the population, Petain insisted that France also needed a 
defense program which involved school and army and provided 
a high degree of preparedness for war. In his opinion, even 
countries whose military policy was purely defensive must 
focus on physical fitness, patriotism, and the passionate 
will to fight for survival. 
However, Petain's admonitions were unheeded. By 1839, 
the nation had not yet recovered its vigor, and the Marshal 
thought the Declaration of War of September 3, 193 9, was a 
mistake, because France was neither militarily nor mentally 
prepared. By June 16 of the following year he was convinced 
that an armistice was necessary, not only to stop a hopeless 
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battle but also to preserve the state and to permit the 
French government to limit as much as possible German 
encroachment in all areas of life. 
Such French concerns were far from tne minds of 
American editors. They reacted to the French defeat with 
shock and bewilderment. The fall of France left Great 
Britain as the last bastion of democracy in Europe, and most 
Americans were convinced that it too would fall within a few 
weeks. Many editors saw the security of the United States 
itself threatened. 
The fate of France was of little concern at such a 
moment. When the armistice conditions were made public, 
editors turned against the French in much the same manner as 
Premier Reynaud had turned his fury upon King Leopold of 
Belgium after his capitulation. To explain the devastating 
defeat without having to acknowledge Hitler's phenomenal 
success, they put the blame on French decadence and lack of 
fighting spirit. Editors reiterated Churchill's charge that 
the French government could and snould have continued the 
war from her overseas Empire, a policy which would have left 
metropolitan France without a government, and under complete 
German control. 
Marshal P~tain also came under fire when he requested 
an armistice. American Jews especially condemned him for 
accepting the clause requiring France to deliver up German 
nationals upon Hitler's demand. They did not consider that 
in a totally occupied France, all Jews and political 
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refugees would have been completely at Hitler's mercy, and 
without recourse to French authorities. 
While P~tain had become a defeatist and even a traitor 
in the eyes of many liberals, conservatives and many 
Catholics admired him and regarded him as a martyr who took 
upon himself the unpalatable task of admitting defeat in the 
place of those who were responsible for the disaster. 
"Traitor" and "Savior": these images were established from 
the start and did not change ctur ing the next four years, an 
indication that liberals and conservatives in the United 
States were as profoundly divided in their views as their 
counterparts in France. 
The reactions ot the foreign correspondents for 
American papers were much more complex and closely linked to 
their experiences in France. Correspondents wno had lived 
in France for many years tended to be very sympathetic to 
Petain and his decision to request an armistice. Some had 
detected a new spirit among Frenchmen, a deep conviction 
that war never solved problems but created new and more 
difficult ones. Others blamed French war-weariness on the 
experience of World War I, from which the nation had not yet 
recovered. A third group castigated French leadership for 
its failure to motivate the population into fighting an all-
out war. Military leaders were not spared, either. 
Decisive French military weaknesses, as pointed out by the 
correspondents, were lack of flexibility, outdated 
logistics, and inferior strategy. 
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An interesting difference in mentality separated the 
American-born correspondents trom those or French 
background. While Americans tried to relate the defeat to 
French mentality and to characteristics of French society, 
many Frenchmen blamed the regime alone for the disaster and 
expected it to "get out of the mess," as in ancient times 
when kings lost battles and the citizens' primary duty was 
to remain calm. As a consequence, the American-born 
correspondents regarded France as "finished," and William 
Shirer wrote of a "complete collapse of French society." 
Significantly, none among the correspondents imagined 
that the French government would inevitably become involved 
in crimes committed by the German occupying forces, as has 
been suggested ny Stanley Hoffmann. Rather, as Sisley 
Huddleston pointed out, the government was expected to 
protect the French people from German atrocities. So 
pervasive was this attitude that an oss report from 1942 
argued that those political leaders who had gone into exile 
would be rejected by the French once the war was over. 
Obviously, growing Allied strength and cruel German 
reprisals for acts of resistance changed such assumptions: 
the Gaullists acquired status, and the French government did 
become involved in the persecution of the Resistance. 
As far as the French defeat is concerned, there is very 
close agreement between the correspondents and the 
historians with regard to its military causes. As to the 
possibility of continuing the war from the colonies, the 
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historians have not reached a consensus, but skepticism 
prevails. 
There is a striking difference regarding the Fall ot 
the Third Republic between the foreign correspondents and 
their editors at home. For American editors, the fall ot 
the Third Republic was an awesome event, and in this point 
they are in complete agreement with the historians. In 
interviews, top specialists in the field, such as Philip 
Bankwitz, Stanley Hoffmann, H. Stuart Hughes, and Robert 
Paxton, invariably condemned P~tain for his abolition of the 
Republic. None among them considered its weaknesses so 
fatal as to justify its demise. This is one issue upon 
which American historians clearly react as Americans, as men 
who consider a republican government the only good 
government. Foreign correspondents, especially those 
French-born, reacted completely differently. Paul Ghali, 
for instance, took the death of the regime with total 
equanimity. After all, France had survived fifteen 
constitutions in 150 years, and the spirit of the French 
Revolution had proven irrepressible. The correspondent's 
main concern was to establish a government which would 
defend French interests vis-a-vis the Germans. Under the 
circumstances, parliamentary debates, oratory, and party 
squabbles seemed frivolous. G. H. Archambault also felt 
that while the regime was "finished", France would 
recuperate with a new leadership. Logically, he was not 
interested in seeing the government leave France to fight on 
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in the colonies but wanted a new regime to take over, save 
what was possible, and guide the country tnrough the dark 
times ahead. 
While editors in the United States regarded the new 
regime as Fascist, or at least dangerously close to Fascism, 
political scientists examined P~tain's authoritarian 
government and discovered a hybrid structure with elements 
borrowed from democratic, Fascist, and socialist regimes. 
As J. G. Heinberg complained, Petain "carried water on both 
his Right and his Left shoulder." One of the regime's most 
interesting features was its total lack of a party system, a 
truly bold and revolutionary way of trying to avoid 
factionalism and an ingenious method or preventing a 
takeover by Communists and Fascists alike. Interestingly, 
the political scientists acknowledged that the new regime 
had been established according to the most stringent 
legalities. 
Unfortunately, no American study has as yet done 
justice to the trial at Riom, which caused such ambivalent 
reactions. While condemning Petain for accusing the leaders 
of the Third Republic for losing the war, American editors 
respected him for insisting on the great power status of 
France irrespective of the defeat of 1940. 
Petain's most original action was probably the reform 
program of the National Revolution, which implemented his 
proposals of the 1930s. If, as had been generally expected, 
the war had been over within a year of the armistice, 
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Petain's plan might well have been successful. The original 
enthusiasm that inspired many Frenchmen in the summer of 
1940 to create a regime that would be more French, more 
social, and more competitive in Europe, wore thin with time 
and endless frustration. Within a year Ghali was citing not 
only Communist resistance as an obstacle to the 
reconstruction, but the people's longing for the easygoing, 
"good old days" of the Third Republic as well. No other 
regime would have been able under the circumstances to 
overcome this longing for the past, and for the National 
Revolution it was deadly. Petain himself knew well what was 
happening, as his speech of August 12, 1941, showed. He 
knew that an Axis success as well as an early peace were 
becoming more unlikely, and hunger, misery, and frustration 
would increase in months to come. His greatest worry was 
civil war in France, and in despair he tried to impose his 
programs on a reluctant and disillusioned population. 
It is no wonder that the National Revolution did not 
attract much attention in the American daily press. Even 
forty years later, American newspapers have little interest 
in purely domestic legislation ot foreign countries. It is 
rather surprising that the correspondents wrote about such 
details as corporatism in the dairy industry or an old age 
pension law. The topics which did attract the editors' 
attention are revealing, however: the statutes against the 
Jews, the suspension of the Masonic order, labor-management 
relations, and the future constitution ot France. Americans 
221 
were plagued by discrimination and labor disputes themselves 
and found therefore a common interest in these areas. The 
French government's efforts to increase the population by 
encouraging large families had no appeal to American 
readers, however, since they could not identify with the 
problem. In spite of the women's liberation movement, this 
neglect has not been remedied in recent years, and American 
specialists on Vichy made no effort to examine the French 
family legislation closely. On the other hand, several 
American historians wrote in detail about Vicny•s economic 
policies. The anti-Semitic legislation has also been 
extensively studied and has drawn so much critical attention 
that it now tends to color the whole regime. A reading of 
the reports of correspondents and contemporary ooservers can 
restore a reasonable balance. 
The most striking result ot the investigation was the 
realization that some of the foreign correspondents were 
excellent historians of their own time and wrote a tirst 
draft of history which ranks their insight and comprehension 
on a par with scholars writing several decades later. 
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ARCHAMBAULT, GASTON BANET (1877-1951) 
G. H. Archambault was born at Ay, Marne, on February 25, 
1877. Educated in England, he was already writing for 
British financial papers before the turn of the century. He 
married an English girl and wrote for the first English-
language paper in Paris, the .Messenger. In 1905, he began 
his 18-year career as editor of the Paris Herald. It was 
interrupted by World War I, when Archambault fought with the 
French Army at Verdun, was wounded, and received the Legion 
of Honor and the Croix .de ~.u.e~. Later in the war, he 
became a liaison officer for the American Expeditionary 
Forces. After the war, he established the Paris Times, and, 
following its demise, he worked for the .li.eli .YQzk .s.u.n. He 
joined the Paris bureau of .!he .li.eli York .Ti..m..e..s in 1933. He 
covered World War II from Paris and Vichy until February, 
1942, when he left France and moved to Berne, Switzerland. 
Archambault returned to Paris in October, 1944. One year 
later, after a three months' stint in London, he began his 
last assignment for Xh.e. ~li .Y.2..t.k .Ti..m..ea in Pretoria, South 
Africa, where he worked until his death on May 21, 1951. 
The funeral service was held in St. George's Cathedral, 
Capetown, South Africa, on May 23, 1951. His son, Michael 
of Southern Rhodesia, survived • 
.,S.Q,y~ ~ .li.eli York .I.im..e..s, Obituary, May 22, 1951, p. 31; 
ibid., May 24, 1951, p. 35. 
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BESS, DEMAREE (1893-1962} 
Demaree Bess was born on July 28, 1893, in Kansas City, 
Missouri, the son of a Presbyterian minister. In 1916, he 
received a bachelor's degree from the University of Iowa and 
subsequently taught English at Assiut College in Egypt. He 
then joined the British forces in Palestine and worked with 
the American Red Cross in Palestine and Syria. After World 
War I, Bess joined .lh.e. Minneapolis Tribune and also worked 
for l'.he ~ Angeles Times before he went to the Far East as 
correspondent for~ Ne~~~ and .T..b...e Philadelphia 
.EJiblic Ledger. For one year, Bess was news editor of~ 
Japanese Advertiser, an English-language newspaper in Tokyo. 
Then, from 1928-1931, he and his wife Dorothy travelled all 
over China for the United Press. Bess worked as bureau 
manager for the United Press in Peiping until 1931, when he 
became Far Eastern Chief and correspondent for .'.r.h.e Christian 
Scienc~ Monitor, a position he held until 1938, when he 
joined~ Saturd~ Evening~. He covered World War II 
from the major capitals and battle fronts. At the time of 
his death, on June 2, 1962, Bess was working on the memoirs 
of former Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy. In 1950, 
Bess had testified on behalf of Professor Owen Lattimore who 
had been accused by Senator Joseph McCarthy of being a 
"Communist sympathizer" and a "malignant influence on th 
shaping of American policy toward Soviet Communism." 
Source: Obituary, l'.he .N.elt .I.o..r.k Times, June 3, 1962, p. 88. 
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DARRAH, DAVID (1894-1976} 
David Darrah was born on May 27, 1894, in Loydsville, Ohio, 
and was eduated at the University of Akron. He began his 
career as a reporter in 1912 with the Akron Beacon Journal. 
In October, 1917, he enlisted in the United States Army and 
after his discharge joined the Paris bureau of~ .Chicago 
Tribune. Seven years later he moved to London but in 1927 
he accepted a position as Chief of the Rome bureau. His 
incisive articles about Mussolini angered the Italian 
leader, and in 1935 Darrah was expelled from Italy. The 
Tribu~ sent him again to Paris, this time as head of the 
bureau. After the fall of France he remained in Vichy and 
was interned by the Germans in the fall of 1942. Released 
in 1944, he continued his work as a war correspondent, and 
after the liberation of France resumed his position in 
Paris. He retired in 1946 but returned to work in 1955 as 
head of the Madrid bureau where he stayed until his final 
retirement in January, 1968. Darrah died on March 29, 1976, 
in Biarritz. 
Source: Obituary,~ Chicago Tribune, March 30, 1976, p. 
14; Biography in .Q.b.iQ AJJthors .a.rui Their Books (Cleveland, 
1962}, p. 154. 
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DE ROCHEMONT, RICHARD (1903-
Richard de Rochemont was born on December 13, 1903, in 
Chelsea, Massachusetts. In 1938 he graduated~ laude from 
Harvard. During his studies he worked for the Boston Daily 
Advertiser. In 193 0, de Rochemon t became involved in 
working on newsreels, and a year later he was appointed 
editor of the French edition of the Fox-Movietone newsreels. 
In 1934, he became the European Manager of the M~h .Q..f 
~m~ newsreels. Among the features he supervised were 
"Croix de Feu," "League of Nations," "Revolt in France," and 
"The Maginot Line." After the French defeat he left France 
and returned to the United States. However, he visited 
France in 1941 for several months to study the conditions in 
the Unoccupied Zone. Back in the United States, he became 
Na t i on a 1 P r e s i d e n t o f .f..t..a.n&.e. .f..Q...t..e..v..e...t. , d e G a u 11 e ' s 
organization in the U.S. He returned to France after the 
liberation and continued his career as producer of the March 
.Q.f fi.m.e. features. 
source: Current Biography llil (New York, 1946), pp. 147-
149. 
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DEWEY, PETER (1916-1945) 
Peter Dewey was born in Chicago on October 8, 1916, the son 
of a prominant banker and politician. He was educated in 
Switzerland, at St. Paul's school in Concord, New Jersey, 
and at Yale, where he graduated in 193 9. With his parents 
he spent the summer of 1939 on the family's estate in 
Normandy, and in the fall of 1939 he began his job as a 
correspondent for ~ Chicag,Q Daily Helf.a. During the 
western campaign he joined the Polish National Army in 
France as an ambulance driver. He returned to the United 
States after the fall of France and enrolled at the 
University of Virginia Law School. For one year he worked 
for Nelson Rockefeller's Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs. In 1942, he entered the United States 
Army, served in Arica and Arabia, and was later transferred 
to the Office of Strategic Services COSS). As commanding 
officer of the Mission Etoile, he parachuted into France on 
August 10, 1944, prior to the southern invasion. Upon his 
return to the United States, he worked for the State 
Department, and was then sent to French Indo-China for the 
. 
OSS as "Senior American Authority." He was killed in Saigon 
on September 26, 1945. Peter Dewey's widow published his 
book, .Aa They il..e..t:J;, in 19 46. It is an account of his 
experiences in France from the summer of 1939 to July, 1940. 
Source: Peter Dewey, As.~~ (New York, 1946), jacket. 
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GHALI, PAUL (1905-1970) 
Paul Ghali was born on June 24, 1905, in Avignon, France. 
His father was Ghali Bey, an Egyptian appellate judge, his 
mother was Jeanne de Baroncelli-Javon, the descendent of an 
exiled Florentine family which had come to Avignon in the 
thirteenth century. Ghali received degrees from the 
University of Alexandria, from the Sorbonne, the Paris 
School of Political Science, and Oxford. Before turning to 
journalism, Ghali was a professor of international law at 
Cairo and a member of the Egyptian diplomatic service in 
Paris. He later became a French citizen. In 1939, he 
joined the Paris bureau of Zh.e ~.a..g,Q Daily ~lll...s., and 
became its chief in July, 1940. On January 8, 1942, Ghal i 
filed his last dispatch from Vichy France before he left for 
Switzerland. In 1943, Ghali freed the daughter of Benito 
Mussolini from a Swiss asylum, and she allowed him to copy 
the diary of her husband, Count Galeazzo Ciano on microfilm. 
Ghali managed to send the microfilm in a perfume bottle to 
Xb..e Chicago Daily ~lll...S.· The publication of the diary 
created a sensation and was of high propaganda value for the 
Allies. Upon his return to France, Ghali, together with 
four other American correspondents, received the first 
Legion of Honor award to the foreign press after the 
liberation of France. In 1961, he married Bernadette 
Beaune. He died on June 3, 1970, in Paris. 
sourceQ: ~ Chicago Dail~ ~lll...s., June 4, 1970. Obituary, 
~ N.elll. .I.o.I.k Times, June 4, 1970, p. 39. 
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HARSCH, JOSEPH (1905-
Joseph Harsch joined~ Christian Science Monitor in 1929. 
In 1939, he became the Assistant Director of the Committee 
on Political Refugees in London. He worked in Berlin as 
correspondent for~ Christian Science Monitor from 1940 to 
1942 and as a news broadcaster and analyst for CBS from 1943 
to 1949. From 1952 to 1967, Harsch was Senior European 
Correspondent and then Washington Diplomatic Correspondent 
for NBC. From 1967 to 1971, he worked for ABC as Washington 
News Commentator. In 1971, he became Chief Editorial Writer 
for l'.h.e. Christian Science Monitor. He continues to write a 
daily column on international affairs for that paper. His 
publications include, Pattern .o.f Conguest (1941) and~ 
Curtain Isn't Iron (1950). Joseph Harsch's papers are at 
the State Historical Society of Wisconsin at Madison. 
source: lU.u..e. .B.QQk. .1.215. CNew York, 1975), p. 643. 
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HUDDLESTON, SISLEY (1883-1952} 
Sisley Huddleston was British-born but left his native 
country before World War I to work in France as a foreign 
correspondent. In 1914, he was editor of~ ~~inental 
Daily ~~.i]., but he wrote for journals in many countries, 
including Canada and Australia. During the Versailles Peace 
Conference he became a correspondent for~ Christian 
Science Monitor, a position he held for nearly twenty years. 
He was President of the Anglo-American Correspondents' 
Association for the year 1923. Huddleston was very 
disappointed with the peace settlements after World War I. 
After 1936 he no longer wrote on a regular basis from 
France. After the fall of France he move to Monaco, where 
he owned an apartment. Throughout the war he returned 
regularly to France. Huddleston was a passionate defender 
of Marshal P~tain. In 1943, he had a lengthy interview with 
the Marshal; the same year he became a French citizen. 
After the liberation of the Riviera, Huddleston was arrested 
as a Collaborator by members of the Resistance. However, in 
April, 1951, the highest French Court ordered the French 
government to pay him an indemnity "for the grave and unfair 
mistake committed against him." 
source: ~ ~lt .I.Q.r.k limli, July 18, 1952, p. 19; ibid., 
Nov. 4, 1952, p. 28. 
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MOWRER, EDGAR ANSEL (1892-1977) 
Mowrer was born in Bloomington, Illinois, on March 8, 1892, 
the son of a businessman. He studied at the University of 
Chicago and in Paris, and graduated with a B. A. degree from 
the University of Michigan in 1913. He returned to Paris 
and joined the staff of~ Chicago Daily l:leYL~ as a reporter 
covering the war in Flanders. In 1915, he was transferred 
to the bureau of the Oaily .N.eYL~ in Rome. In 1923, he was 
sent to Berlin and remained there for a decade. His book, 
.G.e.I.m~ ~ .t.b.e Clock~ (1932), in which he predicted 
the downfall of the Weimar Republic, was banned in Germany. 
Mowrer was President of the Foreign Press Association in 
Germany, and, in spite of German pressure, only agreed to 
resign from this position when a Jewish correspondent, who 
had been arrested, was released. In 1934, Mowrer replaced 
his brother, Paul, as head of the Paris office of ~ 
Chicago D~ NeYl~· Later, he visited Spain, the Soviet 
Union, and China. After the fall of France, he was assigned 
to the Washington bureau of~ ~,asQ D~ l:leYL~ and, 
together with William J. Donovan, authored a series of 
articles on fifth-column activities in Europe. From 1941 to 
1943, he worked in the Office of War Information. After the 
war, Mowrer wrote books on American foreign policy, edited 
Western World, and wrote a column for the McClure newspaper 
syndicate. He died on March 2, 1977, in Madeira, Portugal. 
source: current Biography Yearbook ll.6.2. (New York, 1962), 
pp. 310-312; Obituary, l'..h.e l:leYL .Y..Q.r.k. ~m~, March 4, 1977, 
part IV, p. 12. 
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PHILIP, PERCY J. (1886-1956) 
Percy Philip was born on July 12, 1886, in Scotland, the son 
of a Presbyterian minister. Because of his weak heart he 
could not finish his medical studies and began writing 
nature sketches for the London press. During World War I he 
became a reporter for~ London Daily~- After the war 
he stayed in France as a Paris correspondent for several 
English newspapers. In 1920, he became an assistant to the 
chief of the Paris bureau of ~he lie~ X.o.i:k .!.im~, Edwin L. 
James. In 1932, he succeeded James as head of the bureau, a 
position he held until the fall of France in 1940. He 
remained for a few months in Vichy France, moving to Ottawa, 
Canada, in the late fall of 1940 as the Canadian 
correspondent of .l'..he Ne~ Yo....t.k 1im~. During his stay in 
Canada he also did radio broadcasts for the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation network. 
source: Obituary,~~ .I.Qi:.k Times, Nov. 10, 1956, p. 19. 
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PORTER, ROY (1907-1947) 
Roy Porter was born in Chicago and educated at the 
University of Iowa, where he studied journalism. He got his 
first job in 1927 with~~ Angeles li.e..I..al.a. From May, 
1937 to September, 1941, he covered Paris as a reporter for 
the Associated Press. Porter then worked as a commentator 
for NBC in Europe and in the China-Burmese war theater. 
After the war he returned to Paris but then came back to the 
United States and worked in New York City for an advertising 
agency. In 1942, Porter published a book on his experiences 
in Occupied France under the title Uncensored France. 
Source: Obituary,~~~ Times, December 27, 1947, p. 
14. 
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SEVAREID, ARNOLD ERIC (1912-
Eric Sevareid is a native of North Dakota, where he was born 
on November 26, 1912. In 1935, he received an A. B. degree 
from the University of Minnesota and continued his studies 
in Paris in 1937. He started his career in journalism as a 
copy boy, became a reporter for the Minneapolis .s..t..a.t., and 
was appointed editor of the Paris edition of~ .N.e~ YQi:k 
Herald Tribune in 1938. Advancing quickly, he became a 
night editor for the United Press in Paris in 1939 and the 
European correspondent for CBS in August, 193 9. After the 
French defeat, Sevareid left France to broadcast news from 
all over the world. He wrote a book of reminiscences, N.Q.t 
SQ li.i.ld A Dream, which was published in 1946 and republished 
in 1976. 
source: who's N.ru2 in America 1980-1981 (Chicago, 1980), p. 
2381. 
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SHIRER, WILLIAM L. (1904-
William Shirer was born in Chicago on February 23, 1904. In 
1925, he received an A. B. degree from Coe College. From 
' 1925 to 1926, he was the Paris editor of~ Chicago Tribune 
and its foreign correspondent from 1926 to 1933. He worked 
for the Universal News Service from 1935 to 1937, when he 
accepted the position of Continental representative for CBS. 
During World War II, he was a war correspondent, and after 
the war he was a commentator for CBS and the Mutual Network. 
As war correspondent, Shirer entered France with the German 
Army in 1940. He described his experience in Berlin D~ 
(1941), the first in a series of famous books, among them 
~ .Ris.e. .and ..Eal.l .Q:f. .the Third Reich (1961) and the Collapse 
.Q:f. .the Third Republic (1969>. 
source: Who's .Nh2 ..in America, 1980-1981 (Chicago, 1980>, p. 
3018. 
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SMALL, ALEX (1895-1965) 
Alex Small was a native of Hartford, Connecticut. In 1916, 
he graduated ~m laude from Harvard. 
United States Army during World War I. 
He served in the 
After the war he 
taught English for two years at the University of Wisconsin. 
Small then began three years of graduate studies in France 
and Germany. He joined~ Chicago Tribune in Paris in 
1925, and reported on the Spanish Civil War from 1936 until 
he was expelled from Spain and threatened with execution. 
Small was in Warsaw when Hitler invaded Poland in September, 
1939, and reported on the retreat of the Polish forces. He 
returned to Paris, stayed until the fall of 1940, and then 
worked in Berlin until he was interned by the Germans in 
December, 1941. After his release he reported from North 
Africa and India. After World War II, Small covered the 
Middle East and Europe for a number of years. He died on 
May 18, 1965, in St. Charles, Missouri. 
Source: Obituary,~~~ Times, May 19, 1965, p. 47. 
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WHITCOMB, PHILIP WRIGHT (1891-
Philip w. Whitcomb was born on Nov. 24, 1891, in Topeka, 
Kansas. Both his parents were lawyers. He received his B. 
A. degree from Washburn University in 1910, and as a Rhodes 
Scholar he earned a B. A. from Oxford University in 1914. 
In 195 2, he added an M. A. from Oxford and a Ph. D. from the 
University of Kansa in 1981. From 1914 to 1942, Whitcomb 
was a European correspondent for~ Re~ .I.Qi:k Tribune, 
Harper's weekly, and l'.he Boston Evening Transcript. He was 
a war correspondent for the Associated Press in France 
druing 1941 and 1942, and European correspondent for~ 
~~m~ .5..lln, from 1942 to 1947. Later, he spent many 
years as a special correspondent for l'.he Christian Science 
M.Q.O~. After World War II, former President Herbert 
Hoover chose Whitcomb to edit and translate France During 
.the German Occupation, 1940-1944 (3 vols.>. For many years 
Whitcomb was editor of Euromarket ~' .c.ommerce in France, 
and commerce in Germany. 
source: Contemporar~ Authors, Vol. 73-76 <Detroit, 1978), 
p. 639; Kansas~ Times, June 10, 1981, p. 81. 
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"Dictatorship or Democracy for France?" 
Diary of an Onlooker 
By Mallory Browne 
~ Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 9, 1938, p. 20. 
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PARIS 
France is facing a period of serious political change. 
Just how long the period of transition will last, and how 
grave the changes will be, no one can say. But it is 
certain that French democracy has reached a crucial point, a 
testing time great with significance not only for France but 
for the world. 
There are plenty of political prophets, both French and 
foreign, who predict positively that a dictatorship in 
France is now only a question of a few months, perhaps even 
of a few weeks. The diplomatic defeat implied in the Munich 
accords, these observers say, marked the final collapse of 
the republican regime and prepared the way for the advent, 
in one form or another, of a totalitarian regime. 
Do not think that it is only the enemies of democracy 
who say these things. 
Many Frenchmen who are ardent and. sincere democrats, 
who are genuine supporters of the doctrine of parliamentary 
government, who belong to political parties of various 
shades.: Left, Right and Center, today express serious 
apprehensions as to the outlook for the French Republican 
regime. 
There is a very general feeling, cutting right across 
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ordinary party lines, that France -- faced as she is with a 
totalitarian Germany now numbering nearly 80,000,000 people 
against her own 40,000,000, and a totalitarian Italy more or 
less closely allied to the Reich -- must be reorganized on a 
more efficient basis before she can possibly meet the 
challenge of these militaristic neighbors. 
For the term "totalitarian" has come to have a specific 
sense: it means essentially that all the resources of a 
country man power, labor, capital, currency, trade, 
industrial equipment -- are so organized and co-ordinated 
and controlled by the State as to be virtually in a 
condition of mobilization, and directed principally toward 
making the State more powerful militarily. 
* * * 
The conviction is steadily growing among Frenchmen of 
all classes that, unless France is to resign herself to a 
policy of repeated abdications before the superior force of 
Germany and Italy, some means will have to be found of 
uniting and disciplining under a vigorous, active authority 
all the resources of the French Empire -- that "Greater 
France" which has a population of over 100,000,000 people. 
I do not think I am exaggerating in saying that on so 
much, there is a remarkable measure of agreement among 
French men and French women of all classes and all walks of 
life. But there the agreement ceases. 
How this is to be accomplished, and by whom, and in 
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what form -- these are questions upon which there is almost 
complete discord. 
To take the extremes first, the Communists are 
unshakably convinced that capitalism is the sole cause of 
France's troubles, and that only a dictatorship of the 
proletariat will establish what they call "a free, strong 
and happy France." 
The Royalists -- and they cannot be entirely ignored, 
for though not numerous they are active and persistent --
have just proclaimed through the son of the pretender, the 
Comte de Paris, who risked imprisonment to fly to France and 
launch a manifesto, that only the return of the Monarchy can 
bring about the restoration of French greatness. 
* * * 
There is of course nothing new about these two 
theories, except perhaps the fact that at both ends of the 
scale they are being urged with renewed energy. What is new 
is the effort of the French war veterans to oblige the 
politicians to take a back seat for a time and turn over the 
management and government of France to a non-party "Cabinet 
of Experts," a strong, semi-military Government dominated by 
the war veterans themselves. This movement has met with 
considerable resistance, especially in political circles of 
the Left. But its essential idea -- that of a group of men 
who are specialists in their field and who would govern 
France free from party considerations -- receives widespread 
support throughout the country. 
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There are two other currents which should be recorded. 
One is what might be termed "bourgeois opinion" -- meaning 
chiefly the moneyed and propertied classes -- which 
genuinely fears and even expects a "red" revolutionary 
movement directed against capitalism and capitalists. The 
other is what might be called "democratic leftist opinion," 
which is equally fearful that these "bourgeois" through 
their control of the press and their influence on the 
Government through the banks, would lend themselves to a 
"Fascist" coup backed by Germany and Italy, and based on the 
alleged necessity of saving France from Communism. 
Two facts -- the precarious condition of France's 
finances and the imminent prospect of a burdensome super-
rearmament program -- lend peculiar significance to the 
political unrest. I do not share the alarmist apprehensions 
of some observers, who foresee a French dictatorship in the 
near future. The Frenchman remains an individualist and a 
lover of liberty and democracy. He can be counted upon not 
to abandon these blessings without a hard struggle. But it 
is nevertheless true that this struggle has now begun in 
France. What its eventual outcome will be, only time will 
tell. 
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THE TEXT OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN 
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT 
Effective June 25, 1940 
(Source: ~~~Times, June 26, 1940, p. 4) 
Article I 
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The French Government directs a cessation of fighting 
against the German Reich in France as well as in French 
possessions, colonies, protectorate territories, mandates as 
well as on the seas. It (the French Government) directs the 
immediate laying down of arms of French units already 
encircled by German troops. 
Article II 
To safeguard the interests of the German Reich, French 
State territory north and west of the line drawn on the 
attached map will be occupied by German troops. 
As far as the parts to be occupied still are not in 
control of German troops, this occupation will be carried 
out immediately after the conclusion of this treaty. 
Article m 
In the occupied parts of France the German Reich 
exercises all rights of an occupying power. The French 
Government obliges itself to support with every means the 
regulations resulting from the exercise of these rights and 
to carry them out with the aid of French administration. 
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All French authorities and officials of the occupied 
territory, therefore, are to be promptly informed by the 
French Government to comply with the regulations of the 
German military commanders and to cooperate with them in a 
correct manner. 
It is the intention of the German Government to limit 
the occupation of the west coast after ending hostilities 
with England to the extent absolutely necessary. 
The French Government is permitted to select the seat 
of its government in unoccupied territory, or, if it wishes, 
to move to Paris. In this case, the German Government 
guarantees the French Government and its central authorities 
every necessary alleviation so that they will be in a 
position to conduct the administration of unoccupied 
territory from Paris. 
Article IV 
French armed forces on land, on the sea and in the air 
are to be demobilized and disarmed in a period still to be 
set. Excepted are only those units which are necessary for 
maintenance of domestic order. Germany and Italy will fix 
their strength. The French armed forces in the territory to 
be occupied by Germany are to be hastily withdrawn into 
territory not to be occupied and be discharged. These 
troops, before marching out, shall lay down their weapons 
and equipment at the places where they are stationed at the 
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time this treaty becomes effective. They are responsible 
for orderly delivery to German troops. 
Article v 
As a guarantee for the observance of the armistice, the 
surrender, undamaged, of all those guns, tanks, tank defense 
weapons, warplanes, anit-aircraft artillery, infantry 
weapons, means of conveyance and munitions can be demanded 
from the units of the French armed forces which are standing 
in battle against Germany and which at the time this 
agreement goes into force are in territory not to be 
occupied by Germany. 
The German armistice commission will decide the extent 
of delivery. 
Article VI 
Weapons, munitions, and war apparatus of every kind 
remaining in the unoccupied portion of France are to be 
stored and, or, secured under German and, or, Italian 
control--so far as not released for the arming allowed to 
French units 
The German High Command reserves the right to direct 
all those measures which are necessary to exclude 
unauthorized use of this material. Building of new war 
apparatus in unoccupied territory is to be stopped 
immediately. 
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Article VII 
In occupied territory, all the land and coastal 
fortifications, with weapons, munitions and apparatus and 
plants of every kind are to be surrendered undamaged. Plans 
of these fortifications as well as plans of those already 
conquered by German troops are to be handed over. 
Exact plans regarding prepared blastings, land mines, 
obstructions, time fuses, barriers for fighting, etc., shall 
be given to the German High Command. These hindrances are 
to be removed by French forces upon German demand. 
Article VIII 
The French war fleet is to collect in ports to be 
designated more particularly and under German, and, or, 
Italian control to demobilize and lay up--with the exception 
of those units released to the French Government for 
protection of French interests in its colonial empire. 
The peacetime stations of ships should control the 
designation of ports. 
The German Government solemnly declares to the French 
Government that it does not intend to use the French war 
fleet which is in harbors under German control for its 
purposes in war, with the exception of units necessary for 
the purposes of guarding the coast and sweeping mines. 
It further solemnly and expressly declares that it does 
not intend to bring up any demands respecting the French War 
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Fleet at the conclusion of a peace. 
All warships outside France are to be recalled to 
France with the exception of that portion of the French War 
Fleet which shall be designated to represent French 
interests in the colonial empire. 
Article IX 
The French High Command must give the German High 
Command the exact location of all mines which France has set 
out, as well as information on other harbor and coastal 
obstructions and defense facilities. In so far as the 
German High Command may require, French forces must clear 
away the mines. 
Article X 
The French Government is obligated to forbid any 
portion of its remaining armed forces to undertake 
hostilities against Germany in any manner. 
The French Government also will prevent members of its 
armed forces from leaving the country and prevent armaments 
of any sort, including ships, planes, etc., being taken to 
England or any other place abroad. 
The French Government will forbid French citizens to 
fight against Germany in the service of States with which 
the German Reich is still at war. French citizens who 
violate this provision are to be treated by German troops as 
insurgents. 
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Article XI 
French commercial vessels of all sorts, including 
coastal and harbor vessels which are now in French hands, 
may not leave port until further notice. Resumption of 
commercial voyages will require approval of the German and 
Italian Governments. 
French commercial vessels will be recalled by the 
French Government or, if return is impossible, the French 
Government will instruct them to enter neutral harbors. 
All confiscated German commercial vessels are, on 
demand, to be returned to (to Germany) undamaged. 
Article XII 
Flight by any airplane over French territory shall be 
prohibited. Every plane making a flight without German 
approval will be regarded as an enemy by the German Air 
Force and treated accordingly. 
In unoccupied territory, air fields and ground 
facilities of the air force shall be under German and 
Italian control. 
Demand may be made that such air fields be rendered 
unusable. The French Government is required to take charge 
of all foreign airplanes in the unoccupied region to prevent 
flights. They are to be turned over to the German armed 
forces. 
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Article XIII 
The French Government obligates itself to turn over to 
German troops in the occupied region all facilities and 
properties of the French armed forces in undamaged 
condition. 
It (the French Government) also will see to it that 
harbors, industrial facilities and docks are preserved in 
their present condition and damaged in no way. 
The same stipulations apply to transportation routes 
and equipment, especially railways, roads and canals, and to 
the whole communications network and equipment, waterways 
and coastal transportation services. 
Additionally, the French Government is required on 
demand of the German High Command to perform all necessary 
restoration labor on these facilities. 
The French Government will see to it that in the 
occupied region necessary technical personnel and rolling 
stock of the railways and other transportation equipment, to 
a degree normal in peacetime, be retained in service. 
Article XIV 
There is an immediate prohibition of transmission for 
all wireless stations on French soil. Resumption of 
wireless connections from the unoccupied portion of France 
requires a special regulation. 
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Article XV 
The French Government obligates itself to convey 
transit freight traffic between the German Reich and Italy 
through unoccupied territory to the extent demanded by the 
German Government. 
Article XVI 
The French Government, in agreement with the 
responsible German officials, will carry out the return of 
population into occupied territory. 
Article XVII 
The French Government obligates itself to prevent 
transference of economic valuables and provisions from the 
territory to be occupied by German troops into unoccupied 
territory or abroad. 
These valuables and provisions in occupied territory 
are to be disposed of only in agreement with the German 
Government. In that connection, the German Government will 
consider the necessities of life of the population in 
unoccupied territory. 
Article XVIII 
The French Government will bear the costs of 
maintenance of German occupation troops on French soil. 
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Article XIX 
All German war and civil prisoners in French custody, 
including those under arrest and convicted who were seized 
and sentenced because of acts in favor of the German Reich, 
shall be surrendered immediately to German troops. 
The French Government is obliged to surrender upon 
demand all Germans named by the German Government in France 
as well as in French possessions, colonies, protectorate 
territories and mandates. 
The French Government binds itself to prevent removal 
of German war and civil prisoners from France into French 
possessions or into foreign countries. Regarding prisoners 
already taken outside of France, as well as sick and wounded 
German prisoners who cannot be transported, exact lists with 
the places of residence are to be produced. The German High 
Command assumes care of sick and wounded German war 
prisoners. 
Article XX 
French troops in German prison camps will remain 
prisoners of war until conclusion of a peace. 
Article XX! 
The French Government assumes responsibility for the 
security of all objects and valuables whose undamaged 
surrender or holding in readiness for German disposal is 
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demanded in this agreement or whose removal outside the 
country is forbidden. The French Government is bound to 
compensate for all destruction, damage or removal contrary 
to agreement. 
Article XXII 
The Armistice Commission, acting in accordance with the 
direction of the German High Command, will regulate and 
supervise the carrying out of the armistice agreement. It 
is the task of the Armistice Commission further to insure 
the necessary conformity of this agreement with the Italian-
French armistice. 
The French Government will send a delegation to the 
seat of the German Armistice Commission to represent the 
French wishes and to receive regulations from the German 
Armistice Commission for executing [the agreement]. 
Article XXIII 
This armistice agreement becomes effective as soon as 
the French Government also has reached an agreement with the 
Italian Government regarding cessation of hostilities. 
Hostilities will be stopped six hours after the moment 
at which the Italian Government has notified the German 
Government of conclusion of its agreement. The German 
Government will notify the French Government of this time by 
wireless. 
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Article XXIV 
This agreement is valid until conclusion of a peace 
treaty. The German Government may terminate this agreement 
at any time with immediate effect if the French Government 
fails to fulfill the obligations it assumes under the 
agreement. 
This armistice agreement, signed in the Forest of 
Compiegne, June 22, 1940, at 6:50 P.M., German Summer time. 
HUNTZIGER, 
KEITEL. 
Appendix 
The line mentioned in Article II of the armistice 
agreement begins in the east on the French-Swiss border at 
Geneva and runs thence nearly over the villages of Dole, 
Paray, Le Monial and Bourges to approximately twenty 
kilometers (about twelve miles) east of Tours. From there 
it goes at a distance of twenty kilometers east of the 
Tours-Angouleme-Liborune railway line and extends through 
Mont de Marsan and Orthez to the Spanish border. 
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